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Abstract
This dissertation contains three chapters that study topics on financial interme-
diation, corporate finance, and empirical asset pricing. Below are the individual
abstracts.
Chapter 1: Credit Shock Propagation in Firm Networks: Evidence from Government
Bank Credit Expansions
We study how bank credit shocks propagate through supplier–customer firm
networks. We do so using administrative data that covers the near-universe of
firm-to-firm transactions in Brazil around the debacle of Lehman Brothers. Using
the counter-cyclical reaction of government-owned banks in Brazil after Lehman’s
failure as a policy experiment, we show that credit shocks originated in bank–firm
relationships are transmitted throughout the network of suppliers and customers,
with measurable consequences for firms’ real outcomes and survival probability. A
firm with direct and indirect access to government credit (through its customers or
suppliers) observed a 12.5% greater survival probability, vis-à-vis 4% when the firm
has only direct access. Critically, we uncover drawbacks of these interventions,
including a persistent increased concentration in the market power of firms that
benefited from government liquidity.
Chapter 2: Stock Volatility and the Great Depression
Stock return volatility during the Great Depression has been labeled a “volatility
puzzle” because the standard deviation of stock returns was 2 to 3 times higher
than any other period in American history. We investigate this puzzle using a
new series of building permits and leverage. Our results suggest that volatility
in building permit growth and financial leverage largely explain the high level of
stock volatility during the Great Depression. Markets factored in the possibility of
a forthcoming economic disaster.
Chapter 3: Exporting Uncertainty: The Impact of the Brexit Vote on US Corporations
ii
Building on a real-options model of firm responses to uncertainty, we show that
the 2016 Brexit Referendum had measurable consequences for US corporations,
with effects on decisions regarding investment, divestitures, employment, R&D,
and savings. The effects we identify are short-lived and modulated by the degree
of reversibility of capital and labor. UK-exposed firms with less redeployable cap-
ital and high input-offshoring dependence cut investment the most. Employment
cuts are observed inside US borders, particularly in industries with more union-
ized workers. Job posting data point to a shift from full- to part-time positions
in firms most exposed to the UK. Our results show how foreign-born uncertainty
can be transmitted across borders, shaping domestic capital formation and labor
allocation.
iii
To Marina, My Parents, and the memory of Werner Baer (1931–2016).
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Chapter 1
Credit Shock Propagation in Firm Networks:
Evidence from Government Bank Credit
Expansions
1.1 Introduction
Credit crunches are known to shape the depth and duration of recessions (Rein-
hart and Rogoff (2009); Campello, Graham, and Harvey (2010); Jordà, Schularick,
and Taylor (2013)), and have been considered a major cause for countries’ slow re-
covery from the 2008 Global Financial Crisis (GFC). However, our understanding
of how credit shocks propagate throughout the economy is still limited.1 While
several studies explored the real effects of liquidity shocks from banks to firms
(e.g., Amiti and Weinstein (2011); Chodorow-Reich (2014); Carvalho, Ferreira, and
Matos (2015)), little is known about how these shocks spill over to other firms.
Given the complexity of firm production relationships in an economy, it is natural
to expect that these shocks may be further transmitted across firms. Yet, perhaps
due to data limitations, there are virtually no studies “tracking” these shocks all
the way to firm–firm payment networks. This paper addresses this by quantifying
the pervasive effects of credit shock propagation using regulatory data from Brazil.
We study the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in September 2008 as a large-
scale, exogenous credit shock to the Brazilian economy. We exploit two distinctive
features of Brazil’s response to the crisis. First, the intensity of credit rationing
for firms after Lehman was significantly driven by bank ownership. Panel A of
Figure 1.1 shows that private banks dramatically cut lending due to heightened
risk-aversion, while government-owned banks sustained their pre-crisis trend of
credit counter-cyclically. Second, the historical importance of government bank
ownership in emerging economies like Brazil means that shocks like these matter
1 This chapter is joint work with Bernardus van Doornik and Thiago Silva, Banco Central do
Brasil. Disclaimer: The opinions expressed in this study are those of the authors and should not be
cited to reflect the opinions of the Banco Central do Brasil.
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for the aggregate economy.2 Panel B of Figure 1.1 shows that the widening gap
between government- and private-bank lending forestalled a deep dive in Brazilian
aggregate credit after September 2008. It is therefore plausible to expect that these
firms that depended heavily on private banks before the crisis faced greater finan-
cial constraints than firms borrowing from government banks. This dichotomy in
the credit shock transmission across banks and the unexpected event of Lehman’s
failure — as reflected by the “parallel trends” in Panel A of Figure 1.1 — allows us
to adopt a Difference-in-Differences (DID) analysis to uncover the consequences.
We combine rich administrative data sets including: (1) the loan-level Credit
Register, covering the near-universe of bank lending; and (2) the Payments Sys-
tem, covering the near-universe of payment transactions from one firm to another
through their bank accounts; and (3) an employer-employee matched data set cov-
ering the universe of Brazil’s formal labor market. Credit register data links each
firm to its banks, and the payment system data links each firm to its network of
customers and suppliers. Data on the real value of payments are used to construct
reliable measures of firm-to-firm connectedness, allowing us to identify economic
dependence relations at the firm-level. Using these supplier-customer links, we
derive the impact of government credit access on the flow of payments between
suppliers and customers. Specifically, we address to what extent a customer (sup-
plier) increases its payment flow amid the GFC with suppliers (customers) that
had pre-crisis access to government bank credit vis-à-vis other customers (suppli-
ers) that depended mostly on private credit.
The use of detailed confidential data for the near-universe of Brazilian firms
allows us to tackle concerns of sample selection that naturally arise due to endoge-
nous sorting of firms and their banks. For both supplier and customer firms, we
control for fundamentals like firm default risk (i.e., credit rating), size, age, and for
a rigorous set of dynamic fixed effects interacting a firm’s industry and municipal-
ity over time.3 In robustness tests, we compare firms with access to government
2For the post-1988 period, when more detailed data are available, the market share of govern-
ment banks in total lending was never below 25%, reaching more than 50% in some periods (Cortes
and Marcondes (2018)).
3This set of controls and fixed effects has been shown to effectively capture firm-level ties with
government banks. Carvalho (2014) shows that politically-connected firms in Brazil are clustered
in “priority sectors,” defined by government-elected industries. Also, combining the credit register
with public companies’ balance sheet data, Bonomo, Brito, and Martins (2015) find that age and
size are the top-ranked predictors of Brazilian firms’ access to government bank credit.
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Figure 1.1. Private vs. Government-Owned Bank Credit in Brazil around Lehman’s
Bankruptcy. This figure shows the total bank outstanding credit (in logs) from private and
government-owned banks, normalized to zero in September 2008 (Lehman’s bankruptcy, marked
by a vertical line in both plots). In Panel A, the continuous line represents the time series of credit
supplied by government-owned banks, and the dashed line represents the same for
privately-owned banks. In September 2008, there were 121 private banks and 15
government-owned banks, of which two were federally-owned (Banco do Brasil, ranked #1 in total
assets, and Caixa Econômica Federal, ranked #5). In Panel B, the thick continuous line is the
aggregate bank credit in Brazil and the area shows the difference between government and private
bank credit, i.e., the two lines depicted in Panel A.
credit (“treated”) to similar, propensity-score-matched (“control”) firms. The large
number of firms in Brazilian regulatory data allows us to restrict our algorithm
to exactly match firms by credit rating, industry, and municipality. Moreover, we
can match firms by pre-crisis total credit (ensuring parallel trends), age, and size.
Such refined matching alleviates concerns that fundamental differences between
government-credit-dependent firms and their private-dependent peers are behind
our results.
Our empirical analysis is divided into three steps. We first uncover the di-
rect effects of government credit. We document that firms borrowing from gov-
ernment banks enjoyed greater access to liquidity after the Lehman bankruptcy,
vis-à-vis firms borrowing from private banks. While the importance of govern-
ment banks in supporting credit and real activity in Brazil following Lehman’s
failure has been highlighted before (e.g., Coleman and Feler (2015); Noth and
Ossandon-Busch (2017)), most studies rely exclusively on aggregate, municipality-
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level evidence.4 Providing loan-level evidence of this mechanism is our first con-
tribution. As in Khwaja and Mian (2008), our loan-level data allows us to com-
pletely isolate credit supply shocks from credit demand shocks by exploiting multi-
bank-relationship firms. We find that government banks extended up to 39.8%
more credit to firms than private banks in the one-year time window surrounding
Lehman’s bankruptcy.5 We then look at the real effects of this impressive wedge
in bank credit. We find that firms depending more on government bank credit
enjoyed significantly higher employment (5.1%) and wage bills (6.6%) than firms
depending mostly on private bank credit. These numbers are both statistically and
economically significant. For the average Brazilian firm in the pre-crisis period,
this means avoiding a cut of BRL 3,500 in total wages (vis-à-vis the 2007 Brazilian
minimum wage of BRL 380) and almost two out of 24 total jobs.
Having established the large direct effects of government credit, we then study
the indirect effects of bank credit shocks, focusing on firm-to-firm payments. We
consider two sorts of indirect effects. First, we consider the perspective of a sup-
plier that receives payments from customers that are government-credit-dependent
or not. The logic is that a supplier indirectly benefits from the government credit
shock to the extent that its connected customers are more capable of purchasing
due to being less financially constrained than those customers tied to private credit.
We find that payments are 2.5% higher for customers with access to government
credit 1 year after the Lehman bankruptcy, rising to 3.6% and 4% in the 2- and
3-year time windows surrounding the Lehman failure, respectively. We also test
financial constraints as an amplification mechanism of the propagation of bank
credit shocks. Following Almeida and Campello (2007), we interact our DID coef-
ficient with an index capturing a firm’s tangibility according to the proportion of
tangible-to-total assets in its industry. We find that suppliers see their payments
from customers with no access to government credit and limited tangible assets
decrease 3.3% vis-à-vis other customers with no government credit but greater ca-
pacity to collateralize tangible assets.
4A notable exception is Bonomo, Brito, and Martins (2015). However, they focus on the deter-
minants of access to earmarked credit and its effects on publicly-traded firms’ investment, leverage,
and financial expenditures.
5Our estimates are even stronger than the 28% government credit supply increase found by
Coleman and Feler (2015) for the 12-month period between September 2008 and October 2009 (see
their Table 1). This shows the importance of purging firms’ credit demand factors in our loan-level
setting.
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We then investigate the indirect effects of credit shocks from the perspective of
the customer. A customer may also benefit indirectly from having government-
credit-dependent suppliers. Unconstrained suppliers can support clients through
better payment terms and trade credit (Cuñat (2006); Giannetti, Burkart, and Ellingsen
(2011); Garcia-Appendini and Montoriol-Garriga (2013); Cingano, Manaresi, and
Sette (2016); Norden, Udell, and Wang (2019)). We find that customers purchase
3.5% more from suppliers with access to government credit 1 year after Lehman.
The effect of government credit in the upstream dimension of the production net-
work is also persistent, rising in 2-year (4.2%) and 3-year (5.4%) time windows after
the Lehman failure. Given that the average customer before the crisis in Brazil has
about five suppliers, these results suggest that the total indirect effect of credit
shocks on a customer can be as high as 17.5% in the 1-year window (5× 3.5%) and
27% in the 3-year window (5× 5.4%), assuming all five suppliers as government-
credit-dependent.
We then inspect whether the flow of payments from a customer depends on
suppliers’ characteristics. Customers may want to avoid riskier expansions during
times of distress (Acharya, Almeida, and Campello (2013)), such as innovative in-
vestment opportunities, or decline to integrate new products that require resources
when cash is tight. We test if payment flows decline significantly more between
a customer and suppliers exhibiting a high degree of product innovation vis-à-vis
the flow of payments between a customer and its low-innovation suppliers. We
interact our DID regressor with a sectoral index of product innovation that mea-
sures the proportion of firms’ new products considered novelties in the domestic
market, international market, or both. When a supplier has no access to govern-
ment credit after Lehman (i.e., financial constraints are at play) and the input it
produces is highly innovative, the flow of payments is almost 8% lower relative to
the customer’s purchases from non-innovative suppliers. This result suggests that
firms are cautious with respect to innovative expansions in bad times.
We also study the indirect effect of credit shocks in the share of total payments
that a supplier has with its customers, i.e. a proxy for a supplier’s market power.
We find a concentration effect in the market power of suppliers with access to gov-
ernment credit. Critically, treated suppliers increasingly gain a greater share of
payments with their customers up to 3 years after the Lehman bankruptcy. We
then analyze the indirect effect of credit shocks in our proxy for a customer’s mar-
5
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Figure 1.2. The Dynamics of Payment Share Concentration: Customer and Supplier
Herfindahl-Hirschmann Indices (2005–2011). Panel A shows the distribution of the average HHI
of customers with their survivor suppliers. We calculate the average customer HHI in each of the
5,564 municipalities and plot their kernel density distribution in each year. The densities for each
year are then juxtaposed to visualize the dynamics of market concentration. Panel B shows the
distributions of the average HHI of suppliers with their survivor customers, similarly constructed.
ket power, the share of total payments that a customer has with its supplier. We
again find some evidence of market power concentration, with the effects on cus-
tomer concentration being short-lived, i.e. only lasting 1 year after the Lehman
events. Our concentration results are robust to conditioning the sample to only
firms that survived the crisis, avoiding the interpretation that increasing market
concentration by treated firms is a mechanical result of firm survival. Figure 1.2
confirms these market power concentration results by plotting the distributions of
the average Herfindahl-Hircschman Index (conditional on survivors) at the city-
level. The distributions in Panel A for customer market power displays only a
modest change after 2008. In contrast, Panel B reveals a clear trend towards more
market concentration for suppliers after the Lehman events.
Finally, policy-makers are often interested in evaluating whether governmental
stimulus can spill over to other firms and create a virtuous cycle in the economy.
We conclude our analysis by examining the multiplier effect of government credit
expansions. More specifically, we test whether access to government credit for
the firm itself and its peers in the production network matter for its survival. We
find that suppliers increased their survival probability by 0.008 percentage point
if they had access to government credit before Lehman. More importantly, having
all customers with government credit increments a supplier’s survival probability
by 0.017 percentage point. The total effect sums to 0.025. Given that the average
mortality rate of suppliers in the post-crisis period was 0.20, this implies a relative
6
reduction of 12.5% in the supplier’s death probability. The death probability reduc-
tion for customers is similarly pronounced: 0.004 percentage point for direct access
to government credit and an additional 0.010 percentage point for having all sup-
pliers with access to government credit. The total effect is 0.014 percentage point,
representing a relative decline of 11.6% vis-à-vis an average customer mortality rate
of 12% in the post-crisis period.
This paper contributes to several literatures. First and foremost, we add to the
broad literature on the transmission of financial and real shocks through networks
of banks and firms. While theoretical work on the propagation of idiosyncratic
shocks both in real and financial networks is rapidly growing (e.g., Acemoglu,
Carvalho, Ozdaglar, and Tahbaz-Salehi (2012); Acemoglu, Ozdaglar, and Tahbaz-
Salehi (2015); Bigio and La’O (2016); Baqaee (forthcoming), advances on the em-
pirical front have been modest so far. The spirit of our work is related to recent
contributions by Alfaro, García-Santana, and Moral-Benito (2018) and Dewachter,
Tielens, and Van Hove (2018), who also study credit shock propagation through
supplier–customer networks in Spain and Belgium, respectively.6 Our paper makes
several novel advances relative to these two papers. First, in contrast to Alfaro,
García-Santana, and Moral-Benito (2018), our measure of dependence among firms
is constructed with granular, firm-to-firm payment data rather than merely exploit-
ing sector-sector relationships in aggregate input-output matrices. Also, differently
from Dewachter et al. (2018), we analyze a more diversified economy with less
reliance on exporting firms. The real effects of bank credit shocks are extremely
important to understand in emerging economies like Brazil. Because advanced
economies usually display a more diverse menu of financing instruments, firms in
less advanced economies are relatively more sensitive to bank credit shocks (Rajan
and Zingales (1998); Fisman and Love (2003)). This suggests that bank-dependent
economies like Brazil represent ideal testing grounds for examining bank credit
shocks and their real effects.
To the best of our knowledge, our paper is the first to fully track the origins of
a bank credit shock and its propagation through firms’ payment networks in an
emerging economy. Another distinction of our paper is that we draw from an es-
6Cingano, Manaresi, and Sette (2016) also look at the effect of interbank lending disruptions on
firms’ trade credit in Italy. In the literature focused on real-side shocks, Barrot and Sauvagnat (2016)
exploit natural disasters to examine input-specificity as an amplification mechanism of idiosyncratic
supplier shocks within production networks.
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tablished literature on the political economy of government bank ownership (e.g.,
La Porta, Lopez-de Silanes, and Shleifer (2002); Carvalho (2014)) to characterize
bank credit shocks after an exogenously-born crisis. Government-bank ownership
was shown to function as a policy tool during the GFC that governments used to
smooth the credit cycle (see, e.g., Cull and Martinez-Peria (2013); De Haas, Ko-
rniyenko, Pivovarsky, and Tsankova (2015)). Thus, our contribution is especially
relevant for policy-makers in countries where government bank ownership plays a
significant role in the economy. Government banks play large roles in major emerg-
ing economies (e.g., China, India, Russia) and several other countries (Coleman and
Feler (2015)). Our analysis of customer and supplier market power concentration
as a potential distortion introduced by the government bank credit stimulus is also
novel.
Finally, we also add to the literature on the cross-border transmission of finan-
cial crises through the banking system. From the pioneering work of Peek and
Rosengren (1997), followed by Cetorelli and Goldberg (2012), and Schnabl (2012),
scholars know that shocks originating in one country are quickly transmitted to
other countries via their banking systems. The heightened risk-aversion of private
banks and its consequences for Brazil’s domestic credit conditions underscores the
cross-border spillovers of the GFC to the largest economy of Latin America. We
contribute by documenting and quantifying the propagation of a US-born credit
crunch throughout the network of Brazilian firms.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 1.2 briefly discusses the importance of
government banks in Brazil and their key roles during the Great Recession. Sec-
tion 2.3 describes the data. Section 3.5 outlines the empirical strategy to identify
the transmission of shocks through bank–firm and firm–firm networks. Section 1.5
presents our baseline results. Section 1.6 verifies the robustness of our findings in
alternative modeling choices. Section 3.6 concludes.
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1.2 Government Banks and the Great Recession
1.2.1 Government Banks in Brazil
Government bank ownership plays much larger roles in emerging economies than
in advanced economies. In Brazil, public banks’ share of aggregate bank credit
totalled up to 50% between 1988 and 2014. Even with the Latin American privati-
zation wave in the late 1990s and early 2000s, the market share of public banks al-
ways exceeded one-third (Cortes and Marcondes (2018)). Government banks’ spa-
tial coverage is as comprehensive as their market share: about one-third of Brazil’s
nearly 20,000 bank branches in the period surrounding the Lehman failure belong
to federal government banks (Coleman and Feler (2015)). This group includes
the Banco do Brasil (largest and oldest bank in Brazil), the Caixa Econômica Federal
(fifth largest), and federally-owned regional banks created in the post-war period
to boost regional economic development.7 Virtually all of these state-level banks
were privatized by domestic and foreign banking conglomerates, or acquired by
the federal banks between 1997 and 2006 (Cortes and Marcondes (2018)). Despite
the comprehensive banking sector consolidation, government banks continued to
account for approximately 45% of total bank assets in Brazil (Barth, Caprio, and
Levine (2004)).
Brazil has a hybrid retail banking system, with state-controlled and private-sector
banks competing directly.8 State and federally-owned banks in Brazil historically
functioned as substitutes. State banks existed in wealthier states, whereas federally-
owned banks had greatest presence in underdeveloped states that lacked the re-
sources to establish their own banks. After the privatization of state government
banks in the mid-1990s, bank branches that used to be state-owned in wealthier
states were transferred to private ownership (Summerhill, Crivelli, and Beck (2005);
Cortes and Marcondes (2018)). Federally-owned banks, however, were never priva-
tized. Prior to the onset of the 2008 financial crisis, this wave of state-bank privati-
zations and the absence of any privatization of federal banks left Brazil with bank
7The size ranking is based on total assets of the bank in September 2008, the month of Lehman’s
failure.
8Government-controlled bank Banco do Brasil is the country’s largest bank, followed by Itaú-
Unibanco, the largest private bank and one of the 15 largest in the world.
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branches that were either privately-owned or federally-owned. Many municipali-
ties ended up having a bank branch of a particular type (private or government)
for reasons unrelated to their underlying economic characteristics (Coleman and
Feler (2015)).
1.2.2 The Government Bank Credit Boom after Lehman
Figure 1.1 shows that after the onset of the financial crisis in September 2008, gov-
ernment banks increased lending whereas private banks did not. We attribute this
differential behavior to increased risk aversion of private banks. As Coleman and
Feler (2015) discuss, there are two key reasons for why government and private
banks lent differently during the crisis. Because banks lend a fraction of their lia-
bilities (retail deposits), then for lending to decline, liabilities must decline and/or
the fraction of liabilities lent must decline. Coleman and Feler (2015) show that lia-
bilities did not decline differently between government and private banks. Instead,
the fraction of liabilities lent declines for private-sector banks but rises sharply for
government banks. Following Stiglitz and Greenwald (2003), banks choose a frac-
tion of their liabilities to lend to maximize their valuation. This maximization must
account for potential loan losses in different states of the world, with banks exhibit-
ing risk aversion over these realizations. We have no reason to believe that private
or government banks in Brazil have differential access to information about states
of the world, and we control for their exposure to borrowers of different credit
quality and from different economic sectors to account for differences in poten-
tial losses. This leaves risk aversion as a key reason for why private-sector banks
behave differently and lend a smaller fraction of their liabilities during the crisis.
More importantly, government banks served as a conduit for policy-making. The
counter-cyclical behavior of Government banks in Brazil following the outbreak
of the crisis has been widely documented. It is however interesting to look at
some anecdotal evidence of how the Federal government reacted to the Lehman
events via government banks. For instance, the CEO Message contained in the 2009
Annual Report of the Banco do Brasil reads: “We end 2009 sure of having accomplished
our mission. Amid the international crisis, we increased the supply of credit and kept
our business expansion strategy. Even better, we did so with excellent returns and high
standards of risk management.” The annual report of the second largest government
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bank (Caixa Econômica Federal) in the same year is even more explicit: “In face of
the international crisis and its effects on the scarcity of credit in Brazil (...) the council
has decided to act and to reestablish the flow of credit, that has been crucial to ensure the
accelerated growth pace of the Brazilian economy.”
The language contained in the official communication of the banks with their
investors matches news reported by the financial press at that time. The Finance
Minister and even the Brazilian President participated in negotiations with execu-
tives of the government banks (Safatle, Borges, and Oliveira (2016)). As the majority
shareholder of the banks, the Federal Government had effective power to imple-
ment these policies, even if it meant the replacement of top-ranked employees of
the banks. Pressure for a credit expansion policy reached its highest levels in the
first months of 2009. For example, on April, a Reuters note informed that the CEO
of Banco do Brasil was stepping down, and that “the new CEO is tasked with raising
credit.”9 This and other episodes reported by the financial press show the resolve of
the Federal government to provide bank credit stimulus, despite the risks of such
interventions.10 It is important to visualize how the market share of government
banks changed as the policy was unwound. Figure 1.3 shows the evolving distribu-
tions of government bank credit share in Brazilian municipalities. To construct each
distribution in the plot, we aggregate total bank credit at the municipality-level for
each monthly date and calculate the proportion of government-bank credit to to-
tal credit. This gives us 5,564 observations (municipalities in Brazil) for each date,
which are used to plot each kernel density shown in the plot. We can clearly see
that the Lehman events initiated a positive trend in the median market share of
government banks (vertical lines) across Brazilian municipalities. Their median
market share remains high (≈ 65%) up to the end of 2011, 3 years after Lehman.
9“Banco do Brasil CEO forced out over lending spat.” Reuters, April 8, 2009.
10The shares of Banco do Brasil plunged as much as 9% on the CEO turnover date.
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Figure 1.3. Government Bank Credit Share in Brazilian Municipalities (2006:M1–2011:M12).
This figure shows the share of government bank credit to total bank credit in Brazilian
municipalities. The horizontal line in September 2008 marks the Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy. To
construct each distribution in the plot, we aggregate total bank credit at the municipality-level for
each monthly date and calculate the proportion of government-bank credit to total credit. This
gives us 5,564 observations (municipalities in Brazil) for each date, which are used to plot each
kernel density shown in the plot. The vertical line in each density represents the median.
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1.3 Data and Sample Construction
1.3.1 Data Sources
Credit Registry. Information on bank lending for each firm comes from the Brazil-
ian Credit Registry, a large and comprehensive data set maintained by the Banco
Central do Brasil (BCB) for regulatory purposes. The credit registry data are confi-
dential and protected by bank secrecy laws in Brazil.11 It comprises all loans with
an outstanding value above the minimum threshold of BRL 5,000 (approximately
USD 2,500 in 2012) reported by all banks operating in Brazil.12 Because our analy-
sis focuses on firm lending — rather than household or micro-credit operations —
we presumably observe the quasi-population of business loans in Brazil. The SCR
has detailed information at the loan-level (i.e., all loans obtained by a firm with its
banks).
Following standard practice, we aggregate loan-level data at the firm–bank level.
The SCR contains detailed information on lending amount, interest rates, matu-
rities, and credit rating.13 We consider all commercial banks operating in Brazil
between 2005 and 2011. We exclude investment banks, credit unions, and the
Brazilian Development Bank (BNDES) as they are fundamentally different from
commercial banks.14 We also drop inter-bank loans and focus exclusively on loans
directed to non-financial firms.
11All confidential data were manipulated exclusively by the staff of the Banco Central do Brasil.
12The reporting threshold has changed over time, but it remained constant in our period of
analysis.
13All banks employ the same definition of default, given by the BCB’s Resolution 2,682 from 1999
(defined by the National Monetary Council based on Federal Law 4,595/1964). Credit ratings are
ranked by the sequence: “AA” (highest credit quality, 0 days overdue), “A” (very low probability
of default, 0 days overdue), “B” (15–30 days overdue), “C” (31–60 days overdue), “D” (61–90 days
overdue), “E” (91–120 days overdue), “F” (121–150 days overdue), “G” (151–180 days overdue), and
“H” (more than 180 days overdue, when a bank recognizes the loan as a realized loss in its balance
sheet). Each rating level is associated with a percentage provision of the total due amount of the
loan. Credit ratings must be reviewed monthly in case of late payments. We use the numerical scale
going from 10 (AA) to 2 (H) as defined by the BCB.
14The BNDES is known for having funded “national champions” (government-elected sectors
and companies) with earmarked credit rates during this period. Credit unions are also known for
behaving differently from standard commercial banks given their particular ownership structure
(i.e., a client is also a shareholder of the credit union). There is a literature more focused on
earmarked credit (see, e.g., Bonomo, Brito, and Martins (2015)) and credit unions (e.g., Aghabarari,
Guettler, Naeem, and van Doornik (2018)) in Brazil during the GFC.
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Bank Balance Sheets. Balance sheet data for all banks operating in Brazil come
from the call reports submitted by financial institutions to the BCB. The balance
sheet data set is publicly available at the website of the BCB for individual banks
and banking conglomerates. We use balance sheet data to control for standard
bank fundamentals used in the literature (e.g., Schnabl (2012)) in our loan-level
analysis, such as total assets, return on assets, credit share, liquid assets share,
deposits share, and equity share.
Employment Contracts. Employment data are from RAIS (Relação Anual de In-
formações Sociais), a comprehensive data set assembled by the Ministry of Labor
and Employment (MTE) in Brazil. RAIS comprises the universe of formal em-
ployment contracts in Brazil on annual frequency. Created in 1976, it is used by
several Brazilian government agencies to generate statistics for the Brazilian econ-
omy. The RAIS database also forms the basis for national unemployment insurance
payments and other worker benefits programs. As a result, ensuring the accuracy
of the information is in the interest of both firms (who would otherwise be subject
to monetary fines) and individuals (who want to be eligible to receive government
benefits), as well as the federal government (Bernstein, Colonnelli, Malacrino, and
McQuade (2018)). Each observation in RAIS is a “job” (i.e., an employer–employee
labor contract). The identified RAIS at the employer–employee level is confiden-
tial. We aggregate the job-level data at the firm-level to obtain firms’ information
on the number of employees, wages, industry, and municipality of the firm in each
year. We use the 2-digit CNAE industry classification, leading to 96 different indus-
tries after excluding sector codes of Financial or Insurance firms, and multilateral
organizations.
Payment Transactions. The payments system data (STR) registers transactions
above BRL 5,000 between counterparties in Brazil.15 This data set is also confi-
dential and its original purpose is to inform the BCB about how reserves move
from bank to bank, ensuring the solvency of the Brazilian banking system. The
BCB’s objectives of ensuring financial stability by supervising banks’ systemic risk
ensures that the data has high quality standards. The STR data are originally avail-
15From July 2003, the threshold for reporting was BRL 5,000 (about USD 2,500 in 2012). The
threshold changed in May 2010 (BRL 3,000) and in November 2012 (BRL 2,000). We adjust our
sample to reflect a consistent threshold of BRL 5,000 over the entire period of our analysis.
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able at a much higher frequency (intraday), but we aggregate payments at annual
frequencies to match other data sources. We exclude transactions involving only
households and transactions between households and firms. Our payment data
therefore contains exclusively payments between firms.
A caveat to the STR data is that we do not observe within-bank payments. For
our study of the propagation effects of credit shocks, this should not be a major
concern. Because our credit shock is characterized by bank ownership, consider an
extreme situation in which firms experiencing the government credit shock only
do business with other firms in the exact same government bank. In this “worst-
case” scenario, we would not see any indirect effects of greater liquidity injected
through government banks. In the realistic setting of Brazil’s hybrid banking sys-
tem discussed above, this reporting omission is likely to work against us finding
significant effects of the government credit shock. The fact that we do observe sig-
nificant indirect effects of government bank credit shocks suggests that this effect
would be even more pronounced had we the intra-bank payments between firms.
To illustrate how the payment data are representative of the Brazilian economy,
we present regional and sectoral breakdowns. Figure 1.4 displays a heatmap of
total real payments between sectors of the Brazilian economy before the crisis. Sec-
tors on the horizontal axis are payers (“debtor”) and sectors on the vertical axis are
receivers of payments (“creditors”). We aggregate the real amount of payments for
each debtor–creditor pair of sectors and plot the corresponding sum of payments as
a colored square in the heatmap. The lighter colors of the diagonal (45◦) line show
that the level of payments is greater within-sectors. The most important sectors in
terms of payments are: financial services, financial services auxiliary activities, whole-
sale trade, and food manufacturing.16 Beyond the obvious dominance of inter-bank
transactions (i.e., payments between financial firms), the fact that wholesale and
food manufacturing sectors are highly-ranked is expected given the consumption-
and agribusiness-based characteristics of the Brazilian economy.17 In Figure 1.5,
we do the same exercise, but focusing on payment transactions between the five
Brazilian regions. As expected, the most important region in Brazil as measured
16Even though we exclude financial sectors in our analysis, we include them in the heatmap for
visualization.
17Brazil is among the largest producers in the world of coffee, sugarcane, orange juice, soybean,
corn and ethanol, among others. The large agribusiness industry represents 22% of Brazil’s GDP,
a third of its employment, and about 40% of its exports (Bernstein, Colonnelli, Malacrino, and
McQuade (2018)).
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by the aggregate level of payments is the Southeast. This region contains histori-
cally wealthier states, like São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro. In contrast, the Northern
region — with historically poorer states, in the Amazon region — is the one with
the lowest payments. Taken together, both heatmaps suggest that the payment data
reflects well the regional and sectoral structures of the Brazilian economy.
Input Innovation and Tangibility Indices. To inspect mechanisms of amplifica-
tion in our baseline regressions, we construct indices for a firm’s input innovation
degree as a supplier and its tangibility index. The input innovation index is con-
structed with data from the Survey of Technological Innovation (Pesquisa de Inovação
Tecnológica, PINTEC), published by the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statis-
tics (IBGE). For the tangibility index, we use the Annual Survey of Manufactures
(Pesquisa Industrial Anual, PIA), also published by IBGE. An important distinction
to make is that the data used to construct both indices only comprise a smaller sub-
set of the sectors available in our data. They are mainly targeted at manufacturing,
service, and utilities sectors (approximately 30% of all observations). Interpreta-
tions of results using the indices should be taken with this caveat in mind.
Firm Survival Information. We also analyze the importance of direct and indirect
credit shocks to firm survival. The information on whether a firm is active or
inactive in a given year is obtained from the tax authority of the Brazilian Federal
Government (Receita Federal, the analogue to the IRS in the United States).
16
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Figure 1.4. Payment Data Heatmap: Sectoral Heterogeneity. This figure shows a heatmap of
total real payments between sectors of the Brazilian economy during the pre-crisis period
(2005–2007). Sectors on the horizontal axis are payers (“debtors”) and sectors on the vertical axis
are receivers of payments (“creditors”). We aggregate the real amount of payments for each
debtor–creditor sector pair and plot the corresponding sum of payments as a colored square in the
heatmap. Lighter colors represent greater level of real payments. For example, the lighter colors of
the diagonal (45◦) line mean that the level of payments is greater within-sectors. Pairs of
debtor–creditor sectors with white-colored squares indicate that no payments between the two
sectors happened in the pre-crisis period.
1.3.2 Descriptive Statistics
Table 1.1 presents descriptive statistics for our pre-crisis sample that spans 2005–
2007. Panels A and B reveal that about half of the sample of suppliers (51%) and
customers (57%) have some credit with government banks, allowing a relatively
































Figure 1.5. Payment Data Heatmap: Regional Heterogeneity. This figure shows a heatmap of
total real payments between Brazilian regions during the pre-crisis period (2005–2007). Regions on
the horizontal axis are payers (“debtors”) and regions on the vertical axis are receivers of payments
(“creditors”). We aggregate the real amount of payments for each debtor–creditor region pair and
plot the corresponding sum of payments as a colored square in the heatmap. Lighter colors
represent greater level of real payments. For example, the lighter colors of the diagonal (45◦) line
mean that the level of payments is greater within-regions.
tomers are larger than suppliers and maintain a higher share of payments with
respect to its suppliers than vice-versa. From Panel C, we can see that the median
supplier–customer pair in the Brazilian firm network has an average real payment
of BRL 12,262 per year.18 Finally, Panel D shows us that there are more suppli-
ers than customers over the entire time span (2005–2011). The average number of
suppliers (customers) in our sample is 611,320 (348,957), totalling almost 18 million
supplier–customer–year observations.
1.4 Empirical Strategy
Our empirical strategy is divided in two steps. The first step focuses on the di-
rect effects of credit supply shocks. This “direct effect” depends on whether the
18All nominal values are corrected for inflation using the IPCA consumer price index, published
by the IBGE.
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firm itself is exposed to the government credit shock. We first show that pre-crisis
access to government banks significantly mattered for how much credit a firm re-
ceived after Lehman. Then we show that the credit shock had real effects on firms’
employment and wage policies. The second step focuses on the indirect effects of
credit shocks. This “indirect effect” depends on whether other firms doing business
with the reference firm are exposed to the bank credit shock, i.e. whether these
other firms had direct access to government bank credit. For example, focusing on
the perspective of a supplier, the indirect shock depends on whether its customers
are exposed to the credit shock. After presenting both steps, we inspect two am-
plification mechanisms of the indirect effects of credit shocks. We conclude with a
firm survival analysis that embeds both direct and indirect effects of credit shocks
in the same regression framework.
1.4.1 Direct Effects of the Government Credit Supply Shock
Event Study Dating
We start our empirical analysis defining the key dates in our Difference-in-Differences
event study. We follow the previous literature and consider the Lehman failure in
2008 as the beginning of the Global Financial Crisis. We therefore omit the year of
2008 from our time window and compare the year before (2007) versus the year after
Lehman (2009), as illustrated in Figure 1.6. We also report longer time windows,
to get at the persistent, dynamic effects of credit shocks and to check if results
are sensitive to a particular window choice. More specifically, we focus on three
distinct periods before and after the Lehman Brothers’ failure in 2008: 1 year after
versus 1 year before (the thickest shaded areas); 2 years after versus 2 years before;
and 3 years after versus 3 years before (the thinnest shaded areas).
Loan-Level Analysis: Quantifying the Government Bank Credit Supply Shock
The total credit obtained by a firm with a bank is an equilibrium outcome that
depends on both the firm’s demand and the bank’s supply factors. Disentangling
credit supply from credit demand is only possible when using data at the firm-



















Figure 1.6. Event Study Timeline. This figure shows the timeline of our event study. We
focus on three distinct periods before and after the Lehman Brothers’ failure in 2008: 1
year after versus 1 year before (the thickest shaded areas); 2 years after versus 2 years
before; and 3 years after versus 3 years before (the thinnest shaded areas). We exclude 2008
from the analysis because it is the year of the Lehman events.
methodology and estimate the following DID model with bank and f irm × year
fixed-effects:







[Firmi ×Yeart] + εi,b,t
(1.1)
where firms are indexed by i, banks by b, and years by t. Crediti,b,t is the log of
total outstanding credit that firm i has with bank b at year t. Postt is an indicator
variable that equals one if year t ≥ 2009 and is zero otherwise. Govb is an indi-
cator variable that equals one if bank b is owned by the government, and is zero
otherwise. Controlsb,t are bank-level fundamentals as in Schnabl (2012), including:
size (natural logarithm of lagged total assets), return on assets, credit share, liquid
assets share (Basel III-defined), deposit share, and equity share. Following Petersen
(2009), we double-cluster standard errors at the bank and year levels.
The model disentangles the credit supply shock in a simple way. The f irm× year
fixed effects purge all variation in the data that is characterized at the firm-level.
This gets rid of any determinants of firm credit demand, allowing us to isolate
supply factors. The coefficient of interest in Equation (1.1), δDID, thus measures
the difference between government and private bank credit supply for the same firm
after the Lehman failure.
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Firm-Level Analysis: The Real Direct Effects of the Government Bank Credit
Supply Shock
Once one has estimated the liquidity effects of government bank during the GFC,
one could ask whether the credit crunch was severe enough to affect firms’ real-
side policies. If firms relying on private credit were able to substitute alternative
types of funding for bank lending, then the government credit shock would not
matter for the real economy. We test this by comparing the real outcomes of firms
with pre-crisis access to government credit (i.e., firms exposed to the government
credit supply shock) versus firms with no such access. This analysis is not feasible
in the loan-level setting of Equation (1.1), because the Khwaja and Mian (2008)
identification strategy compares outcomes for the same firm.
We therefore aggregate our firm-bank-year observations at the firm-level. The
aggregation of bank credit information allows us to observe how much of a firm’s
total credit comes from government banks vis-à-vis private banks. We end up with
the share of government credit before the crisis, which emerges as a natural measure
of firm exposure to the government bank credit shock. At the firm-level dimension,
we consider a firm as “treated” if its government credit share is positive, i.e. if the
firm has already initiated a relationship with a government bank before the crisis.19
One concern that arises is that treated firms may be politically-connected and
therefore could fundamentally differ from those firms that did not have govern-
ment credit prior to the crisis. One wants to rule out the possibility that differ-
ences between groups are the true cause of any differential behavior we find after
the Lehman crisis, and not the greater liquidity from government banks enjoyed
by treated firms. To address these issues, we take advantage of the literature on
the political economy of banking in Brazil. From Carvalho (2014), we know that
politically-connected firms in Brazil are clustered in a subset of industries con-
sidered “priority sectors” by the Federal Government.20 We therefore include a
complete set of industry× municipality× year dynamic fixed effects.21 Addition-
19Because the median firm has zero government bank credit share, this is equivalent to set-
ting firms with higher-than-median government credit share as treated. Even though the median
customer firm and the median supplier firm in Table 1.1 have non-zero government credit share,
because some firms are suppliers-only or customers-only, it turns out that the median firm has
zero government credit share over the full sample distribution. This is because firms that are both
customers and suppliers are larger, and therefore more likely to have government credit.
20For a complete list of these sectors, see Carvalho’s (2014) Internet Appendix.
21Because most of these industries are historically clustered in certain regions (e.g., the Automo-
bile industry is concentrated in the State of São Paulo), dynamic industry fixed effects would most
21
ally, Bonomo, Brito, and Martins (2015) show that firms with access to government
credit are usually bigger and older. This leads us to include a firm’s size (as mea-
sured by the log of the number of employees) and its age as controls. Finally, one
might worry about other characteristics in the group of treated firms that are not
captured by the variables that the previous literature identifies. This leads us to
include a firm’s credit rating in the set of controls, relying on banking theory’s ra-
tionale that the credit rating is a summary of all information about the firm that is
available to the bank (e.g., Freixas and Rochet (2008)). Because banks use all avail-
able information in monitoring a firm’s creditworthiness, the credit rating inclusion
is aimed at mitigating omitted variable concerns with respect to firm characteristics
not available in our database. In sum, we estimate the following DID model at the
firm-level:









[Indj × Cityk ×Yeart] + εi,t (1.2)
where Reali,t is one of the two real outcome variables (i.e., the log of total firm
employment and the log of the total wage bill). Govi is an indicator variable that
equals one if firm i has an existing government credit relationship in the pre-crisis
period (2005–2007), and is zero otherwise. Controlsi,t are firm-level fundamentals
discussed above, including: size, age, and credit rating.22 We include a full set of
firm fixed effects, and interactions of industry (Indj), municipality (Cityk), and time
(Yeart). We double-cluster standard errors at the firm and year levels.
likely suffice to control for the unobserved heterogeneity of priority-sector firms. However, we also
include municipalities into the set of dynamic fixed effects to mitigate concerns that unobserved re-
gional heterogeneity at the industry level is behind our results. In unreported tests, we find similar
results using industry× state× year or industry× year fixed effects. These results are available on
request.
22In the regressions where the log of employment is used as the dependent variable, we must
use another measure for firm size. To proxy a firm’s total assets, we use the log of the firm’s social
capital from its tax returns data.
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1.4.2 Network-Level Analysis: Indirect Effects of Government Bank
Credit Shocks
We now shift our attention from the direct effects to the indirect effects of credit
shocks. As emphasized earlier, this is only possible when one has data that links
firms with other firms in the economy. With our network of payments, we observe
payments from customers to their suppliers in each year. We want to evaluate
how the level of payments between suppliers and customers is affected by credit
shocks, and to use payment shares as a measure of market power concentration. The
intuition is simple: a treated customer may be able to increase its market power
(as measured by the share of payments with its suppliers) to detriment of another
credit-constrained competitor customer. The same rationale can be applied to an
unconstrained supplier that exploit its access to credit to gain a larger share of
payments with its clients to detriment of other suppliers that face credit shortages
after Lehman.
For simplicity, first consider the case where the exposure to the shock varies
across customers (i.e., the “treatment” is downstream in the production chain).
Panel A of Figure 1.7 illustrates this possibility: a supplier receives payments from
both treated and non-treated customers. A straightforward way to obtain this
Khwaja and Mian (2008)-like setting centered on the same supplier is to include
dynamic supplier× year fixed effects in the following model:







[Sups ×Yeart] + εc,s,t
(1.3)
where Payments,c,t is one of the payment variables we analyze. Our baseline anal-
ysis considers the level of payments (i.e., the log of the real amount in Brazilian
reais paid to supplier s by customer c at year t) and the share of payments (i.e.,
the percentage of payments that a customer c has with respect to all payments re-
ceived by supplier s at year t).23 Govc is an indicator variable that equals one if
customer c has a positive share of government credit in the pre-crisis period, and is
zero otherwise. Controlsc,t are customers’ firm-level fundamentals discussed above
(size, age, and credit rating). We include a full set of customer fixed effects, and the
23In the Online Appendix, we also report results for the number of payments and for the average
value of payments.
23
(A) Supplier-Centered Setting (B) Customer-Centered Setting

















Figure 1.7. Network-Level Analysis Intuition: Downstream and Upstream Treatment
Heterogeneity. Panel A shows the regression setting represented in Equation (1.3), where
supplier× year dynamic fixed effects allow the interpretation of payments to the same supplier
from treated and non-treated customers. Panel B shows the regression setting represented in
Equation (1.4), where customer× year dynamic fixed effects allow the interpretation of payments
from the same customer to treated and non-treated suppliers.
aforementioned supplier × year dynamic fixed effects. In robustness analyses, we
add interactions of customer industry (Indj), customer municipality (Cityk), and
time (Yeart) fixed effects. Finally, we double-cluster standard errors at the supplier
and year levels.
The supplier× year fixed effects in Equation (1.3) allow us to interpret the model
as follows: for a given supplier that receives payments from both treated and non-
treated customers, how are its payments affected by their customers’ exposure to
the government credit shock? The coefficient of interest in Equation (1.3), δDID,
measures the difference between payments from government-credit-treated and
non-treated customers for the same supplier after the Lehman failure.
Panel B of Figure 1.7 illustrates the analogous case, where a customer sends
payments to both treated and non-treated suppliers. The customer-centered model
is exactly that of Equation (1.3), save that we include customer × year (instead of
supplier × year) fixed effects. Interchanging the subscripts of suppliers (s) and
customers (c), yields:







[Custc ×Yeart] + εc,s,t
(1.4)
where all variables are as defined above, and standard errors are double-clustered
by customer and year. As before, the customer× year fixed effects in Equation (1.4)
let us interpret the model as follows: for a given customer paying to both treated
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and non-treated customers, how are its payments affected by their suppliers’ expo-
sure to the government credit shock? The coefficient of interest in Equation (1.4),
δDID, measures the difference between payments to government-credit-treated and
non-treated suppliers by the same customer after Lehman.
1.4.3 Inspecting Amplification Mechanisms
After presenting both direct and indirect effects of credit shocks, we inspect whether
characteristics of suppliers or customers can amplify these effects. We draw from
the literature to consider characteristics that may exacerbate the transmission of
credit shocks through the production network.
Input Innovation Index. From a customer’s perspective, it is riskier to pursue in-
vestment opportunities that integrate novel inputs in the production process when
liquidity is scarce. We test this by constructing an index for a supplier’s degree of
input innovation based on the 2007 Survey of Technological Innovation (PINTEC)
in Brazil. More specifically, the survey asks a representative sample of manufac-
turing, service, and utility firms in Brazil how many of their newly-introduced
products were considered novel in a certain year. The survey details the degree
of innovation by breaking it down into the following categories: (i) the product is
not novel for the firm, the domestic, or the international market; (ii) the product
is novel for the firm, but exists in the domestic and international markets; (iii) the
product is novel for the firm and for the domestic market, but exists in the interna-
tional market; (iv) the product is novel for the firm, for the domestic market, and
for the international market. The data are aggregated for each industry, to deliver
an industry-level input innovation index as:
Input Innovj =
(




where Domestic Noveltyj is the sum of all products in category (iii) above for in-
dustry j. International Noveltyj is the sum of all products in category (iv), and
the denominator All Products represents the sum of all products (innovative or
not) introduced by firms in industry j in 2007.24 More innovative industries will
24We choose 2007 for consistency with our pre-crisis period illustrated in Figure 1.6. Using the
survey from earlier years does not change our results.
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(A) Input Innovation Index (B) Tangibility Index
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Figure 1.8. Amplification Mechanisms: Input Innovation Index and Tangibility Index by
Sector. Panel A shows the input innovation index constructed in Equation (1.5). The vertical line in
Panel A corresponds to the median value (0.1773) of the index across sectors. Panel B shows the
tangibility index constructed in Equation (1.7). The vertical line in Panel B corresponds to the
median value (0.0398) of the index across sectors.
have a higher share of their products in categories (iii) or (iv), so that customers
buying from them plausibly assume greater risks in implementing domestically-
or internationally-novel inputs when liquidity is scarce. Panel A of Figure 1.8
shows that the sector of Research & Scientific Development is the top-ranked in in-
novation, since almost 80% of the products introduced by this sector in 2007 were
domestic or international novelties. Other highly-innovative industries are Vehicle,
Non-Autovehicle, and Pharmaceuticals manufacturing. The median sector has an in-
novation index of 17.73%, represented by the vertical line in the plot. Sectors like
Wood Product Manufacturing and Leather, Footwear and Accessories Manufacturing are
low-ranked in terms of their innovation.
With the input innovation index at hand, we define an indicator variable for
highly-innovative input suppliers, Input Innovs. We consider a supplier to pro-
duce a highly-innovative input if its industry has greater-than-median (17.73%)
Input Innovj index. We then estimate the following triple-difference model (or
Difference-in-Difference-in-Differences, DIDID) based on our customer-centered model
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in Equation (1.4):
Paymentc,s,t = δDID · [Privs × Postt] + δDIDID · [Privs × Input Innovs × Postt]






[Custc ×Yeart] + εc,s,t
(1.6)
where all variables were defined above, except for Privs, which is the analogue
of our original treatment dummy (Govs in Equation (1.4)). It equals one if sup-
plier s is private-credit-dependent (i.e., if its government bank credit share before the
crisis is equal to zero), and is zero otherwise. We invert the treatment dummy
from Gov to Priv in this regression to make the interpretation of our coefficient
of interest (δDIDID) more intuitive. The triple interaction coefficient is therefore
expected to be negative because the level of payments should decrease more for
private-credit-dependent suppliers that produce highly-innovative inputs, vis-à-vis
private-credit-dependent suppliers of standard inputs, who suffer less from cus-
tomers’ precaution after the Lehman failure. Standard errors are double-clustered
at the customer and year levels.
Tangibility Index. We construct a tangibility index to analyze whether a cus-
tomer’s financial constraints can exacerbate the effects of credit shocks. As Almeida
and Campello (2007) show, firms with greater share of tangible assets (e.g., plants,
trucks) are less likely to be financially-constrained because banks can pledge these
assets as collateral in loan contracts. The tangibility index is constructed with data
from the 2007 Annual Survey of Manufactures (PIA). The survey reports the total
value of: (i) Real Estate & Land, (ii) Machinery & Equipment, and (iii) Vehicles from
a representative sample of manufacturing firms, aggregated at the industry-level.
Our tangibility index is given by the sum of items (i) to (iii) divided by the total
assets of industry j:
Tangibj =
(





Panel B of Figure 1.8 shows that the top-ranked sector in terms of tangibility is
Metallic Mineral Extraction, for which almost 10% of all assets is tangible. The least
tangible sectors are Informatics & Office Equipment Manufacturing and Telecommunica-
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tions Equipment Manufacturing, which are arguably more dependent on intangible,
human capital.
The median tangibility sector has about 4% of its assets in the mentioned cate-
gories. We therefore proceed as before and define an indicator variable for low-
tangibility customers based on their industry’s tangibility index. More specifically,
Low Tangibc is equal to one if Tangibj of customer c is below the median (3.98%),
and it is zero otherwise. We estimate the following DIDID model based on our
supplier-centered model in Equation (1.3):
Paymentc,s,t = δDID · [Privc × Postt] + δDIDID · [Privc × Low Tangibc × Postt]






[Sups ×Yeart] + εc,s,t
(1.8)
where all variables are defined as before. To ease interpretation of the coefficient
of interest (δDIDID), we once again invert the treatment dummy from Gov to Priv.
The triple interaction coefficient here is expected to be negative because the level of
payments should decrease more for private-credit-dependent customers that can-
not rely on tangible assets to alleviate credit constraints, vis-à-vis private-credit-
dependent customers that can pledge more collateral with banks after the Lehman
failure. Standard errors are double-clustered by supplier and year.
1.4.4 Firm Survival and the Government Credit Multiplier
We complete our empirical analysis with a firm survival examination that embeds
direct and indirect effects in the same regression framework. To do this, we aggre-
gate our supplier-customer-year data at the supplier-year and customer-year level.
Consider the case where we aggregate the data at the supplier-level. For each sup-
plier, we observe if it is treated (Govs = 1) or not. As emphasized before, this is
our firm-level indicator of direct exposure of supplier s. Because we also observe
the treatment indicators of all customers doing business with supplier s, we can
construct the following index of indirect exposure that each supplier faces through
its customers c ∈ {c1, c2, . . . , cN}:








where the index can be interpreted as the share of customers that are treated with
government credit before the crisis, weighted by Payments,c,t, i.e., the value of pay-
ments that each c transfers to its supplier s in year t.
The indirect exposure index allows us to estimate firm-level regressions with
both direct and indirect effects embedded in the same model. Focusing on the post-
crisis period (2009–2011), we use an indicator variable of the supplier’s “death”
(i.e., when the firm becomes inactive) to estimate the following probit model:
Deaths,t = δDirect · Govs
+ δIndirect · Indirect Gov Exps






[Indj × Cityk ×Yeart] + εc,s,t
(1.10)
where the coefficients of interest are δDirect, that measures the direct impact of a
supplier’s access to government credit, and δIndirect, which captures the effect of
indirect exposure to government credit through its creditors. Controlss,t is a set
of controls containing the supplier’s size, age, and credit rating. To account for
the different relationships that suppliers have with their customers, we also control
for the number of relationships of each supplier. We also control for customer
characteristics averaged over each supplier, including average customer size, age,
and credit rating, as well as the customers’ average number of relationships and
average death rate. Finally, we include industry × city fixed effects in the 1-year
post-crisis specification (i.e., 2009), and industry× city× year fixed effects in the 2-
year (2009-2010) and 3-year (2009-2011) specifications. Standard errors are clustered
at the supplier level for the 1-year post-crisis regression, and double-clustered at
the supplier and year levels for the 2- and 3-year regressions.
The indirect exposure index can also be calculated for customers, by summing
over suppliers rather than customers in Equation (1.9) and aggregating the data at




1.5.1 Direct Effects of Credit Shocks
Government Banks as Counter-Cyclical Lenders
Table 1.2 presents the results from estimating Equation (1.1). Column (1) shows
the result of the credit supply shock as in Khwaja and Mian (2008) for the 1-year
time window, i.e., comparing the post-crisis (2009) with the pre-crisis (2007) period.
The DID coefficient for the interaction of government bank lending after the crisis
is positive and statistically-significant at the 1% level. Columns (2) and (3) report
the results for the 2- and 3-year-expanded windows, respectively. Both columns
show that the DID coefficient is positive and highly significant, lending support
to the view that government banks supplied credit in a counter-cyclical fashion in
response to the crisis and that this effect was persistent. Most importantly, this
differential is economically significant. The government banks’ credit wedge vis-
à-vis private banks ranges from roughly 33%
(
e0.288 − 1 = 33.37%
)
for the 2-year
window to a massive 49%
(
e0.398 − 1 = 48.88%
)
in the 1-year window estimate.
Our loan-level estimation purging firm demand factors uncovers an increment of
10 percentage points (1-year window) in the government vs. private credit sup-
ply shock vis-à-vis previous studies (e.g., Coleman and Feler (2015)). Such differ-
ence is significant and expected because controlling for credit demand factors are
likely to matter more during recessions, i.e. when several firms experience greater
need for funding. In unreported tests, we look at other loan contracting terms,
including maturity and interest rate spread. We repeat our specifications using the
contractual maturity and interest rate as dependent variables, finding statistically-
insignificant DID estimates for these outcomes. These results suggest that the credit
expansion took place mostly via lending higher amounts.25
Next, we ask whether the wedge in government bank credit vis-à-vis private
banks had real effects. Table 1.3 reports the direct effects of the government-bank
credit shock on labor outcomes. Columns (1) to (3) show that firms with access
to government bank credit before the crisis had 5%
(
e0.051 − 1 = 5.23%
)
greater
25These results are available on request.
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employment than private-credit-dependent firms in the 1-year window, with sig-
nificant persistent effects holding in the 2- and 3-year windows. Columns (4) to
(6) show that these firms were also able to sustain almost 7%
(
e0.066 − 1 = 6.82%
)
greater wage bills, an effect that persisted and increased to 6.9%
(




e0.075 − 1 = 7.78%
)
in the 2- and 3-year time windows. These magni-
tudes are economically significant: for the average pre-crisis firm in Brazil, direct
access to government credit means avoiding a cut of almost BRL 3,700 in total
wages (vis-à-vis the 2007 Brazilian minimum wage of BRL 380) and two jobs out of
24.
1.5.2 Indirect Effects of Credit Shocks
The Indirect Effects of a Supplier interacting with Treated Customers
We next analyze the indirect effects of credit shocks, first from the perspective of a
supplier that receives payments from both treated and non-treated customers (Fig-
ure 1.7, Panel A). Table 1.4 presents results from estimating the supplier-centered
regression in Equation (1.3). The DID coefficient is positive and significant at the
1% level for columns (1) to (3), showing that a supplier receives significantly more
payments from customers with access to government bank credit before the crisis.
In the 1-year window, the difference in payments is 2.5%
(









e0.040 − 1 = 4.08%
)
in the 2- and 3-year
time windows, respectively. Table A.1 in the Appendix reports the same specifi-
cation using the number of payments rather than the total value of payments as
the dependent variable, with similar results. Interestingly, the supplier-centered
regression in Appendix Table A.3 shows that the level of average payments did not
differ between both groups of customers.
Because the average supplier in pre-crisis Brazil has about four customers, these
results suggest that the total indirect effect of credit shocks on a supplier can be
as high as 10% in the 1-year window (4× 2.5%) and 16.32% in the 3-year window
(4× 4.08%), assuming all four customers are private-credit-dependent.
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The Indirect Effects of a Customer interacting with Treated Suppliers
Now we consider the perspective of a customer that sends payments to both treated
and non-treated suppliers (Figure 1.7, Panel B). Table 1.5 presents the results from
the customer-centered regression in Equation (1.4). The DID coefficient is again
positive and significant at the 1% level for columns (1) to (3), meaning that a cus-
tomer purchases significantly more from suppliers that have access to government
bank credit before the crisis. Column (1) reveals that customers purchase 3.5%(
e0.035 − 1 = 3.56%
)
more from suppliers with access to government credit 1 year
after Lehman. The effect of government credit in the upstream dimension of the
production network is also persistent, rising in the 2-year
(





e0.054 − 1 = 5.54%
)
time windows around the Lehman failure. Table A.2 in
the Appendix reports the same specification using as dependent variable the num-
ber of payments, yielding the same conclusions. Table A.4 in the Appendix also
shows that the level of average purchases was greater for treated suppliers.
Given that the average customer before the crisis in Brazil has about five suppli-
ers, these results suggest that the total indirect effect of credit shocks on a customer
can be as high as 17.5% in the 1-year window (5× 3.5%) and 27% in the 3-year win-
dow (5× 5.4%), assuming all five suppliers are private-credit-dependent.
Amplification Mechanisms
Taken together, the results from the customer- and the supplier-centered regres-
sions above suggest that credit shocks propagate throughout the production net-
work. They also suggest that the propagation effects are persistent over the 3-year
period analyzed. We now ask whether characteristics of suppliers or customers
modulate these propagation effects. Starting with the customers’ channel of finan-
cial constraints, we present the results of estimating the DIDID model shown in
Equation (1.8). Columns (1) to (3) in Panel A of Table 1.6 show that the triple inter-
action of Privc× Postt× Low Tangibc is negative as expected and statistically signif-
icant.26 The DIDID coefficient suggests that private-credit-dependent firms (those
with no access to government credit before the crisis) with relatively less tangible
assets decreased their purchases by vis-à-vis other private-credit-dependent firms
26Recall that we use the flip side (Privc) of our treatment variable used so far (Govc) to make the
coefficient interpretation easier, as explained in Section 1.4.3.
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with a higher tangibility index. These results suggest that customers’ financial
constraints can magnify the indirect effect on payments to suppliers.
Turning to the supplier’s channel of input innovation, Panel B of Table 1.6 reports
the results of Equation (1.6). Columns (1) to (3) show that the DIDID coefficient
is negative as expected and statistically significant. The flow of real payments is
between 7% and 16% lower when the supplier has no access to government credit
after Lehman and the input it produces is highly innovative. The precautionary
behavior of customers in implementing innovative inputs under liquidity scarcity
is therefore at play after the Lehman events.
Effects on Market Concentration
We now change the dependent variable in our supplier-centered model from Equa-
tion (1.4) to the share of total payments that customers have with its supplier to
analyze effects on market concentration. Finding a positive effect on the share of
payments that customers have with a supplier would indicate that pre-crisis access
to government credit increases the market power of treated customers. Table 1.7
reports the results. Column (1) shows that the DID coefficient is positive and sig-
nificant at the 1% level in the 1-year window, but Columns (2) and (3) show that
this effect disappears over longer windows.
Doing the same analysis for the customer-centered case, we can evaluate whether
the government credit shock affected suppliers’ payment concentration. We calcu-
late the share of payments that each supplier has with its customers and use it as
the dependent variable in Equation (1.4). The results are in Table 1.8. Columns (1)
to (3) show that, in contrast to customer market power, the DID coefficient is pos-
itive and significant at the 1% for all periods. In fact, it increases over longer time
windows, suggesting that the government credit shock potentially helped treated
firms to gain market share.
The Government Lending Multiplier: Firm Survival Analysis
Having shown that bank credit shocks permeate the payment outcomes on both
the upstream (suppliers) and downstream (customers) dimensions of the produc-
tion network, we now show how much direct and indirect effects matter for firm
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survival. Table 1.9 reports the results of estimating the probit models described in
Equation (1.10) for suppliers and customers. Panel A focuses on suppliers. Col-
umn (1) shows that having direct access to government credit reduces its death
probability by 0.8 percentage points. The indirect effect coefficient reduces the
supplier’s probability of death by 1.7 percentage points when Indirect Gov Exps =
1, i.e., when a supplier has all of its payments coming from government-exposed
customers. These results suggest that, for a supplier, having a large amount of
payments coming from customers with access to government credit is about twice
as important as having government credit itself for its survival. Given the 20% av-
erage supplier mortality in the post-crisis (2009-2011), the total reduction of 0.025
(0.008 + 0.017) percentage points represents a relative decline of 12.5%.
Turning to customers, Panel B of Table 1.9 shows that indirect effects are also
twice as important as direct effects. Columns (1) to (3) show that the direct effect of
access to government credit ranges between a reduction of 0.004 and 0.005 percent-
age points in the customer’s death probability. The indirect exposure, affecting the
customer through its suppliers’ access to government credit, decreases the death
probability by 0.010 percentage points in all periods. Given an average customer
mortality rate of 12% after the crisis, this entails a relative decrease ranging between
11.6% and 12.5%, depending on the chosen period.
1.6 Robustness and Sensitivity Analysis
1.6.1 Industry and City Dynamic Fixed Effects
Our network-level regressions included dynamic supplier × year fixed effects (Ta-
ble 1.4) and customer × year fixed effects (Table 1.5). While we control for firm
characteristics that matter for explaining government-dependency in Brazil as sug-
gested by the literature, we did not include industry× city× year fixed effects. This
allows us to focus on the broadest definition of the Brazilian production network,
which is more complex than the network within the same industry and municipal-
ity.27 The drawback of this modeling choice is that we might be simply capturing
27By definition, including dynamic effects of industry and municipalities changes the interpre-
tation of our regressions to a within-industry-city estimation, meaning that transactions across in-
dustries and cities are no longer accounted for.
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effects that only occur in some industry-city pairs, not being representative of the
entire network of production. We therefore report results for the within-industry-
city estimations.
Appendix Table A.5 re-estimates Table 1.4 and confirms our previous findings
that suppliers receive more within-industry-city payments from treated customers.
Similarly, Appendix Table A.6 also confirms the results from Table 1.5. Both set of
results suggest that the indirect propagation of credit shocks is also present within-
industry and city pairs.
1.6.2 Market Concentration: Survivors Only
One could argue that our concentration results are mechanical. The reason is
straightforward: firms with no access to government bank credit are in signifi-
cantly more distress after Lehman, and therefore are less likely to survive. This
would mechanically raise the share of government-credit-dependent firms after
Lehman because their private-dependent peers would no longer exist. Thus, we
now analyze the robustness of these results by re-estimating both regressions con-
ditional on the sample of firms that survived the crisis. Table A.7 in the Appendix
shows the estimation output of the same model from Table 1.7, but conditioning
on survivor suppliers. The results on customer market power are similar.
Additionally, the supplier market power results from Table 1.8 is not changed
when we condition the sample to include only survivor customers in Table A.8.
Overall, the concentration results are robust to the survivor sample check and con-
firm the Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index visual evidence in Figure 1.2. Whereas the
distributions in Panel A for customer market power remain relatively unchanged
after 2008, those in Panel B reveal a clear trend towards more market concentration
for suppliers after the Lehman events.
1.6.3 Parallel Trends
One of the concerns in DID estimation are pre-existing trends on the outcome
variables. We therefore provide evidence supporting the parallel trends assumption
for our outcome variables in Table A.9, in the Appendix. We choose all possible
combinations of years in the pre-crisis period: (i) 2006 versus 2007, (ii) 2005 versus
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2006, and (iii) 2005 versus 2007. We then re-run all of our baseline regressions
using the same DID specifications described in Section 3.5. As can be seen from
columns (1) to (7), none of our outcome variables show statistically-significant DID
coefficients. This confirms that there are no distinctive patterns between treated
and non-treated groups before the Lehman events.
1.6.4 Matching Estimator
As a final robustness check, we perform a propensity-score matching estimation
of our baseline regressions of the indirect effects of credit shocks. We match firms
using the following algorithm. For each supplier, sort its customers between treated
and non-treated. Match each treated customer with a control customer satisfying
an exact match in terms of credit rating, city, and industry. Among these exactly-
matched potential controls, optimally choose (Abadie and Imbens (2011)) the best
possible control firm by minimizing the distance between the treated firm and its
control in terms of firm age, firm size, and lagged values of total credit. In addition
to the parallel trends shown above, these steps allow us to obtain matched controls
that satisfy the parallel trends assumption by construction.
The results are reported in Appendix Table A.10. Panel A shows the result of
the supplier-centered regression (refer to Table 1.4) and Panel B (refer to Table 1.5)
shows the customer-centered regression. Both sets of results confirm our previous
findings.
1.7 Concluding Remarks
We provide firm-level evidence of the transmission and propagation of bank credit
shocks throughout the production network of Brazilian firms. We do so using the
counter-cyclical policy adopted by Brazil’s government banks after the Lehman
Brothers’ bankruptcy in September 2008. We show that firms doing business with
other affected firms in the economy end up being affected by bank credit shocks
indirectly through customer and supplier linkages. The most relevant implication
of our study is quantifying how important these indirect effects of credit shocks
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are. They were about twice as important as direct bank credit shocks for firms’
survival probability during the Global Financial Crisis in Brazil.
Because the reaction of several emerging market economies included liquidity
expansions through government-owned banks, this paper also serves as a warn-
ing for the trade-offs involved in such interventions. Relaxing credit constraints
in times of distress through government-owned banks can help firms to keep pro-
duction schedules, payments to suppliers, employment, and wage bills, as shown
by the “government credit multiplier” in our empirical analysis. But there are
also drawbacks of these interventions, such as a persistent concentration of market
power and potential misallocation. It is important to keep in mind the costs and
benefits of large-scale interventions in the banking sector when approaching future
episodes of financial crises.
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1.8 Tables
Table 1.1. Summary Statistics
This table shows the summary statistics for the main variables used in the paper using the
pre-crisis sample (2005–2007), except for Panel D where we use the full sample
(2005–2011).
Panel A. Supplier Characteristics
Variables Mean Median Std. Dev.
Number of Employees 2,358 39 17,780
Total Annual Wage Bill (BRL) 5,891,872 42,705 47,964,447
Log(Employment) [Size] 3.37 1.59 4.25
Log(Total Wage Bill) 6.77 4.63 7.68
Share of Gov. Credit 0.241 0.001 0.348
High Gov Indicator 0.511 1.000 0.500
Share of Payments with Customers 0.138 0.004 0.285
Panel B. Customer Characteristics
Variables Mean Median Std. Dev.
Number of Employees 9,472 196 41,477
Total Annual Wage Bill (BRL) 20,782,545 324,663 85,650,607
Log(Employment) [Size] 3.98 2.29 4.62
Log(Total Wage Bill) 7.32 5.51 7.93
Share of Gov. Credit 0.262 0.025 0.355
High Gov Indicator 0.576 1.000 0.494
Share of Payments with Suppliers 0.241 0.050 0.346
Panel C. Supplier–Customer Pair Characteristics
Variables Mean Median Std. Dev.
Total Payments (BRL) 651,722 26,272 49,150,542
Number Payments 6.66 2.00 42.88
Average Payment (BRL) 51,127 12,262 1,262,169
Panel D. Unique Firms and Observations Per Year
Year Suppliers Customers Supplier–Customer–Year Obs
2005 386,459 198,682 1,596,420
2006 431,810 225,402 1,781,742
2007 493,180 264,150 2,042,654
2008 583,174 332,560 2,463,389
2009 631,821 371,553 2,589,143
2010 798,589 469,359 3,306,069
2011 954,210 580,991 3,973,403
Total 1,985,439 1,351,320 17,752,820
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Table 1.2. Government Banks and Counter-Cyclical Lending after the Lehman Bankruptcy
This table reports output from estimating Equation (1.1). The dependent variable is the log of
outstanding credit of firm i with bank b. The coefficient of interest is the Difference-in-Differences
estimator given by the interaction Govb × Postt. Govb is an indicator variable that equals one if
bank b is government-owned, and is zero otherwise. Postt is an indicator variable with value of
one if year t ≥ 2009 and zero if t ≤ 2007. The year of 2008 is not included in the event study
window for being the year of Lehman Brothers’ failure. Bank-level controls follow Schnabl (2012)
and include: size (natural logarithm of lagged total assets), return on assets, credit share, liquid
assets share (Basel III-defined), deposit share, and equity share. As detailed in Figure 1.6, in
column (1), we use a time window of 1 year after versus 1 year before the Lehman bankruptcy. In
column (2), we expand the time window to include 2 years before and 2 years after. In column (3),




2009 vs. 2007 2010:2009 vs. 2007:2006 2011:2009 vs. 2007:2005
DID Period (±1 Year) (±2 Years) (±3 Years)
Govb × Postt 0.398*** 0.288** 0.343**
(0.143) (0.145) (0.162)
Bank Controls
Size 0.431*** 0.456*** 0.435***
(0.066) (0.076) (0.114)
ROA 4.344*** 3.442 –4.340
(0.819) (4.340) (3.673)
Liquid Assets Ratio –4.093*** –3.234*** –3.011***
(0.449) (0.487) (0.511)
Deposits Share –0.268 0.272 0.913*
(0.588) (0.350) (0.526)
Equity Share 1.418*** 1.160** 1.246*
(0.474) (0.577) (0.755)
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes
Firm×Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Clustered SE Bank, Year Bank, Year Bank, Year
N. Observations 5,359,393 10,901,246 15,639,540


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 1.4. Indirect Effects: Suppliers receive more payments from Treated Customers
This table reports output from Equation (1.3). The dependent variable is the log of real payments
received by a supplier from its customers. The coefficient of interest is the
Difference-in-Differences estimator given by the interaction Govc × Postt. Govc is an indicator
variable that equals one if customer c is government-credit-dependent (i.e., if its share of credit
with government banks is greater than zero), and is zero otherwise. Postt is an indicator variable
with value of one if year t ≥ 2009 and zero if t ≤ 2007. The year of 2008 is not included in the
event study window for being the year of Lehman Brothers’ failure. Customer controls include age,
size, and credit rating. As detailed in Figure 1.6, in column (1), we use a time window of 1 year after
versus 1 year before the Lehman bankruptcy. In column (2), we expand the time window to include
2 years before and 2 years after. In column (3), the time window is expanded to 3 years before and
after. Statistical significance levels: *** p-value<0.01, ** p-value<0.05, * p-value<0.10.
Dependent Variable Log(Real Payments)
Downstream DID: (Inflow to a Supplier from Treated vs. Non-Treated Customers)
(1) (2) (3)
DID Period 2009 vs. 2007 2010:2009 vs. 2007:2006 2011:2009 vs. 2007:2005
(±1 Year) (±2 Years) (±3 Years)
Govc × Postt 0.025*** 0.036*** 0.040***
(0.008) (0.013) (0.014)
Customer Controls
Age 0.020 0.017* 0.024**
(0.018) (0.010) (0.010)
Size 0.029*** 0.028*** 0.032***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.004)
Credit Rating 0.011*** 0.013*** 0.015***
(0.000) (0.002) (0.003)
Fixed Effects
Customer Yes Yes Yes
Supplier×Year Yes Yes Yes
Clustered SE Supplier, Year Supplier, Year Supplier, Year
N. Observations 3,754,746 7,889,679 12,430,443
R-Squared 0.538 0.520 0.511
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Table 1.5. Indirect Effects: Customers buy more from Treated Suppliers
This table reports output from Equation (1.4). The dependent variable is the log of real payments
sent by a customer to its suppliers. The coefficient of interest is the Difference-in-Differences (DID)
estimator given by the interaction Govs × Postt. Govs is an indicator variable that equals one if
supplier s is government-credit-dependent (i.e., if its share of credit with government banks is
greater than zero), and is zero otherwise. Postt is an indicator variable with value of one if year
t ≥ 2009 and zero if t ≤ 2007. The year of 2008 is not included in the event study window for
being the year of Lehman Brothers’ failure. Supplier controls include age, size, and credit rating. As
detailed in Figure 1.6, in column (1), we use a time window of 1 year after versus 1 year before the
Lehman bankruptcy. In column (2), we expand the time window to include 2 years before and 2
years after. In column (3), the time window is expanded to 3 years before and after. Statistical
significance levels: *** p-value<0.01, ** p-value<0.05, * p-value<0.10.
Dependent Variable Log(Real Payments)
Upstream DID: (Outflow from a Customer to Treated vs. Non-Treated Supplier)
(1) (2) (3)
DID Period 2009 vs. 2007 2010:2009 vs. 2007:2006 2011:2009 vs. 2007:2005
(±1 Year) (±2 Years) (±3 Years)
Govs × Postt 0.035*** 0.042*** 0.054***
(0.000) (0.005) (0.011)
Supplier Controls
Age –0.010 0.025*** –0.021***
(0.008) (0.004) (0.003)
Size 0.048*** 0.047*** 0.050***
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Credit Rating 0.012** 0.015*** 0.016***
(0.005) (0.004) (0.002)
Fixed Effects
Supplier Yes Yes Yes
Customer×Year Yes Yes Yes
Clustered SE Customer, Year Customer, Year Customer, Year
N. Observations 4,183,704 8,779,779 13,858,964
R-Squared 0.516 0.494 0.483
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Table 1.6. Amplification Mechanisms: Financial Constraints and Input Innovation
This table shows the estimation of the amplification mechanisms studied in Section 1.4.3. Panel A
reports the estimation output of Equation (1.8). Panel B shows the estimates of Equation (1.6). The
dependent variable in both panels is the log of real payments between customers and suppliers.
Statistical significance levels: *** p-value<0.01, ** p-value<0.05, * p-value<0.10.
Panel A. Customer’s Financial Constraint as an Amplification Mechanism
Dependent Variable Log(Real Payments)
(Inflow to a Supplier from Treated vs. Non-Treated Customers)
(1) (2) (3)
DID Period 2009 vs. 2007 2010:2009 vs. 2007:2006 2011:2009 vs. 2007:2005
(±1 Year) (±2 Years) (±3 Years)
Privc × Postt –0.006 –0.012 –0.009
(0.017) (0.008) (0.012)
Privc × Postt × Low Tangibc –0.033*** –0.029*** –0.028*
(0.003) (0.010) (0.015)
Customer Controls Yes Yes Yes
Customer FE Yes Yes Yes
Supplier×Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Clustered SE Supplier, Year Supplier, Year Supplier, Year
N. Observations 378,030 794,241 1,245,073
R-Squared 0.570 0.550 0.538
Panel B. Supplier’s Input Innovation as an Amplification Mechanism
Dependent Variable Log(Real Payments)
(Outflow from a Customer to Treated vs. Non-Treated Suppliers)
(1) (2) (3)
DID Period 2009 vs. 2007 2010:2009 vs. 2007:2006 2011:2009 vs. 2007:2005
(±1 Year) (±2 Years) (±3 Years)
Privs × Postt 0.048*** 0.200** 0.241***
(0.009) (0.095) (0.068)
Privs × Postt × Input Innovs –0.069* –0.165** –0.161***
(0.041) (0.072) (0.036)
Supplier Controls Yes Yes Yes
Supplier FE Yes Yes Yes
Customer×Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Clustered SE Customer, Year Customer, Year Customer, Year
N. Observations 119,623 225,158 406,957
R-Squared 0.626 0.589 0.578
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Table 1.7. Indirect Effects: Market Power of a Customer
This table reports output from Equation (1.3). The dependent variable is the share of payments
that a customer has with respect to its suppliers’ total payments. This share of payments is
interpreted as a measure of the market power of the customer. The coefficient of interest is the
Difference-in-Differences estimator given by the interaction Govc × Postt. Govc is an indicator
variable that equals one if customer c is government-credit-dependent (i.e., if its share of credit
with government banks is greater than zero), and is zero otherwise. Postt is an indicator variable
with value of one if year t ≥ 2009 and zero if t ≤ 2007. The year of 2008 is not included in the
event study window for being the year of Lehman Brothers’ failure. Customer controls include age,
size, and credit rating. As detailed in Figure 1.6, in column (1), we use a time window of 1 year after
versus 1 year before the Lehman bankruptcy. In column (2), we expand the time window to include
2 years before and 2 years after. In column (3), the time window is expanded to 3 years before and
after. Statistical significance levels: *** p-value<0.01, ** p-value<0.05, * p-value<0.10.
Dependent Variable Share of Payments of a Customer with its Suppliers
(Market Power of Customer)
(1) (2) (3)
DID Period 2009 vs. 2007 2010:2009 vs. 2007:2006 2011:2009 vs. 2007:2005
(±1 Year) (±2 Years) (±3 Years)
Govc × Postt 0.002*** 0.004 0.004
(0.000) (0.002) (0.002)
Customer Controls
Age –0.002** 0.001 0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Size 0.003*** 0.004*** 0.004***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Credit Rating 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Fixed Effects
Customer Yes Yes Yes
Supplier×Year Yes Yes Yes
Clustered SE Supplier, Year Supplier, Year Supplier, Year
N. Observations 3,754,746 7,889,679 12,430,443
R-Squared 0.832 0.820 0.810
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Table 1.8. Indirect Effects: Market Power of a Supplier
This table reports output from Equation (1.4). The dependent variable is the share of payments
that a supplier has with respect to its customers’ total payments. This share of payments is
interpreted as a measure of the market power of the supplier. The coefficient of interest is the
Difference-in-Differences (DID) estimator given by the interaction Govs × Postt. Govs is an
indicator variable that equals one if supplier s is government-credit-dependent (i.e., if its share of
credit with government banks is greater than zero), and is zero otherwise. Postt is an indicator
variable with value of one if year t ≥ 2009 and zero if t ≤ 2007. The year of 2008 is not included in
the event study window for being the year of Lehman Brothers’ failure. Supplier controls include
age, size, and credit rating. As detailed in Figure 1.6, in column (1), we use a time window of 1 year
after versus 1 year before the Lehman bankruptcy. In column (2), we expand the time window to
include 2 years before and 2 years after. In column (3), the time window is expanded to 3 years
before and after. Statistical significance levels: *** p-value<0.01, ** p-value<0.05, * p-value<0.10.
Dependent Variable Share of Payments of a Supplier with its Customers
(Market Power of Supplier)
(1) (2) (3)
DID Period 2009 vs. 2007 2010:2009 vs. 2007:2006 2011:2009 vs. 2007:2005
(±1 Year) (±2 Years) (±3 Years)
Govs × Postt 0.002*** 0.004*** 0.005***
(0.000) (0.001) (0.002)
Supplier Controls
Age –0.001*** –0.001*** –0.001
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Size 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Credit Rating 0.002*** 0.001*** 0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Fixed Effects
Supplier Yes Yes Yes
Customer×Year Yes Yes Yes
Clustered SE Customer, Year Customer, Year Customer, Year
N. Observations 4,183,704 8,779,779 13,858,964
R-Squared 0.882 0.865 0.852
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Table 1.9. The Government Lending Multiplier: Supplier and Customer Death Probability
This table reports output from Equation (1.10), where the dependent variable is a dummy of firm
“death” (i.e., if the firm becomes inactive). Panel A shows the probit estimation for the suppliers
and Panel B for the customers. In Panel A, controls at the supplier-level include size, age, and
credit rating. In Panel B, we follow exactly the same procedures described above for the supplier’s
probit, but focusing on the case customers. Statistical significance levels: *** p-value<0.01, **
p-value<0.05, * p-value<0.10.
Panel A. Death Probability of Suppliers
Dependent Variable Dummy: Supplier Death
(1) (2) (3)
Period 1 Year: 2 Years: 3 Years:
2009 2009–2010 2009–2011
Govs –0.008*** –0.006*** –0.007***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Indirect Gov Exps –0.017*** –0.016*** –0.012***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Firm Controls
Supplier Yes Yes Yes
Customer (Avg. over Suppliers) Yes Yes Yes
Fixed Effects
Supplier Industry×City Yes No No
Supplier Industry×City×Year No Yes Yes
Clustered SE Supplier Supplier, Year Supplier, Year
N. Observations 860,730 1,946,902 3,264,635
R-Squared 0.107 0.117 0.132
Panel B. Death Probability of Customers
Dependent Variable Dummy: Customer Death
(1) (2) (3)
Period 1 Year: 2 Years: 3 Years:
2009 2009–2010 2009–2011
Govc –0.005*** –0.004*** –0.004***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Indirect Gov Expc –0.010*** –0.010*** –0.010***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Firm Controls
Customer Yes Yes Yes
Supplier (Avg. over Customers) Yes Yes Yes
Fixed Effects
Customer Industry×City Yes No No
Customer Industry×City×Year No Yes Yes
Clustered SE Customer Customer, Year Customer, Year
N. Observations 329,385 748,709 1,274,321
R-Squared 0.112 0.126 0.142
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Chapter 2
Stock Volatility and the Great Depression
“For many years macroeconomists have puzzled about the inability of their models to
explain the data of the Great Depression. Results in this paper pose a similar problem to
financial economists.”
— G. William Schwert (1989). “Why does stock market volatility
change over time?” Journal of Finance, 44(5), 1115–1153.
2.1 Introduction
The annualized standard deviation of US stock returns during the Great Depres-
sion reached as high as 60% per annum, two to three times higher than any other
period in American financial history (Officer (1973); Schwert (1989); Wilson, Sylla,
and Jones (1990)).1 Figure 2.1 shows that stock volatility during the Great De-
pression stands out even when compared to the volatility of market returns over
a time span of more than 200 years (1802–2016) that includes the Great Recession.
Goetzmann, Li, and Rouwenhorst (2005) find that the Great Crash of 1929 led to a
structural change in stock volatility. Merton (1987) and Schwert (1989) argue that
the high levels of stock volatility during the Great Depression might be explained
by the rise of communism that threatened the capitalist system. Shiller (1981) sug-
gests that the “excessive volatility” of stock returns in the late 1920s and 1930s
could be the result of a “Peso problem” or irrational behavior by investors.2
1 This chapter is joint work with Marc Weidenmier, Chapman University.
2White (1990) provides an excellent review of the literature on the 1929 Crash. More recently,
Mathy (2016) finds that stock volatility spikes during the Depression are explained by discontinuous
jumps resulting from banking crises, the end of the Gold Standard, and expectations regarding the
war in Europe.
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A convincing explanation for the high level and persistence of stock volatility
during the Great Depression has eluded scholars. In an influential paper, Schwert
(1989) finds that various macroeconomic and financial time series do not predict
fluctuations in stock volatility during the Great Depression and the 1930s. Schwert
concludes that “there is a volatility puzzle” and that “there remains a challenge to both
theorists and empiricists to explain why this episode [Great Depression] was so unusual”
(Schwert, 1989, p. 1146). This puzzle has remained unsolved for nearly 30 years.
The contribution of this paper is to identify two primary drivers of this volatility
puzzle for the Great Depression. We find that financial leverage and measures of
the economic health of the real estate sector can explain a large majority of volatility
in the NYSE between 1928 and 1938. A recent wave of literature has argued that
the collapse of the real estate sector in the late 1920s and early 1930s played an
important role in the onset and severity of the Great Depression (Goetzmann and
Newman (2010); Brocker and Hanes (2014); Gjerstad and Smith (2014); Goetzmann
(2016)). Of particular interest to our study is the work of Gjerstad and Smith (2014).
They identify a decline in real estate prices as the exogenous shock that led to a
deterioration of the balance sheets of households and firms in the mid-to-late 1920s
and early 1930s. This led to a decline in consumption and economic activity. Their
study provides a transmission mechanism and explanation for the unidentified
“exogenous” shock to consumption that played a key role in the propagation of
the Great Depression in Temin’s (1976) classic study.
We employ building permits as a forward-looking indicator of the economic
health of the real estate sector. The virtues of building permits are that, like stock
markets, they are forward-looking indicators and are available at the monthly fre-
quency during the interwar period — unlike house price data. Moreover, building
permit growth is highly correlated with changes in the Case-Shiller house price in-
dex at the annual frequency.3 We supplement the building permit series with new
data to examine the role of economic, financial, and political factors in predicting
monthly US stock volatility for the period 1928–1938. First, we employ the mea-
sure of financial leverage collected by Graham, Leary, and Roberts (2015) from the
Moody’s Manuals. Their series allows us to directly control for a fundamental deter-
minant of stock volatility. Second, we use a new series of junk bond yield spreads
3There is a 65% correlation between annual changes in building permit growth and annual
changes in the Case-Shiller Index from 1921 to 1951, a period for which the index is only available
at the annual frequency.
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Figure 2.1. Annualized Standard Deviations of US Stock Returns from Monthly Returns in the
Year, 1802–2016. The figure shows the time series of annualized stock returns volatility calculated
from monthly data. The two highlighted periods are the Great Depression and the Great
Recession. The data are taken from Schwert (1989). The data and the updated volatility chart are
available in http://schwert.ssb.rochester.edu/volatility.htm.
to test the importance of forward-looking interest rates in forecasting stock volatil-
ity.4 Other forward-looking indicators such as the volatility of truck production,
bank lending, and the ratio of failed bank deposits to total deposits are used as
explanatory variables to predict the standard deviation of stock returns. Third, we
hand-collect data on important political events to construct a new database of po-
litical uncertainty. Measures of political conflict are used to test the hypothesis that
the high levels of stock volatility during the Great Depression were driven by the
rise of communism that threatened the future of market capitalism (Merton (1987);
Schwert (1989)). We convert the Banks (1976) annual database on riots, assassina-
tions, anti-government demonstrations, and general strikes into a monthly measure
to examine the relationship between stock volatility and political uncertainty.
The empirical analysis suggests that stock volatility during the Great Depres-
sion can largely be explained by two variables: (1) financial leverage; and (2) the
volatility of building permit growth. The two-variable specification together with
historical lags of stock volatility account for about 73% of the movements in stock
volatility for the period 1928–1938. Figure 2.2 shows that the volatility of build-
4It is well-known in the forecasting literature that interest rate spreads are important leading
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Figure 2.2. Lagged Building Permit Growth Volatility vs. Stock Volatility (1928:M1–1938:M12).
This figure shows the time series of 6-month lagged building permit growth volatility and stock
volatility. We also include the (annual) series of financial leverage for reference. Shaded areas
denote the Great Depression and the 1937–38 recession as defined by the NBER. Data on building
permits are from Dun & Bradstreet’s Review. Stock market data are from CRSP. Stock volatility is
the monthly standard deviation from daily stock returns. Building permit growth volatility is
estimated with a GARCH(1, 1) model. Leverage is defined as Debt/(Debt + Market Equity) for all
non-financial firms.
ing permit growth leads and predicts stock volatility for much of the period. We
then follow-up the macro time series analysis with an investigation of the impor-
tance of the volatility of building permit growth in the cross-section of stock return
volatility. We find that the volatility of building permit growth improves the fore-
casting performance for highly cyclical sectors such as steel, financials, fabricated
products, and chemical stocks. Furthermore, the volatility of state-level building
permit growth helps to forecast the volatility of state-level stock returns based on
the location of headquarters of NYSE listed firms.
The empirical results are robust to many alternative specifications including win-
sorizing the data, median quantile regression, and Markov-switching dynamic re-
gression. Standard macroeconomic and credit channel variables do not explain
stock return volatility during the Great Depression except for the volatility of truck
production growth — which are often used by the construction industry. Further-
more, the empirical results from the leverage and building permit specification are
robust to expanding the sample period from 1926 (when the CRSP data begin) to
1961 (when the monthly building permit series is no longer available). Overall,
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we argue that the stock volatility puzzle of the Great Depression is largely solved
using a simple model of building permits and leverage.5
The paper begins with a discussion of the building permits data, followed by
a description of other economic and financial data used in our analysis. We then
present the empirical strategy and baseline results of stock volatility during the
Great Depression. We then test the robustness of the baseline specifications. The
empirical analysis concludes with a study of the role of economic and financial
factors in predicting the volatility of building permit growth. The final section
discusses the implications of the results and makes suggestions for future research.
2.2 Building Permits
We use the value of building permits, “Permits”, as a forward-looking indicator
of economic activity in the real estate sector. Building permits must be filed with
local authorities before any construction can take place. The real-time data are
taken from issues of Dun & Bradstreet’s Review, a well-known monthly business
and financial publication in the 1920s and 1930s. The forward-looking measure
of economic activity is assembled from building inspector reports collected by the
F.W. Dodge Division, a McGraw-Hill Information Systems company. F.W. Dodge also
provided their data to the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). The value of building
permits is based on the estimated cost of new commercial and residential buildings
provided by building inspectors for 215 cities across the US.6
Figure 2.3 plots the value of building permits from 1928–1938.7 At the beginning
of the sample period, building permits rose to a value of almost $350 million and
then declined to $213 million by the start of 1929. Building permits increased to
nearly $229 million in February, and to $372 million in March 1929. In April 1929,
building permits rose to a level of almost $480 million. The rise represents a 62%
increase over the previous year. The forward-looking economic measure fell to $260
million in May and to $218 million in June. One month before the Great Crash in
October 1929, the value of building permits plunged to $183 million. The value of
5Leamer (2015, p. 43) argues that “housing is the single most critical part of the US business cycle,
certainly in predictive sense and, I believe, also in a causal sense.”
6According to Dun & Bradstreet’s, the data also includes additions, alterations, and repairs. It
does not include land costs.
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Figure 2.3. Aggregate Building Permits in the United States: With and Without New York City
(1928:M1-1938:M12). Shaded areas denote the Great Depression and the 1937–38 recession as
defined by the NBER. The largest spikes in the All Cities time series are in March and April 1929,
approximately six months before the Great Crash.
building permits fell by more than 60% between April and September 1929. This
forward-looking construction measure remained quite low for the remainder of the
sample period except for a couple of spikes at the end of the 1930s. The building
permit spike in 1929 appears to be explained, in part, by an increase in the number
of new filings for large buildings and skyscrapers in New York City. In Manhattan,
14 skyscrapers of 30 stories or higher were filed with the city in 1928. The number
of skyscraper building permits increased to 52 in 1929 with most of the activity
taking place at the beginning of the year (see, e.g., Gray (2009); Barr (2010)).8 Fig-
ure 2.3 shows that the large rise in building permits during 1929 disappears if New
York City filings are removed from the aggregate series. The value of building
permits in New York City rose dramatically from $29.6 million in January 1929 to
more than $259.1 million in April. New York City building permits then abruptly
fell to a value of $37.1 million in June.
The 1928–1929 New York “skyscraper boom” saw the construction and com-
pletion of the Waldorf-Astoria and the Empire State Building (Barr (2010)). The
latter was finished at half the expected cost of $25 million in 1931 due to the pre-
cipitous decline in economic activity from the Depression. Other skyscrapers in-
cluded the National City Bank Building, located at 55 Wall Street, between Hanover
and William Streets. Overall, only 19 of the 52 planned skyscrapers in 1929 were
8Figure B.1 in the Online Appendix shows how New York City’s building permits series help
to explain the variation of stock volatility spikes at the onset of the Depression through a rolling-
window regression.
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ever built as construction spending tanked with the onset of the Depression (Gray
(2009); Gray and Braley (2017)). Many builders decided not to exercise their option
(building permit) to build a skyscraper. In addition, some entrepreneurs exercised
only a fraction of their option by building a cheaper skyscraper as shown by the
Empire State Building, while others delayed construction of the skyscrapers be-
cause of poor economic conditions. For example, the National City Bank Building
was not completed until the 1940s. The historical record suggests that the volatility
of building permit growth is a forward-looking measure of the uncertainty of a
growth option.9
2.3 Data
Our empirical analysis uses monthly data from January 1928 to December 1938. We
combine various sources to assemble a new database with economic, financial, and
political variables to explain movements in stock volatility during the Great De-
pression. Online Appendix B.1 provides a detailed discussion of the data sources.
2.3.1 Stock Volatility
We follow Schwert (1989) and construct our measure of stock return volatility by
calculating the monthly standard deviation of stock returns from daily data using
CRSP. In addition, we consider the historical news-implied volatility index (NVIX)
constructed by Manela and Moreira (2017).
2.3.2 Corporate Leverage
We obtain the market value of corporate leverage from Moody’s Manuals, the stan-
dard source of firm-level financial data for the pre-COMPUSTAT period. The data
were collected and provided by Graham, Leary, and Roberts (2015). We calculate
the market value of leverage as Debt/(Debt + Market Equity) for all non-financial
9Engelhardt and Thornton (2015) find that skyscraper height predicts business cycles. Contrary
evidence is found by Barr (2010) and Barr, Mizrach, and Mundra (2015).
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firms. We convert the annual series of financial leverage into a monthly series using
linear interpolation for the period 1928:M1–1938:M12.
2.3.3 Macroeconomic and Financial Data
We test the predictive power of building permits against several other variables
that have been shown to forecast recessions in previous studies. For example, we
consider a bank lending measure collected by the Federal Reserve from reports of
member banks as a forward-looking indicator (see, e.g., Sekkel (2015)). We also
look at the predictive power of building contracts, manufacturing hours, and an
index of new truck production (see, e.g., Stock and Watson (1993)). The series are
taken from the NBER Macrohistory Database.
We employ two yield spread measures as leading indicators (see, e.g., Estrella
and Mishkin (1998)). We use the interest-rate differential between AAA corporate
bonds and commercial paper. We also consider a junk bond yield spread for the
interwar period constructed by Basile, Kang, Landon-Lane, and Rockoff (2017).
Following Schwert (1989), we also use data on coincident economic variables
to assess the importance of real factors in forecasting stock volatility. We utilize
the Federal Reserve’s series on retail sales and industrial production to estimate
the volatility of the real sector. Finally, we consider the ratio of failed deposits to
total deposits as a credit-channel measure of financial distress (Anari, Kolari, and
Mason (2005)). The failed deposits data are taken from the Journal of Money, Credit,
and Banking’s website.
2.3.4 Political Data
We construct a monthly version of the Banks (1976) annual Cross-Polity Time-Series
for the US. The political database is widely used in economics, political science, and
other social sciences. We convert the annual database into a monthly one using
Banks’ original sources and the search engine for the ProQuest Historical New York
Times.10 We follow the previous literature (e.g., Funke, Schularick, and Trebesch
(2016)) in our selection of conflict variables that proxy for political uncertainty. The
10Appendix B.1 has a detailed description of the sources used by Banks (1976) and the method-
ology used to collect the political data.
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four variables are: (1) Anti-Government Demonstrations; (2) Assassinations; (3) Gen-
eral Strikes; and (4) Riots. An Anti-Government Demonstration is any peaceful public
gathering of at least 100 people for the primary purpose of displaying or voic-
ing opposition to government policies or authority (excluding anti-foreign nature
demonstrations). The number of Assassinations is defined as a politically-motivated
murder or attempted murder of a high government official or politician. A General
Strike is a strike of at least 1,000 industrial or service workers that involves more
than one employer and targets national government policies or authority. Finally,
a Riot is a violent demonstration or clash of more than 100 citizens involving the
use of physical force. The event data — (1) through (4) — are then summed up to
form an aggregate “Politics” variable.
2.3.5 Descriptive Statistics
The summary statistics are reported in Table 3.1. The volatility of the economic and
financial times series are far less pronounced for the entire sample period (Panel
A) than for the Great Depression (Panel B). Political variables are also more volatile
during the Great Depression, which is consistent with the hypothesis that political
conflict is exacerbated by the poor economic conditions of the Great Depression.
There were only two Assassinations in the sample. The most frequent events were
Anti-Government Demonstrations, followed by Riots and General Strikes. Riots and
Anti-Government Demonstrations also display greater frequency during the Great
Depression sub-period.11
2.4 Empirical Strategy
The first step in our analysis is to extract a measure of volatility from the raw data.
For stock return volatility, we follow Schwert (1989) and exploit the high-frequency
(daily) data to construct our measure Stock Vol as the monthly standard deviation
calculated from daily returns. For lower-frequency (monthly) data, we follow an
extensive literature and use GARCH models to construct estimates of the one-step
11Figure B.2 in the Online Appendix shows the monthly time series for each measure of political
conflict.
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ahead conditional volatility (e.g., Chan, Chan, and Karolyi (1991); Karolyi (1995)).
We choose the most standard specification, GARCH(1, 1), and estimate the follow-
ing model for each variable xt:




θp · xt−p + εt, εt ∼ N(0, σ2t ), (2.1)
σ2t = α0 + α1 · ε2t−1 + α2 · σ2t−1, αi > 0 ∀i ∈ {0, 1, 2}. (2.2)
Following Schwert (1989), we add twelve lags of xt in the conditional mean equa-
tion (2.1) to control for the persistence of each series. We estimate (2.2) using max-
imum likelihood methods, taking the square root of σ̂2t+1 as the estimated one-step
ahead standard deviation. Our baseline regression of the determinants of stock
volatility during the Great Depression is:





















β4,p · Politics + εt
(2.3)
where Stock Vol is our measure of stock market volatility (standard deviation of
stock returns), Dm is a set of seasonal monthly dummies, Lev is the market value of
aggregate corporate leverage, Permit Vol is the volatility of building permit growth
estimated from a GARCH(1, 1) model, and Politics is the sum of the four measures
of political conflict. A lag length of P is chosen based on the Akaike Information
Criterion (AIC). For the baseline sample (1928:M1–1938:M12), the AIC selected a
lag length of seven. We estimate the following OLS regression models using Newey
and West (1987) standard errors:
1. Autoregressive Model: a model that includes only the lags of stock volatility
(Stock Vol) and seasonal dummies to measure how much of current volatility
can be explained by historical volatility.
2. Leverage Model: a model that adds lags of financial leverage (Lev) to the initial
Autoregressive Model. Financial leverage is widely considered a fundamental
determinant of stock volatility.
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3. Pure Building Permit Model: a model that adds lags of building permit growth
volatility (Permit Vol) to the initial Autoregressive Model. Our objective is to
compare the predictive power of Permit Vol with that of the Leverage Model.
4. Building Permit Model: a model focusing on the relationship between the real
estate sector and stock return volatility. The specification includes financial
leverage (Lev) and the volatility of building permit growth (Permit Vol), a
forward-looking measure of economic activity. We use the volatility of build-
ing permit growth (as opposed to the volatility of the level of building per-
mits) because the dependent variable is stock return volatility rather than
stock price volatility.12
5. Political Model: a model that includes financial leverage (Lev) and the politi-
cal determinants of stock volatility (Politics) to test the political uncertainty
hypothesis.
6. Permit–Political Model: a model combining the variables from the Building
Permit and Political models.
We follow the previous literature (e.g. Schwert (1989); Flannery and Protopa-
padakis (2002)) in assessing models of stock volatility by comparing the R-squared
of different specifications. For example, the Building Permit Model tests the hy-
pothesis that the volatility of the growth rate of building permits predicts stock
volatility. If the forward-looking measure of economic activity is statistically sig-
nificant (through joint-significance F tests) and the model’s R-squared increases, the
result may suggest that economic factors are important for explaining the high lev-
els of stock volatility during the period 1928–1938. Such a finding would provide
additional evidence that markets were concerned about a forthcoming economic
disaster.
2.5 Results
2.5.1 Stock Volatility: Time Series Evidence
Table 2.2 shows the results for the baseline sample period, 1928–1938. Column 1
reports the Autoregressive Model. Seven lags of historical volatility explain 60% of
12We also tested whether the volatility of building permits (in levels or first-differences) could
predict stock return volatility. The level of the commercial and residential construction variable did
not predict stock return volatility. Results are available upon request.
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the standard deviation of stock volatility for the period 1928–1938. We next control
for financial leverage, adding seven lags of leverage to the baseline autoregressive
specification. Column 2 shows that leverage is statistically significant at the one
percent level. Leverage increases the explanatory power of the model from 60% to
68%. Column 3 reports the pure building permit model. The volatility of building
permit growth is significant at the one percent level and raises the R-squared of the
baseline autoregressive model from 60% to 66%. This suggests that the building
permit variable has explanatory power comparable to leverage even though the
debt variable is mechanically related to stock prices.
Column 4 of Table 2.2 presents the results of the forward-looking building per-
mit model. The F-statistic for building permit growth volatility is significant at the
one percent level. The building permit specification increases the R-squared by five
percentage points to 73 percent. We follow-up the forward-looking building permit
model with a political model of stock volatility. Column 5 shows that the aggregate
political measure is not significant at conventional levels.13 The R-squared of the
political measure only increases the fit of the model by three percentage points to
69% relative to the baseline model of historical lags of stock volatility and finan-
cial leverage. This is somewhat surprising given that some political events in the
sample period were notable and widely reported in the press. For example, Anton
Cermak, the Mayor of Chicago, was murdered in February 1933 even though the
hit targeted President Franklin D. Roosevelt.14 Senator Huey Long was shot and
killed in September 1935, a year before the outspoken congressman planned to run
for President of the United States against FDR.15
Finally, we combine the forward-looking building permit model with the polit-
ical specification in Column 6. The volatility of building permits remains signif-
icant at the one percent level while the aggregate political variable is statistically
13Voth (2002) finds that political variables explain a significant fraction of stock volatility using
equity market data for a sample of 10 countries during the period 1919–1938. His analysis does not
control for leverage or the volatility of building permits.
14The front-page headlines of the New York Times read “Cermak in Critical Condition at Hospital;
‘Glad It Was I, Not You,’ He Tells Roosevelt,” February 16th, 1933.
15For a study of political uncertainty in Louisiana under Long as Governor, see Mathy and
Ziebarth (2017). We also tested whether the Economic Policy Uncertainty (EPU) index constructed
by Baker, Bloom, and Davis (2016) could predict stock volatility during the Great Depression and
1930s (see, e.g., Mathy (2017)). The EPU variable was not statistically significant. The results are
available upon request.
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insignificant.16 The R-squared rises to 74% in the permit and political model of
stock volatility. The forward-looking building permit variable is statistically signif-
icant in all specifications. Overall, the results suggest that the volatility of building
permits had a larger impact on stock volatility than political factors.
The results for the baseline sample period are then subjected to several robust-
ness checks. We test whether the volatility of real-activity and inflation indicators
such as the growth rate of retail sales, industrial production, inflation, value of con-
struction contracts, truck production, and manufacturing hours, can predict stock
volatility.17 The results in Table 2.3 show that building permit growth volatility
remains highly significant whereas the other variables cannot predict stock volatil-
ity. The only exception is the volatility of truck production growth. This is not
surprising given that trucks are often used to transport materials to help build new
commercial and residential structures.
Table 2.4 presents the empirical results of adding money and credit variables to
the baseline regression of leverage and the volatility of building permit growth.18
The volatility of M2 money growth, the interest-rate differential between junk
bonds and AAA corporate bonds, the spread between AAA corporate bonds and
prime commercial paper, and the volatility of the growth rate of bank loans cannot
predict stock volatility. The ratio of failed bank deposits to total bank deposits,
a measure of financial distress, does not forecast the standard deviation of stock
returns. The additional money and credit variables are not statistically significant
in the stock volatility regressions. The volatility of building permit growth remains
significant in all specifications.
We next assess the explanatory power of the Building Permit Model by examining
the residuals from a stock volatility regression that includes only financial leverage
and the volatility of building permit growth (i.e., the model excludes historical lags
16We also constructed a text-based measure of political uncertainty by aggregating the number
of times the words communism, communist(s), socialism, and socialist(s) appeared each month in the
New York Times. The text-based political variable did not significantly predict stock volatility for the
entire sample period or the Great Depression period as defined by NBER recession dates. These
results are available upon request.
17These leading indicators have been shown to perform well in predicting recessions in post-
war US data (see, e.g., Stock and Watson (1993)). Similarly, Schwert (1989) uses the volatility of
industrial production, money growth, inflation, and interest rates as economic variables to explain
stock volatility.
18For a discussion of financial factors during the Great Depression, see Calomiris (1993) and












Figure 2.4. Regression Residuals from Stock Volatility Models: Baseline Sample
(1928:M1–1938:M12). The figure shows the original time series of stock volatility (continuous line)
and stock volatility regression residuals (dashed line) after controlling for two variables: financial
leverage (Lev) and the volatility of the growth rate of building permits (Permit Vol). The residuals
are constructed from a regression of stock volatility on financial leverage, the volatility of building
permit growth, and a set of seasonal monthly dummies. Dashed horizontal lines are 95%
confidence bands. Shaded areas are the Great Depression and the 1937–1938 Recession as defined
by the NBER.
of stock volatility).19 Figure 2.4 shows the residual series along with 95% confi-
dence intervals. The two-variable model predicts stock volatility quite well given
the high level and persistence of the standard deviation of stock returns during
the late 1920s and 1930s. The R-squared is about 61% for the two-variable specifi-
cation.20 There are only two outliers in the residual graph that are outside of the
95% confidence intervals. The first outlier is the largest stock volatility spike in US
financial history. Even though the regression residual of the dramatic rise in stock
volatility during 1929 is outside the 95% confidence bands, the two-variable regres-
sion model explains more than 50% of the volatility spike. The simple regression
model significantly reduces the amplitude of the largest stock volatility spike in US
history to a much lower level.
The stock volatility model also does a good job at predicting the second largest
volatility spike in US history that occurred during the “recession within the Great
Depression” of 1937–1938. The regression residual of the 1937–1938 downturn
is just outside the 95% confidence intervals shown in Figure 2.4. We finish off the
analysis of our baseline regressions by examining the robustness of the two-variable
19The regression used to compute the residual series also contains monthly seasonal dummy
variables.
20The sum of coefficients (and p-values from joint-significance F tests) of the estimation used to
construct the residuals are 0.010 (0.025)∗∗ for building permit growth volatility and 0.104 (0.000)∗∗∗
for leverage.
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model to outliers and influential observations. Table B.1 in the Online Appendix
shows that the empirical results are robust to winsorizing the data at the 1% level,
median quantile regression (Koenker and Bassett (1978)), and Markov-switching
dynamic regression.21
We then examine whether leverage and the volatility of building permit growth
can predict stock volatility over a longer time period. The first expanded sample
period covers the years from 1926 until 1961 when the NBER stopped reporting
the building permit series. The AIC criterion selected 10 lags. Columns 1 to 4
in Table 2.5 show the results of the baseline regressions using the first expanded
sample. The coefficients of leverage and the volatility of building permit growth
are highly statistically significant over the 36-year period.
The second expanded sample splices the NBER Macrohistory series with the time
series of building permits from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis’ FRED
database. The sample period covers the full length of the Graham, Leary, and
Roberts (2015) leverage measure, i.e., 1926–2010.22 The AIC criterion selected 10
lags. Columns 5 to 8 in Table 2.5 show the results for the longest sample period.
The leverage and the volatility of building permits growth are significant at the 1
and 10 percent levels, respectively.
We next compare the effect of the volatility of building permit growth and lever-
age on the R-squared of our baseline stock volatility regression over different sam-
ple periods. For the Great Depression period discussed above, the volatility of
building permit growth increases the R-squared in the baseline regression model
by 6 percentage points, whereas leverage raises it by 8 percentage points. Extending
the sample to cover the years 1926–1961, we find that the housing measure increases
the R-squared by 2 percentage points and leverage by 4 percentage points. For the
longest period that runs from 1926 to 2010, the volatility of building permit growth
improves the R-squared by 1 percentage point while leverage increases the statisti-
cal fit of the baseline specification by 3 percentage points. The effect of adding the
21We also run our baseline regressions for the Great Depression as defined by NBER recession
dates. Given the reduced number of observations, we are unable to include seasonal dummies.
Results of the Permit Model in Table B.2 in the Online Appendix show that results are even stronger
when focusing on the Great Depression period.
22The spliced time series is first transformed into growth rates. Building permit growth volatility
is then calculated using a standard GARCH(1,1) model. To account for differences in the sources
and characteristics of both time series, we include a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 for the
period 1961:M10–2010:M12 in the GARCH’s mean equation.
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Average Stock Return Volatility (1926:M1-1938:M12)
Figure 2.5. Average Stock Return Volatility by Sector (1926:M1–1938:M12): Fama-French
17 Classification. The graph shows the average stock return volatility for each industry.
The averages include all firms listed in CRSP between 1926:M1 and 1938:M12. Industries
are classified according to the Fama-French 17 Industries methodology.
volatility of building permit growth to a simple stock volatility regression dimin-
ishes as the sample period is extended forward in time. The evidence is consistent
with recent research that compares long-run returns between housing and equity
from 1870 to the present. Jordà, Knoll, Kuvshinov, Schularick, and Taylor (2017),
for example, find that housing and equity returns moved closely together prior to
1945. The breakdown in the housing and stock return relationship in the post-
World War II period may help explain the reduced predictive power of building
permits in the stock volatility regressions using contemporary data. Alternatively,
the declining importance of the housing measure in explaining stock volatility may
reflect that the modern data on building permits is just the number of single fam-
ily homes while the historical NBER series reflected the total value of residential
and commercial building permits. In summary, we interpret our results as strong
evidence that leverage and the volatility of building permit growth largely explain
the “volatility puzzle” of the Great Depression.23
23As an additional robustness check, we replaced our stock volatility measure (the standard
deviation of monthly stock returns calculated from daily returns) with the historical News Implied
Volatility Index (NVIX) constructed by Manela and Moreira (2017). The volatility of building permit
growth is also a significant predictor of implied volatility as proxied by the NVIX for the Great
Depression sub-sample, but not for the baseline sample period. The results are available from the
authors upon request.
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Figure 2.6. Industry Breakdown of Incremental R-squared: Leverage vs. Building
Permit Growth Volatility. This graph shows the increment in the value of the R-squared
(in percentage points) from adding the lags of leverage vis-à-vis adding the lags of
building permit growth volatility to the Autoregressive Model of Stock Volatility (see
Section 3.5). Industries are classified according to the Fama-French 17 Industries
Classification. All values refer to regressions using the baseline sample
(1928:M1–1938:M12).
2.5.2 Regional and Sector Analysis: Cross-Sectional Evidence
We now exploit the cross-sectional heterogeneity of the data to further characterize
the building permit variable. First, we group firms into sectors as defined by the
Fama-French 17-industry classification and calculate industry-specific stock return
volatilities, as shown in Figure 2.5. Then, we examine the relationship between
the volatility of stock returns for each sector and the volatility of building permit
growth. We start with the Autoregressive Model and compare the explanatory power
gains of including the volatility of building permit growth vis-à-vis leverage as
predictors of stock volatility.
Figure 2.6 shows the incremental R-squared for each Fama-French sector of the
“horse race” exercise between building permit growth volatility and leverage. The
figure shows that the volatility of building permit growth increases the R-squared
12 percentage points for the volatility of steel returns. The building variable out-
performs leverage in explaining the volatility of financial stocks as well as equities
in the drugs, soap, perfumes, and tobacco (DSPT) sector. The volatility of build-
ing permit growth improves the R-squared of financials by more than 8 percentage








Figure 2.7. Number of Corporate Headquarters by State, 1928. The figure shows the
number of corporate headquarters by state. States with more headquarters are shown in
darker shades. The sample consists of all US-based firms listed in the NYSE between 1926
and 1938. Data on office locations were collected from the Moody’s Manuals of Investment.
The total sample consists of 1,458 offices (out of which 1,075 are main offices) from 1,068
CRSP companies. Appendix B.1 describes the data collection.
stock volatility regression by more than 3.5 percentage points for fabricated prod-
ucts and the chemical industry. According to Table 2.6, the steel, financial, DSPT,
fabricated products, and chemical industries account for about 30 percent of the
market capitalization of NYSE stocks in 1928. As shown in Figure 2.5, the steel,
financial, and DSPT sectors rank 5th (.050), 9th (.048), and 15th (.038) in terms of
the average volatility. For the remaining sectors, the volatility of building permits
increases the R-squared by 2 percentage points or less.
Next, we investigate whether the baseline empirical results are sensitive to firm
location. Figure 2.7 shows the number of headquarters for all CRSP firms in 1928 by
state. The data were hand collected from Moody’s Manuals. Darker shading denotes
states with more corporate headquarters. The map indicates that the main office for
most firms are located in the northeast or the mid-west with the notable exception
of California. Table 2.7 shows that New York state accounts for 421 main offices
(39%) followed by Illinois with 96 offices (8.9%), Pennsylvania with 75 offices (7%),
and Ohio with 71 headquarters (6.6%). The top 10 states account for nearly 83% of
all corporate headquarters. We then take the 10 states with the largest number of
corporate headquarters and ask whether the volatility of state-level building per-
mit growth predicts aggregate state-level stock return volatility. Figure 2.8 shows
that the volatility of building permit growth increases the R-squared in the stock
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Figure 2.8. State Breakdown of Incremental R-Squared: Leverage vs. Building Permit
Growth Volatility. This graph shows the increment in the value of the R-squared (in
percentage points) from adding the lags of leverage vis-à-vis adding the lags of building
permit growth volatility to the Autoregressive Model of Stock Volatility (see Section 3.5).
States are chosen for being among the top 10 in terms of number of corporate
headquarters. All values refer to regressions using the baseline sample
(1928:M1–1938:M12).
volatility regression by about 2 percentage points for most states in the empirical
analysis. The predictive power of building permits is greater in Ohio and Penn-
sylvania, where the US steel industry was particularly important. This finding is
consistent with the sector analysis that the volatility of building permit growth is
especially strong at predicting volatility for steel stocks.
Finally, we exploit the cross-sectional variation of the 17 Fama-French sectors
and the location of firms using Arellano and Bond (1991) dynamic panel GMM
regressions. The approach has the advantage of increasing the statistical power
of our tests. The results reported in Table B.3 of the Appendix for the sectoral
panel (Column 1) and for the state panel (Column 2) show that the volatility of
building permit growth predicts industry- and state-level stock return volatility at
the 1 percent level.
Overall, we find that building permit growth volatility significantly improves the
in-sample forecast of stock volatility for cyclical industries like steel, financials, and
the chemical sector. The analysis also shows that the building variable sharply im-
proves the R-squared of stock volatility regressions at the state level for Ohio and
Pennsylvania, but not for other states.
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2.5.3 What drives the Volatility of Building Permit Growth?
We estimate several regressions to examine the factors that predict the volatility of
building permit growth for the sample period 1928–1938. The dependent variable
for the regressions is the conditional standard deviation of the growth rate of build-
ing permits (Permit Vol). We investigate three channels that could drive the volatil-
ity of the growth rate of building permits: (1) Real Channel (retail sales volatility and
the volatility of truck production growth); (2) Monetary Channel (money growth
volatility); and the (3) Credit Channel (Junk Bond–AAA Corporate Bond spread;
AAA Corporate Bond–Prime Commercial Paper spread; Volatility of bank loan
growth). The volatility of each variable is estimated using a standard GARCH(1,1)
model, except for the credit spreads which are included directly in the model as in
the previous literature (see, e.g., Schwert (1989) and Estrella and Mishkin (1998)).
A lag length of 7 is chosen for each independent variable. We regress building
permit growth volatility on each channel using Newey and West (1987) standard
errors.
Table 2.8 reports the results. Column 1 shows the regression using only historical
lags of the volatility of building permit growth. The historical lags of the volatility
of building permit growth is significant at the five percent level, and the R-squared
is only 24% for the baseline regression. Next, we add the volatility of retail sales to
the baseline specification (Column 2). The volatility of retail sales is not statistically
significant at conventional levels. Historical lags of the volatility of the growth rate
of building permits are also not statistically significant at the five or ten percent
level.
We next replace the volatility of the growth rate of retail sales with the volatility
of truck production growth. Column 3 reports that truck production growth volatil-
ity does not predict the volatility of building permit growth. Column 4 presents the
results for the monetary model. The volatility of monetary growth (M2) predicts
building permit growth volatility at the one percent level. The R-squared is 26%
and is only marginally higher than the baseline specifications that include historical
lags of building permit volatility.
The results for the credit channel models are presented in Columns 5, 6, and
7. In the junk bond specification, the credit measure is not significant at conven-
tional levels. The R-squared for the high-risk credit channel model is 26% (Column
5). The corporate bonds and commercial paper yield spread predicts the build-
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ing permit variable at the 5 percent level with an R-squared of 29% (Column 6).
The volatility of bank lending growth does not significantly predict the volatility of
building permit growth (Column 7).
Finally, we combine the independent variables from the monetary model, the
real sector specification, and the credit channel regressions. The results of the
fully specified model appear in Column 8. The historical lags of the volatility of
building permit growth and the other variables are not statistically significant and
the R-squared is 62%. The all-channel model also suggests that the monetary and
credit channel indicators are not robust predictors of the volatility of building per-
mit growth. Overall, we find little evidence that standard economic and financial
variables can predict the volatility of building permit growth. This suggests that
the volatility of building permit growth is weakly exogenous to many economic
and financial fundamentals.
We then test whether Manela and Moreira’s (2017) news-implied volatility index
(NVIX) and its five components can predict the volatility of building permit growth.
These categorical time series were constructed from textual analysis of historical
newspapers and gauge specific sources of risk in the aggregate economy. The five
NVIX components are Government, Wars, Natural Disasters, Financial Intermediation,
and Unclassified. Table 2.9 shows that only the natural disaster component of the
news-implied volatility index is statistically significant at the five percent level. The
R-squared for the natural disaster regression is 27%. The finding is not that sur-
prising giving that the drought-driven Dust Bowl reduced economic activity in the
1930s (see, e.g., Hornbeck (2012)). The analysis suggests that environmental disas-
ter risk during the Great Depression may have increased the volatility of building
permits for commercial structures and houses.
2.6 Concluding Remarks
What economic and financial factors explain stock volatility during the Great De-
pression? We show that this question is largely resolved by incorporating the
volatility of building permit growth and a measure of financial leverage into a
simple model of stock volatility. Even in a model without historical lags of stock
volatility, the volatility of building permit growth and financial leverage explains
stock volatility with an R-squared of over 60%. The results are robust to expanding
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the sample period and different specifications that examine various aspects of the
time series and cross-sectional dimensions of the data.
The importance of the volatility of building permit growth led us to explore the
determinants of the real estate variable. We found weak evidence that standard
economic and financial measures can forecast the volatility of building growth. We
do find some evidence that natural disaster risk predicts the volatility of build-
ing permit growth. In sum, our analysis suggests that future research might test
whether forward-looking economic measures such as building permits or housing
starts have greater explanatory power for predicting stock volatility during a pe-
riod of severe economic and financial stress. It might be particularly interesting
to see if the volatility of building permit growth can forecast stock volatility in




Table 2.1. Summary Statistics
This table reports summary statistics for the main variables used in the empirical analyses. Each
panel reports the mean, median, standard deviation, number of observations, minimum,
maximum, and a quantile breakdown conditional on non-zeros. Panel A summarizes the data for
the Baseline Sample between 1928:M1–1938:M12. Panel B describes data for the sub-sample of the
Great Depression as defined by NBER recession dates (1929:M8–1933:M3).
Panel A. Baseline Sample (1928:M1–1938:M12)
Percentile, conditional on non-zero
Variable Mean Median Std. Dev. N. Obs. Min Max 10th 25th 75th 90th
Stock Return Vol 0.017 0.014 0.009 132 0.005 0.049 0.007 0.010 0.022 0.031
Market Value of Leverage 14.606 12.236 6.155 132 7.648 27.093 9.326 10.222 16.086 25.918
Building Permit Vol 0.190 0.169 0.048 132 0.155 0.439 0.157 0.160 0.196 0.226
Assassinations 0.015 0 0.123 132 1 1 1 1 1 1
General Strikes 0.046 0 0.244 132 1 2 1 1 1 2
Riots 0.435 0 0.745 132 1 3 1 1 2 2
Anti-Govt. Demonstrations 0.397 0 0.883 132 1 6 1 1 2 2
Total Political Events 0.908 0 1.267 132 1 8 1 1 2 3
Panel B. Great Depression Sub-sample (1929:M8–1933:M3)
Percentile, conditional on non-zero
Variable Mean Median Std. Dev. N. Obs. Min Max 10th 25th 75th 90th
Stock Return Vol 0.023 0.022 0.011 44 0.007 0.049 0.011 0.014 0.029 0.040
Market Value of Leverage 21.265 25.918 5.954 44 11.829 27.093 11.829 16.086 27.093 27.093
Building Permit Vol 0.179 0.171 0.025 44 0.156 0.289 0.158 0.162 0.191 0.203
Assassinations 0.023 0 0.151 44 1 1 1 1 1 1
General Strikes 0.068 0 0.255 44 1 1 1 1 1 1
Riots 0.75 1 0.943 44 1 3 1 1 2 3
Anti-Govt. Demonstrations 0.591 0 0.972 44 1 5 1 1 2 2








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 2.6. Market Capitalization in 1928 by Sector
This table shows the relative importance of each Fama–French 17 industry in terms of total market
capitalization in 1928. The data are from CRSP. Market capitalization is calculated as the product
of stock price (CRSP variable: prc) and the number of outstanding shares (CRSP variable: shrout).
# Fama–French 17 Share of Total




4 Oil and Petroleum Products 8.79
5 Machinery and Business Equipment 6.80
6 Transportation 6.60
7 Other 6.59
8 Steel Works and Others 5.99
9 Retail Stores 4.89
10 Fabricated Products 4.59
11 Drugs, Soap, Perfumes, Tobacco 4.54
12 Food 4.00
13 Construction and Construction Materials 3.13
14 Mining and Minerals 2.71
15 Banks, Insurance, Other Financials 2.24
16 Consumer Durables 1.86
17 Textiles, Apparel, Footware 0.62
Total 100.00
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Table 2.7. Number of Main Corporate Offices by State: Most Important Locations
This table shows the top 10 states in terms of the number of main corporate offices. The data are
collected from the Moody’s Manuals of Investments and contains the entire sample of CRSP-listed
firms in 1928. It also shows the relative importance of each state as a fraction of the total number
of main corporate offices.
# State Number of Offices Share of Total (%)
1 New York 421 39.2%
2 Illinois 96 8.9%
3 Pennsylvania 75 7.0%
4 Ohio 71 6.6%
5 Michigan 61 5.7%
6 New Jersey 43 4.0%
7 Delaware 37 3.4%
8 California 32 3.0%
9 Massachusetts 32 3.0%
10 Missouri 22 2.0%
Total (Top 10) 890 82.8%


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Exporting Uncertainty: The Impact of the
Brexit Vote on US Corporations
3.1 Introduction
On June 23, 2016, voters in the United Kingdom elected to leave the European
Union.1 The outcome of the Brexit Referendum was surprising since most opin-
ion polls had the “remain” vote winning by a safe margin. Perhaps most notable
was the notion that voters went to polling stations with little understanding about
what casting a ballot for Brexit would entail.2 Leaving the EU could irrevocably
change the status of the UK in European trade and customs agreements. It could
also change the status of European workers in the UK and that of British workers
in continental Europe. Brexit would trigger renegotiations of decades-old agree-
ments running a gamut from financial regulation and legal jurisdiction authority
to border restrictions and the fight against terrorism.
Rising political uncertainty appears to be a global phenomenon. This can be
gleaned from the annotated time series of the policy uncertainty index calculated
by Davis (2017); see Figure 3.1. Even in light of events such as the Global Financial
Crisis and the Iraq War, the single largest spike in global uncertainty came with
the Brexit Referendum. The Referendum was not part of an institutional mandate
or predetermined political cycle (such as the election of new administrations in
the US). Instead, it was an ad hoc consultation of the public’s sentiment about an
international agreement that Prime Minister David Cameron chose to conduct for
political leverage. Formally, the Referendum had no immediately binding man-
date. It would simply initiate a process by which the UK would ask the EU to
negotiate an exit (trigger EU’s Article 50). Once this process was set in motion (at
1 This chapter is joint work with Murillo Campello and Gaurav Kankanhalli, Cornell University;
and Fabricio d’Almeida, Purdue University.

































































Figure 3.1. Global Economic Policy Uncertainty. This figure is a reproduction of Figure 1 in
Davis (2017), which computes a GDP-weighted average of monthly Global Economic Policy
Uncertainty using the methodology of Baker et al. (2016).
a date to be later determined), the parties would have years to design new rules
governing their relations. At its inception, the Brexit vote did not represent a mea-
surable innovation to trade, capital, and labor markets within a well-defined range
of anticipated outcomes. Instead, it would bring about a fundamental change to
the ways agents form expectations about those markets going forward.3
Uncertainty-filled events like Brexit are seemingly more frequent in a world gone
wary of the workings of the global financial markets, international trade, and mi-
gration.4 These are phenomena of much interest, yet of poorly-understood conse-
quences. This paper sheds light into an array of cross-border connections between
political uncertainty and economic activity. It does so gauging the impact of Brexit
on businesses located outside of the UK–EU geographical boundaries; in particu-
lar, firms domiciled in the United States. The US economy serves as a candidate
to study the cross-border effects of Brexit for several reasons. Firstly, while EU-ties
are at the root of Brexit, and effects observed across European countries could be
endogenous to the UK Referendum itself, this is plausibly not true of the US. Sec-
3This sentiment is made explicit in public remarks by the Governor of the Bank of England
(Mark Carney): “Brexit is a regime shift that has markedly changed the possible outcomes for the UK
economy...affecting how agents (households, businesses and financial markets) react, particularly the extent
to which they are affected by uncertainty during the negotiations and the degree to which they anticipate any
outcome and pull forward.”
4The surprising election of Donald Trump in the United States (dubbed Trumpit) is said to
be rooted in voter sentiment that finds close parallels in Brexit (see Becker et al. (2017)). Similar
manifestations of that sentiment have emerged in various forms in France, Italy, Catalonia, and
Brazil, among others, in recent years.
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ondly, there exist long-standing, strong ties between the US and UK economies.5
Finally, it is uniquely informative to look at the world’s largest economy to gauge
the global impact of a potentially consequential event like the 2016 Brexit vote.
We begin our analysis estimating a series of Bayesian Vector Autoregressive
(BVAR) models designed to trace the impact of UK uncertainty on US aggregates.
These model simulations include both countries’ key macroeconomic variables
along with a political uncertainty proxy — the Baker et al. (2016) economic pol-
icy uncertainty (EPU) index. This exercise is conducted with data that purposedly
excludes Brexit and allows us to gauge potential spillover effects of UK uncertainty
onto US macroeconomic variables through various channels. Impulse-response
functions point to measurable, detrimental effects of UK-born uncertainty onto US
aggregates. Effects are larger for investment than for employment. The patterns
we report are shaped by the fact that investment in the US is dominated by large
corporations that are highly integrated into the global economy (cf. Bloom (2017)).6
We then look for microeconomic underpinnings for our macro findings. To do
so, we work out a model of investment under uncertainty that is modified to incor-
porate firm-level exposure to macro uncertainty. Within a real-options framework,
our analysis points to a negative relation between uncertainty and fixed capital
investment, divestitures, and employment growth. The model predicts stronger
effects for firms with higher capital (labor) adjustment costs on investment (em-
ployment). In other words, it shows that macro uncertainty effects are modulated
by adjustment costs in relevant production factors. The model further predicts that
the negative relation between uncertainty and investment resulting from the de-
ferral of spending is temporary, and that firms eventually return to normal levels
of investment, even as uncertainty persists in the economy. The model also ana-
lyzes the impact of uncertainty on “growth options” activities, such as R&D invest-
ing. It shows how these activities are positively affected by aggregate uncertainty.
The model we develop provides implications for second-moment (“uncertainty”)
shocks onto corporate decisions independent of associated changes to first-moment
expectations (e.g., “bad news”). It disciplines our empirical analysis and adds to
5The UK is the 5th top destination of US exports and the 7th top US import partner.
6Capital expenditures by the top 100 US corporations make up for some 60% of the aggregate
investment of publicly-traded firms, accounting for most of the variation in aggregate fixed private
non-residential investment (see Grullon et al. (2018)). The creation of employment, on the other
hand, is driven by small, young firms (see Haltiwanger et al. (2013)).
80
the literature by embedding into a single framework a number of corporate deci-
sions that have been previously only separately examined.
We derive a number of testable implications from our real-options model to
study how our macro results translate into firm-level outcomes. Specifically, we ex-
amine how “UK-exposed” firms in the US (identified through market- and textual-
search-based measures) conduct decisions regarding investment, divestitures, em-
ployment, and R&D spending in the aftermath of the 2016 Brexit vote. Using
forward-looking financial analysts’ forecast data, we first show that there was no
decline in the expected profitability of UK-exposed firms, but an increase in profit
dispersion — suggesting that Brexit embedded a “second-moment” innovation. We
subsequently use an empirical testing approach that accounts for Brexit potentially
having both first- and second-moment effects on US firms. Our base difference-
in-differences (DID) estimates show that in the last two quarters of 2016 alone, the
investment-to-assets rates of UK-exposed firms fell by 0.16 percentage points more
than the investment rates of comparable non-UK-exposed firms. Given that the av-
erage quarterly investment rate in 2015 was 1.1% of assets, this decline represents a
drop of 15% in baseline investment spending. UK-exposed firms also reduced their
divestitures by 0.03 percentage points following Brexit, a drop of nearly 30% of the
average divestiture rate. Our results imply that the increase in uncertainty brought
about by the June 2016 Brexit vote reduced both investment and disinvestment ac-
tivities of UK-exposed firms domiciled in the US — pointing to an expansion of
those firms’ “investment inaction region.”
Consistent with our theoretical framework, we also observe an increase in R&D
spending by UK-exposed firms following the Brexit vote. Specifically, those firms
increased their R&D-to-asset ratios by 0.2 percentage points more than non-UK-
exposed firms in the second half of 2016, implying an increase of 7% in R&D
spending relative to the 2015 mean. Looking at employment, our estimations show
that labor force growth declined from 3.4% in 2015 to –1.5% for UK-exposed firms
in 2016. That is, the Brexit vote led to a slowdown in net job creation among
UK-exposed firms in the United States.
Along the lines of our model, we also find that the investment behavior of
UK-exposed firms was relatively short-lived and modulated by capital adjustment
costs. Specifically, the investment contraction caused by the Brexit vote was a func-
tion of the nature of the assets US firms operated — it was more acute for firms in
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industries where fixed capital is highly irreversible (non-redeployable). Labor ad-
justment costs also seem to modulate the extent to which UK-exposed firms hired
and fired workers. In particular, exposed firms in industries with higher unioniza-
tion rates — where workforce adjustments are costlier — registered a significantly
lower job growth. Importantly, we find that investment spending converges back
to its long-run trend over time (approximately one year after the Brexit vote).
We set out to characterize our findings on US companies’ investment and em-
ployment decisions following the Brexit vote by identifying whether those deci-
sions affected their US-based or their foreign-based operations. We find that sig-
nificant investment cuts and jobs losses took place within US borders. Brexit also
affected the extensive margin of UK-exposed firms’ hiring, with new job postings
in the US falling by more than 5%. Notably, these firms replaced full-time with
part-time positions. We finally delve into an analysis of offshoring activities of
firms in our sample. This analysis reveals that investment cuts are undertaken
primarily by US firms with a high degree of input (rather than output) offshoring
activity with the UK. The evidence we present shows that the 2016 Brexit vote had
a multifaceted impact on the US labor market.
Looking beyond investment and employment, we examine several auxiliary firm
policies and find that UK-exposed firms also saved more cash and accumulated less
inventory (non-cash working capital) in the aftermath of the Brexit vote. Our esti-
mates imply that in the last two quarters of 2016, UK-exposed firms increased their
cash holdings by 12% relative to their 2015 baseline level. The results we report are
in line with the theoretical literature on corporate liquidity management suggesting
that in times of heightened volatility firms with higher market exposure are likely
to increase liquid asset holdings for precautionary reasons (Acharya et al. (2013)).
Our investigation considers whether tightening financing constraints for UK-
exposed firms in the wake of the Brexit vote played a role in explaining the effects
we observe. This is an important check in light of research showing that uncer-
tainty may lead to heightened credit spreads, which in turn may prompt firms to
cut investment (Gilchrist et al. (2014)). We look into a number of metrics that speak
to firms’ ability to raise funding following Brexit. Specifically, our empirical models
are re-estimated accounting for firm-level yields on existing bonds, yields on new
bond issues, mark-ups on new syndicated loans, as well as a proxy for the cost of
raising equity financing. Our results continue to obtain.
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Our results are also robust to several alternative test strategies, including dif-
ferent firm-level measurements of exposure to UK uncertainty, sampling periods,
estimation methodologies, and falsification checks. For example, analogous DID
analyses conducted in periods not characterized by high levels of uncertainty in the
UK show no change in investment levels between UK-exposed and non-exposed
firms in the US. Additional test strategies featuring the exclusion of “Trumpit” or
focusing on the election of David Cameron suggest that the increase in uncertainty
brought about by the Brexit Referendum is the reason behind the documented be-
havior of UK-exposed American firms around June 2016. We also find no change in
investment by US firms exposed to major trading partners (such as China, Mexico,
Japan, India, and Brazil) that did not witness significant increases in uncertainty at
the same time of the Brexit vote. Our results also continue to hold when we use
non-parametric propensity score matching estimations.
One of the immediate effects of the Brexit vote was a depreciation of the British
pound (9% relative to the US dollar). Virtually all of the firms in our sample report
using derivatives to hedge against foreign exchange (FX) risk over the 2010–2016
period. Yet, by design, our tests are unconfounded by FX fluctuations. To wit,
since both our treatment and control groups comprise firms domiciled in the US,
any homogeneous effects of the pound depreciation on US firms are differenced
out in our estimations. Moreover, as we demonstrate in our offshoring analysis,
most affected firms had input-based relationships with the UK. To the extent that
the pound depreciation has heterogeneous effects, it would act as a positive shock
to importing firms’ cash flows, which would be consistent with such firms increas-
ing — instead of reducing — their investment and hiring. These features of our
empirical strategy further suggest that the 2016 Brexit vote is likely to represent
an unhedgeable source of economic uncertainty, differently than hedgeable fluctu-
ations in FX markets.
Our study builds upon a rapidly growing literature on the effects of political
uncertainty. Macroeconomic studies on how uncertainty affects investment and
output go back at least to Bernanke (1983), with recent contributions including
Bloom (2009) and Bachmann et al. (2013). Micro-level studies on the effect of un-
certainty on corporate investment and bank lending include Julio and Yook (2012),
Gulen and Ion (2016), and Berg et al. (2016). Our paper is different from the existing
literature on several fronts, but particularly in that we focus on the international
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transmission of uncertainty, rather than its domestic effects. Notably, the existing
literature is virtually silent on the international transmission of uncertainty at the
firm level.7 In our analysis, we use granular data that allow us to look in de-
tail at firm outcomes that go beyond fixed capital expenditures, simultaneously
including corporate asset sales, employment, R&D, and savings policies. Our pa-
per is also different in that we examine the effect of uncertainty that arises from
an unprecedented political event, whereas most prior studies focus on predeter-
mined electoral cycles (e.g., presidential and gubernatorial elections in the US). As
the British anti-integration Referendum has reportedly inspired similar national-
centric movements in several other countries, it is important that researchers and
policy makers are able to gauge its economic implications.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 provides a brief
background of the Brexit Referendum. Section 3.3 motivates the analysis of inter-
national spillovers between the UK and the US through the lens of Bayesian VAR
estimations. Section 3.4 presents a model of corporate activity under uncertainty
that generates testable firm-level predictions. Section 3.5 describes the data and the
empirical strategy used to identify US firms’ exposure to the UK economy. It also
presents our firm-level results along with robustness checks. Section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 Background on the Brexit Referendum
The 2016 Brexit Referendum is believed to be rooted in long-standing political and
social tensions within Europe, fueled by nationalistic and populist movements (see,
e.g., Becker et al. (2017)). In the early 2000s, attempts by the EU to deepen inte-
gration among its members sparked British opposition against the oversight of a
supranational entity. The rise of the UK Independence Party (UKIP) captured this
sentiment. As Britons voted for their representatives in the EU parliament, the
UKIP achieved the third place in 2004, second in 2009, and first in 2014. This was
the first time in modern British history that a party other than the Labour or Con-
servative parties had taken the largest share of a nation-wide election. Facing the
rise of the UKIP in 2013, Prime Minister David Cameron announced a contingent
(non-binding) plan: If the Conservative Party were to win the general elections of
7Studies on the international spillovers of policy uncertainty have focused on aggregate, time-









































































































































































Figure 3.2. UK Economic Policy Uncertainty (2010–2017). The figure shows a 7-day moving
average of the Economic Policy Uncertainty index of Baker et al. (2016) for the UK. The shaded
area marks the period of Brexit-related events, starting with the February 2016 announcement of
the date of the Referendum.
May 2015, he would commit to a referendum on Britain’s membership in the EU
before 2017. Granted another term on a narrow victory, Cameron fulfilled his elec-
toral promise, and on June 2015 the House of Commons approved the European
Union Referendum Act.
David Cameron was against the UK’s exit from the EU and vowed to resign if
Brexit was passed. On February 20, 2016, he announced that voting would take
place on June 23, 2016. In the months leading up to the Referendum, the polls
indicated that the chances of the UK leaving the EU were slim. A few weeks before
the Referendum, the “leave” vote led for the first time, only to trail again follow-
ing the assassination of a “remain” supporter (Labour MP Jo Cox) by a “leave”
extremist. On the eve of the Referendum, bookmakers’ odds showed chances of
more than 90% that the UK would remain in the EU. The upsetting vote result led
to Cameron’s immediate resignation.
The political upheaval around the Brexit Referendum process was unprecedented.
The uncertainty it brought about regarding economic policy in the UK can be
gauged by the Baker et al. (2016) EPU index (see Figure 3.2). The average quarterly
UK EPU index before 2016 was 133 (starting from the beginning of the modern
series in 1997). The index jumped by 410 points in 2016 — nearly four times the
baseline average, or a 3.4-standard deviation from the series. Although the June
23 vote resolved the uncertainty about the Referendum per se, Brexit’s nonbinding
mandate and unspecified procedures were still problematic. Under Prime Minis-
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ter Theresa May, it became clear that conditions under which the UK would leave
the EU regarding agreements on trade, migration, and financial relations, among
others, remained unsettled. Voicing her intention to proceed with the will of the
voters, Prime Minister May triggered the formal exit process provided by Article
50 of the Lisbon Treaty on March 29, 2017. In what follows, we trace some of the
international consequences of these events.
3.3 Uncertainty Spillover: Cross-Country VAR Analysis
We estimate a VAR model as a way to assess whether UK-born uncertainty has
sufficient power to affect US macroeconomic variables. We follow the US-based
VAR specification of Baker et al. (2016) in setting up our model. A few modifica-
tions are needed to address our objectives, nonetheless. First, our model includes
variables for both the US and the UK economies, so that cross-country dynamics
can be traced. Second, because we include seven variables for each country, we end
up with a large-scale VAR. Given the high dimensionality of the model, we adopt
a Bayesian approach.8 Our data coverage is set up so as to exclude Brexit, rang-
ing from 1957:Q1 through 2015:Q4. Our goal is to test the argument that UK-born
uncertainty may affect US aggregates irrespective of Brexit itself.
We estimate the model using the Minnesota prior, which combines a prior belief
that a random-walk may partially describe the dynamics of the variables in a VAR.9
We choose values for the hyperparameters of the prior distribution as suggested in
Canova (2007). Variables are included in the same fashion as in Baker et al. (2016):
(1) the Economic Policy Uncertainty (EPU) index; (2) the US dollar/British pound
FX rate; (3) the log of stock market index; (4) the short-term interest rate; (5) the
log of gross fixed investment; (6) the log of unemployment; and (7) the log of real
GDP. We include four lags of each variable in the system to allow for an entire year
of persistence in the quarterly-based series. A Gibbs sampler algorithm is used to
obtain draws from the posterior distribution.
8When the VAR’s system of equations is large or the lag structure is long, the number of free
parameters in the model becomes impractically large. In such cases, reducing the dimensionality of
the model through Bayesian shrinkage improves estimation (see, e.g., Canova (2007)).
9This method is laid out in Doan et al. (1984) and is one of the most popular prior structures
used in the literature (see, e.g., Koop and Korobilis (2010)).
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Figure 3.3. Impulse-Response Functions from Bayesian VAR. Each figure shows the
impulse-response function of a 3.4-std. dev. shock to UK Economic Policy Uncertainty and its
response on key macroeconomic variables for both the UK and the US along with 68% confidence
intervals. Data window: 1957:Q1–2015:Q4.
Figure 3.3 depicts the estimated impact of a “Brexit-size” orthogonalized shock
— a 3.4-standard deviation innovation — to UK uncertainty onto several US macroe-
conomic variables. The top two plots show that the potential impact of UK uncer-
tainty onto the UK GDP (Panel A) is significant, and that it also has the power to
affect the US GDP (Panel B). Likewise, the two middle plots suggest that UK uncer-
tainty can be highly detrimental for UK investment (Panel C), and still potentially
significant for US investment (Panel D). Finally, the bottom plots (Panels E and F)
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show that UK uncertainty also poses concerns for employment in the UK and the
US.10
One must bear in mind that each of the individual IRFs depicted in the sim-
ulations in Figure 3.3 assumes that other policies are held constant, an unlikely
scenario. Yet, the takeaway from our macro-level experiment is that UK uncer-
tainty bears the potential to harm the US economy, with a special impact on in-
vestment. One of the reasons to consider investment as the main international
transmission channel for Brexit is that firms are forward-looking when investing,
thus more sensitive to uncertainty (Bloom (2017)). Given that the American econ-
omy is open and that US private investment is dominated by large firms, our tests
suggest that American corporations should be particularly sensitive to Brexit. We
will dig deeper into the issue of corporate investment in fixed capital and employ-
ment in our micro-level analyses. Before doing so, we derive testable implications
from a model of corporate investment under macro-level uncertainty.
3.4 Theoretical Framework
We develop a simple theoretical framework to guide our tests of the impact of ag-
gregate uncertainty on various types of corporate activity. To this end, we charac-
terize increases in uncertainty using the concept of mean-preserving spread (MPS).
An uncertainty-increasing MPS only requires that a zero-mean, non-degenerate
source of randomness has been added to the distribution of the uncertain outcome.
This approach allows us to derive a set of results that hold with generality, while
remaining agnostic about the functional forms governing the distribution and mo-
ments of the outcomes of interest (see also Lee and Shin (2000)). Our model helps
one differentiate between a theory of the impact of uncertainty on corporate deci-
sions and an alternative story of how firms react to the expectation of “bad news”
(lower mean).11 A contribution of our analysis is the modeling of a number of
different corporate decisions under a single framework.
10Our VAR results are robust to alternative modeling choices. Appendix C.2 shows that the
tenor of our impulse-response functions (IRFs) remains when we consider lags as chosen by the
Bayesian information criterion. It is also unaffected by using the data-driven hyperparameter grid-
search method from Giannone et al. (2015). Finally, results are also robust to using Uhlig’s (2005)
sign-restrictions identification.
11See Bloom (2009) for a detailed discussion of first-moment versus second-moment shocks.
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3.4.1 Set Up
We model the investment decision of a firm, i, that operates for three periods, t =
0, 1, and 2. The firm chooses whether and when to invest in two types of projects:
standard-type investments (“capital” or “labor”) and growth option-type invest-
ments (“R&D”). The menu of potential capital investment projects is indexed by n,
which lies on the interval [0, N]. The menu of potential R&D projects is indexed by
m, on the interval [0, M]. The firm has an endowment of existing capital investment
projects that it had already invested in prior to t = 0. The menu of existing capital
projects is indexed by w, on the interval [0, W]. There is no time discounting.
Investment Income
If the firm decides to invest in a capital project n, its income at t = 1, 2, denoted
by v(n)it > 0, is an IID random variable:
v(n)it = vit = βiVt + εit. (3.1)
If the firm decides to invest in a R&D project m, its income at t = 1, 2, denoted by
u(m)it > 0, is:
u(m)it = uit = βiVt + ξit. (3.2)
Finally, the firm’s income from disinvesting (selling) an existing project from its
capital endowment, w, at t = 1, 2, is denoted by s(w)it > 0, such that:
s(w)it = sit = βiVt + ζit. (3.3)
In this setting, Vt > 0 represents the time-varying aggregate demand curve fac-
ing the firm and βi ∈ (0, 1] is the firm’s sensitivity to demand. εit, ξit, and ζit
are independent, idiosyncratic, mean-zero shocks, with variances σ2ε , σ2ξ , and σ
2
ζ ,
respectively. Vt is distributed as:
Vt ∼ G(Vt, r), (3.4)
where the mean of Vt is equal to Vt, the variance is equal to σ2(r), and r is an index
of the mean-preserving spread. Specifically, r′ > r =⇒ G(·, r′) is a MPS of G(·, r),
and: ∫
VtdG(·, r) = Vt ∀ r. (3.5)
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The firm’s revenue from each capital investment project it decides to invest in can
be characterized as a MPS with distribution vit ∼ P(vit, r) and mean vit = βi ×Vt,
with variance σ2i (r) = β
2
i × σ2(r) + σ2ε . Likewise, each R&D project’s revenue can
be characterized as a MPS with distribution uit ∼ Q(uit, r) and mean uit = βi ×Vt,
with variance ω2i (r) = β
2
i × σ2(r) + σ2ξ . Finally, the proceeds from disinvesting each
existing project can be characterized as a MPS with distribution sit ∼ R(sit, r) and
mean sit = βi ×Vt, with variance ψ2i (r) = β2i × σ2(r) + σ2ζ . We note that we model
the firm’s income from the projects in this way, and not with an explicit charac-
terization of the production function and demand equation, so as to abstract away
from unnecessary assumptions about the firm’s technology and market structure.
The approach allows us to parsimoniously capture the effect of uncertainty on the
timing of the firm’s investment decisions and the moderating role played by input
irreversibility.
Investment Costs
In order to undertake investment project n, the firm must incur a one-time fixed
cost of capital, denoted by FiK(κ, n) = κn, and a one-time fixed cost of labor, de-
noted by FiL(λ, n) = λn. The parameters κ > 0 and λ > 0 capture the degree of
irreversibility of input fixed costs, which scale with n.12 If it chooses to invest in
capital project n, the firm can either invest at t = 0 or t = 1. If it invests in n at
t = 0, it incurs the fixed costs λn + κn at t = 1, and earns the revenues vi1 + vi2. If
it does not invest at t = 0, choosing instead to invest at t = 1, it incurs the fixed
costs λn + κn at t = 2, earning the revenue vi2. The negative effect of uncertainty
on capital investment through a real-options channel arises from the joint presence
of the option to delay and irreversible fixed costs.
Growth-option-type projects, m, differ from capital investment-type projects, n,
in two key ways. First, the option to invest in these projects is only available at
t = 0. That is, the firm has only one chance to decide whether to invest. If it
declines, these projects cease to become available in the future (t = 1 or 2). This
means that the investment decision cannot be delayed or postponed, unlike the
12For analytical tractability, we choose to model the irreversibility of capital and labor investment
decisions through fixed costs, rather than through a “price discount” when the firm attempts to sell
assets. In adopting this approach, we follow prior literature (see, e.g., Lee and Shin (2000)) and
derive results that would remain qualitatively similar to those under the price discount approach.
90
decision to make standard-type investments. To a first-order approximation, this
matches the reality of several types of R&D projects, including the “race to patent”
a certain idea or bring a new technology to the market, where the first-mover enjoys
a substantial advantage (monopoly in the case of patents) over late-movers.
Second, investments in growth projects are partially reversible. If the firm wishes
to buy the option to invest in project m, it pays an upfront cost of m. In addition, it
must pay a development cost dt for each period in which the project remains alive.
That is, in order to earn t = 1 revenue ui1, it must pay d1; similarly, in order to
earn t = 2 revenue ui2, it must pay d2. However, at the end of t = 1, the firm may
choose to scale back and recover a fraction, µm, of the initial investment cost, with
µ ∈ (0, 1). In this case, it does not receive any revenue from the project at t = 2; i.e.,
ui2 = 0. On the other hand, if at the end of t = 1, it wishes to continue the project
then it must pay the second period development cost, d2, to receive ui2. This, too,
matches the reality of certain types of R&D projects (e.g., pharmaceutical trials), in
which decisions are made in stages, and the firm does not need to pre-commit to
follow through on all stages at once.13 Notably, the joint absence of (1) the option
to delay and (2) irreversible, fixed costs generates a positive effect of uncertainty on
R&D investment (Bloom and Van Reenen (2002)).
Finally, the firm can choose at time t = 0 or t = 1 to disinvest (sell) any of its
existing endowment of projects, w. If the firm sells a project at time t, it must pay
a scrapping cost δw, but receives the cash flow from disinvestment of sit. Else, for
each period t that the project remains alive, the firm earns a known xit (for example,
rent accruing from a real-estate holding).14 The process of disinvesting a project
is irreversible, and as in the case of capital investment, it is this irreversibility that
generates a negative effect of uncertainty on disinvestment.
13Hall and Lerner (2010) note that around half of R&D expenditures are payments to highly-
skilled workers, and such contracts are often designed such that payments are conditional on suc-
cess in the various stages of a given research project.
14The continuation revenue could also be characterized as random.
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3.4.2 Analysis and Results
Capital and Labor Investment Decisions
In solving the firm’s capital investment problem, we first consider its decision at
t = 1. If the firm had initiated any projects at t = 0, it obtains the second period
revenue vi2 per project. Among those projects that were not undertaken at t = 0,
the firm can choose to initiate any of them at t = 1 and earn vi2 − (κ + λ)n per
project. Else, it can discard any uninvested projects and earn 0. The firm will
rationally discard a given project, ñ, when its expected revenue is less than the
associated costs of investment and hiring. The firm will cease operations at the end
of t = 2 and any project that is not undertaken at either t = 0 or t = 1 has a value
of 0 by the end of t = 2. The firm’s investment decision at t = 1 will be guided by
profit in the second period that is generated by project ñ. The profit function, πi2,




vi2 − (κ + λ)ñ if vi2 > (κ + λ)ñ (Delayed Investment),
0 if vi2 ≤ (κ + λ)ñ (No Investment).
(3.6)
Next, we consider the firm’s decision at t = 0. The optimal total investment
level at t = 0 can be expressed in terms of n∗, the breakeven project. The firm
will invest in all projects in the range [0, n∗), and not invest in projects in the
range [n∗, N], instead waiting until t = 1 to decide whether to undertake any of
those projects. The firm’s expected profit from investing in project ñ at t = 0 is
vi1 + E[vi2] − (κ + λ)ñ. Its expected profit from not investing in ñ at t = 0, and
choosing instead to wait until t = 1 to decide, is E [max (vi2 − (κ + λ)ñ, 0)]. The
firm invests in project ñ at t = 0 if:
vi1 + E[vi2]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Expected Revenue
≥ (κ + λ)ñ︸ ︷︷ ︸
Cost o f Investment
+ E [max (vi2 − (κ + λ)ñ, 0)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Value o f Waiting
. (3.7)
The breakeven condition for determining the optimal investment level n∗ at t = 0
is:
vi1 + E [vi2] = (κ + λ)n∗ + E [max (vi2 − (κ + λ)n∗, 0)] (3.8)
In Lemma 1, we prove the existence of the optimal t = 0 investment level, n∗.15
15See Appendix C.1 for full proofs of lemmas and propositions.
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Lemma 1. The optimal capital investment level n∗ at t = 0 is given by (3.8) for sufficiently
large N.
The breakeven condition in (3.8) implies that the firm invests in all projects at t =
0 up to project n∗, for which the benefits are expected to exceed the costs. Firm costs
are made of two components: (1) the cost of investing in capital and hiring, and (2)
the option value of waiting to choose whether to invest. The embedded optionality
in the firm’s investment decision is key in generating a negative relation between
uncertainty and investment. In particular, while the addition of a zero-mean spread
does not change the left-hand side of (3.7), it increases the right-hand side of that
inequality given the firm’s option to forgo investment in low income states. Differ-
ently put, an increase in uncertainty in the distribution of vit reduces the breakeven
project level n∗, and correspondingly shrinks the set of projects the firm invests in
at t = 0, namely the interval [0, n∗). We establish this result in Proposition 1.
Proposition 1. Increased uncertainty leads to less investment at t = 0. For r′ > r, namely
when G(·, r′) is obtained by a mean-preserving spread of G(·, r), n∗(r′) < n∗(r). That is,
dn∗
dr < 0.
Given that the firm invests in n∗ projects, the variance of its total income is




> (n∗ × σi(r))2 .
In addition, for β′i > βi, it follows that
(










β2i × σ2(r) + σ2ε
)
= (n∗ × σi(r))2 ∀ r. That is, higher values of parameter
βi imply greater increases of firm i’s income variance for a given increase in uncer-
tainty. This means that firms with higher βi should reduce capital investment more
pronouncedly in the face of higher uncertainty.
R&D Investment Decisions
Our model shows how the growth options nature of R&D-type investments gener-
ates a positive relation between uncertainty and investment. The argument is based
on the idea that increased uncertainty increases the probability of both highly pos-
itive and highly negative outcomes. Provided that there is sufficient investment
reversibility, or the ability to scale back without incurring substantial costs in the
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face of a negative realization (“downside limiting”), uncertainty only increases the
incentive to invest in such projects.16 Our model delivers a prediction that is con-
sistent with this intuition.
In solving the firm’s R&D investment problem, we consider its decision at t = 0,





ui1 − d1 + ui2 − d2 − m̃ (Investment, No Scaling Back),
ui1 − d1 + µm̃− m̃ (Investment, Later Scaling Back).
(3.9)
The firm will invest at t = 0 if:
E[max (min (ui1 − d1 + ui2 − d2, ui1 − d1 + µm̃) , 0)] ≥ m̃. (3.10)
Since the firm may only scale back at t = 1 if E[u2t] < µm̃ + d2, it is clear that the
firm will invest if:
E[max (ui1 − d1 + µm̃, 0)] ≥ m̃. (3.11)
The breakeven R&D project, m∗, is determined by:
E[max (ui1 − d1 + µm∗, 0)] = m∗. (3.12)
In Lemma 2, we prove the existence of the optimal R&D investment level m∗.
Lemma 2. The optimal R&D investment level m∗ at t = 0 is given by (3.12) for suffi-
ciently large M.
The breakeven condition (3.12) implies that the firm invests in all R&D projects
up to the point at which benefits are expected to exceed costs. Since at t = 1 the
firm can choose to scale back the project, and if so, partially recover the upfront
cost, the decision to invest in the R&D projects at t = 0 is equivalent to the decision
to buy a call option expiring at t = 1. At the breakeven R&D investment level,
m∗, the price of the option equals its value. Increased uncertainty in the distri-
bution of uit increases the value of this option, thereby increasing the breakeven
project threshold m∗, expanding the set of R&D projects the firm undertakes. This
argument is formalized in Proposition 2.
16This dynamic is believed to have played a significant role in the dot-com bubble (see Bloom
(2014)).
94
Proposition 2. Increased uncertainty leads to greater R&D investment at t = 0. For
r′ > r, namely when G(·, r′) is obtained by a mean-preserving spread of G(·, r), m∗(r′) >
m∗(r). That is, dm
∗
dr > 0.
Proposition 2 states that an increase in uncertainty increases the set of R&D-type
projects that the firm is willing to undertake, given that the potential upside has
increased and the downside is capped by the ability to scale back and partially
recover upfront costs. It is important to stress the two key conditions that generate
opposing predictions of the effect of uncertainty on capital investments versus R&D
investments. The first condition is the firm’s ability to delay capital investments
(“wait and see”), but not R&D investments (“patent race”). The second relates to
the irreversibility of the investment. In the R&D setting, the firm has the ability to
scale down investment at the end of t = 1. This is in contrast to capital investment,
whose initial costs, once paid, are largely lost.
Disinvestment Decisions
In solving a firm’s disinvestment problem, we first consider its decision at t = 1.
If the firm had disinvested any of its endowed projects at t = 0, then it earns 0
for those projects. Among projects that were not disinvested at t = 0 (i.e., remain
alive a t = 1), the firm can choose to sell any of them at t = 1 and receive cash
flows of si2 + xi2 − δw per project. Else, it can choose not to sell and receive xi2 per
project. As in the case of the investment decision, the firm’s disinvestment policy





si2 + xi2 − δw̃ if si2 > δw̃ (Delayed Disinvestment),
xi2 if si2 ≤ δw̃ (No Disinvestment).
(3.13)
Next, we consider the firm’s disinvestment decision at t = 0. The optimal level
of disinvestment at t = 0 can be expressed in terms of w∗, the breakeven project.
The firm will optimally disinvest (sell) all projects in the range [0, w∗), and not
disinvest (choose to retain) any projects in the range [w∗, W], instead of waiting
until t = 1 to decide whether or not to disinvest. The firm’s cash flows from dis-
investing project w̃ at t = 0 is si1 + xi1 − δw̃. Its expected cash flows from not
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disinvesting project w̃ at t = 0, and choosing instead to wait till t = 1 to decide,
is xi1 + E [max (si2 + xi2 − δw̃, xi2)]. Simplifying these two expressions, the firm
disinvests project w̃ at t = 0 if:
si1 − δw̃ ≥ xi2 + E [max (si2 − δw̃, 0)] . (3.14)
The breakeven condition for determining the optimal disinvestment level w∗ at
t = 0 is:
si1 − δw∗ = xi2 + E [max (si2 − δw∗, 0)] . (3.15)
In Lemma 3, we prove the existence of the optimal t = 0 investment level, w∗.
Lemma 3. The optimal disinvestment level w∗ at t = 0 is given by (3.15) for sufficiently
large W.
The breakeven condition in (3.15) implies that at t = 0 the firm sells all projects
up to project w∗, as the benefits of doing so, si1, are expected to exceed the costs.
Costs are made of two components: (1) the cost of selling the project, δw, and (2)
the option value of waiting to choose whether to disinvest. The embedded option-
ality in the firm’s disinvestment decision is key in generating a negative relation
between uncertainty and disinvestment, as is the case with investment. As before,
while the addition of a zero-mean spread does not change the left-hand side of
(3.14), it increases the right-hand side of that inequality given the firm’s option to
forgo disinvestment in high income states. An increase in uncertainty in the distri-
bution of sit reduces the breakeven project level w∗, and correspondingly shrinks
the set of projects the firm disinvests at t = 0, namely the interval [0, w∗). We
establish this result in Proposition 3.
Proposition 3. Increased uncertainty leads to less disinvestment at t = 0. For r′ > r,




Taken together, the results of Proposition 1 and 3 imply that by increasing the




While a richer model is needed to fully characterize the dynamics of investment
under uncertainty over time, ours can provide intuition for the fact that the drop
in investment induced by higher uncertainty is temporary (see also Bloom (2009)).
Consider two t = 0 breakeven investment levels n∗ and n∗∗ associated with two
degrees of uncertainty, r∗ and r∗∗ respectively, with r∗∗ > r∗. From Proposition 1, it
follows that n∗ > n∗∗. This means that at t = 1, the firm has the option to invest in
projects [n∗, N] and [n∗∗, N], respectively, having chosen to invest in projects [0, n∗)
and [0, n∗∗) at t = 0. At t = 1, uncertainty regarding vi1 has been resolved, and
the firm must determine which of the remaining projects [n∗, N] or [n∗∗, N], it will
invest in. The interval [n∗∗, n∗] represents the projects that the firm has foregone
investing in at t = 0 due to increased uncertainty. As the firm loses the option to
invest in these projects at the end of t = 2, the firm will choose to invest in them
at t = 1 provided the benefits exceed the costs. In Proposition 4 we show that
even under the higher level of uncertainty, r∗∗, the firm invests in all projects on
the interval [n∗∗, n∗] at t = 1.
Proposition 4. The firm will invest in the set of projects [n∗∗, n∗] at future time t = 1
regardless of the level of uncertainty, r.
The intuition behind this proposition is as follows. Projects on the interval
[n∗∗, n∗] are profitable projects that are not undertaken at t = 0 due to increased
uncertainty. However, since the firm loses the ability to invest in any project [0, N]
at the end of t = 2, it will invest in any profitable projects on this interval at t = 1
(when uncertainty regarding vi1 has been resolved). As the projects [n∗∗, n∗] con-
tinue to remain profitable, the firm will undertake them. This implies that the firm
returns its investment levels to normalcy by t = 1, despite the reduction in invest-
ment levels at t = 0 induced by uncertainty. It follows that the effect of uncertainty
on investment is temporary.
The Effect of Input Irreversibility
We now address the role played by the degree of irreversibility of capital and labor,
as captured by their associated fixed costs. We do so by way of two propositions.
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Proposition 5. An increase in the degree of irreversibility of capital leads to less investment
for higher levels of uncertainty in the first period; i.e., dn
∗
dκ < 0.
Proposition 6. An increase in the degree of irreversibility of labor leads to less investment
for higher levels of uncertainty in the first period; i.e., dn
∗
dλ < 0.
Combining the last two propositions with Proposition 1, we have that for an
increase in uncertainty in the MPS sense (i.e., r′ > r) and for greater degree of input
irreversibility (κ′ > κ and λ′ > λ), the following conditions hold with respect to
investment:
n∗(r, κ, λ) > n∗(r′, κ, λ) > n∗(r′, κ′, λ),
n∗(r, κ, λ) > n∗(r′, κ, λ) > n∗(r′, κ, λ′).
(3.16)
The above conditions state that an increase in uncertainty reduces the set of
projects the firm is willing to invest in at t = 0, electing to wait until uncertainty
is partially resolved at t = 1 before deciding whether to invest. Notably, when the
firm faces higher irreversible costs, it invests even less at t = 0. Differently put,
an increase in uncertainty reduces investment in the first period, and the effect is
modulated by the degree of irreversibility of capital or labor.
It is worth concluding our theoretical analysis with a discussion contrasting “un-
certainty” about future cash flows and “expectations” about future cash flows. In
our model, we do not explicitly derive the effects of a decline in expected cash
flows (i.e., Vt), focusing instead on the effects of an increase in uncertainty (i.e.,
r). A decline in expected cash flows could produce similar implications in terms
of a decline in capital investment and employment. Notably, however, a decline in
expected cash flows would provide contrasting implications in terms of an increase
in disinvestment and a decline in R&D, counter to the predictions of Propositions
2 and 3. Our subsequent empirical analysis will differentiate across these sets of
theoretical predictions.
3.4.3 Testable Hypotheses
Our model implies that an increase in aggregate uncertainty reduces firm invest-
ments in standard-type projects, and that the effect is modulated by the degree of
exposure to uncertainty, βi. In the context of the impact of UK-born uncertainty
onto US-based firms, we state our first testable hypothesis.
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Hypothesis 1. American firms with a higher exposure to UK uncertainty (High UK-
Exposure firms) will disproportionately reduce their investment in capital and labor in
response to the Brexit vote.
Our model also indicates that an increase in aggregate uncertainty triggers firm
investment in R&D-type projects, and the effect is modulated by the degree of
exposure to uncertainty, βi. Under our test setting, we state our second testable
hypothesis.
Hypothesis 2. American firms with a higher exposure to UK uncertainty (High UK-
Exposure firms) will disproportionately increase their investment in R&D in response to
the Brexit vote.
Our model further implies that an increase in aggregate uncertainty reduces
firm capital disinvestment, and the effect is modulated by the degree of firm-level
exposure to uncertainty. This translates into our third testable hypothesis.
Hypothesis 3. American firms with a higher exposure to UK uncertainty (High UK-
Exposure firms) will disproportionately reduce their disinvestment in fixed capital in re-
sponse to the Brexit vote.
Finally, our model results are shaped by fixed costs FiK and FiL, which capture
the degree of irreversibility of capital and labor, respectively. It implies that higher
input adjustment costs in each factor modulates the effect of uncertainty in invest-
ment in that input. This gives rise to our fourth and fifth testable hypotheses.
Hypothesis 4. American firms with a higher exposure to UK uncertainty (High UK-
Exposure firms) facing higher capital adjustment costs will reduce their fixed investment
more pronouncedly in response to the Brexit vote.
Hypothesis 5. American firms with a higher exposure to UK uncertainty (High UK-
Exposure firms) facing higher labor adjustment costs will reduce their hiring more pro-
nouncedly in response to the Brexit vote.
3.4.4 Empirical Counterparts
The implementation of our tests calls for identifying empirical counterparts to the
constructs of the model. We first introduce an empirical counterpart to the sen-
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sitivity parameter βi, which captures individual firms’ responses to changes in
aggregate uncertainty. We adopt two approaches. The first follows the model very
closely, yielding an empirical proxy for βi that is derived from the capital mar-
kets. The second is based on expectations of corporate decision-makers regarding
uncertainty, taken from firms’ disclosures to market investors.17 After defining em-
pirical counterparts for βi, we present measures of capital and labor irreversibility,
corresponding to κ and λ, respectively.
Model-Based Measure of Uncertainty
In the context of our examination, the increase in aggregate uncertainty, Vt, comes
from the rise in uncertainty associated with the Brexit vote. Accordingly, we take
variances on both sides of Eq. (3.1) in our model (alternatively, Eq. (3.2)) to capture
the notion of uncertainty in the MPS framework:
Var(vit) = β2i Var(Vt) + σ
2
ε . (3.17)
We can employ a regression-like approach to operationalize an empirical counter-
part to βi. Specifically, taking square-roots of both sides of (3.17) we obtain:
Vol(vit) ≈ βiVol(Vt) + σε −
√
2× βiVol(Vt)× σε. (3.18)
Following Bloom (2014), we use stock market volatility as a gauge of aggregate
uncertainty and estimate (3.18) for each firm i as:18
Vol(rit) = αi + βUKi Vol(FTSE100t) + θControlst + εit. (3.19)
Eq. (3.19) uses the volatility of equity returns, Vol(rit), as a proxy for firm income
volatility, Vol(vit). It also uses the volatility of the FTSE100 index as a proxy for
17We also consider firm sales to the UK from sources like COMPUSTAT’s Segment files. How-
ever, close examination of 10-K forms from a number of sample firms indicates that such data are
often incomplete and inconsistently tabulated in the forms. Aggravating this problem, sales that
take place in the UK are known to be invoiced in other countries (such as Ireland) for tax pur-
poses. As such, as we describe below, our main analyses rely on information from other sources.
In Section 3.5.5, however, we resort to an alternative textual-search-based analysis that goes beyond
financial statements contained in 10-K forms in identifying exposure to the UK (cf. Hoberg and
Moon (2017)). That approach allows us to identify offshoring activities, as reported by firms in the
text of their disclosures (information often missing from their tabulated financial statements).
18Bloom (2014) shows that stock market volatility exhibits a high degree of commonality with
other observed proxies for uncertainty including those derived from bond markets, exchange rates,
and GDP forecasts.
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uncertainty in the UK — the relevant source of aggregate uncertainty in our setting.




into (3.19) to absorb effects arising through firms’ exposure to the domestic US mar-
ket and exchange rate fluctuations between the US dollar and the British pound.
For each firm, we take the estimated value of βUKi from the above regression as the
empirical counterpart to βi in our model.19
Textual-Search-Based Measure of Uncertainty
As an alternative measure of US firms’ exposure to Brexit-induced uncertainty, we
develop a textual-search-based metric that is constructed by parsing firms’ 2015
10-K filings. In particular, we look for the number of entries of keywords related
to uncertainty about Brexit (“Brexit”, “Great Britain”, and “Uncertainty”) in firms’
disclosures, classifying firms with a “high” number of entries as High UK-Exposure
firms, and those with zero entries as control firms.20 Notably, the vast majority
of firms file their 10-Ks with the SEC between between March and June of each
year. By computing these wordcounts from firms’ 10-K disclosures — before the
vote takes place, yet after the Referendum is announced — we build a measure of
exposure to the UK based on what firms consider relevant to communicate to their
investors on the eve of the 2016 Brexit vote.
Textual analysis reveals that most firms cite concerns about Brexit a half dozen
times or more in their 10-Ks, or not at all. As such, we arbitrarily set a cut-off for
high Brexit cites at more than 5 entries. There are 807 firms citing Brexit more than
5 times in their 10-Ks. On the other hand, 433 do not cite any Brexit-related terms
in their public filings. While the heuristic cut-off we consider is naturally arbitrary,
our results are robust to many sensible alternative choices.
19The last term in (3.18) is subsumed by the idiosyncratic volatility term, εit, in (3.19). We note
that the volatility of equity returns may be an imperfect proxy for the volatility of firm income as
returns are driven by news on both cash flows and discount rates (Campbell and Shiller (1988)).
Following Vuolteenaho (2002), we alternatively decompose the volatility of each firm’s returns into
cash flow and discount rate components and re-estimate Eq. (3.19) with the cash flow component
(only) as the dependent variable, obtaining an alternative uncertainty measure, βUKi,CF. The estimates
for βUKi and β
UK
i,CF have a rank correlation of 0.8, and there is an 86% overlap in the set of firms
appearing at the top tercile of both βUKi and β
UK
i,CF. Our inferences are unchanged whether using
βUKi or β
UK
i,CF to conduct our tests (see Appendix C.3).
20Entries like “Referendum”, “Uncertain”, “United Kingdom”, “UK”, “U.K.”, “G.B.”, etc. are
subsumed by the above wording.
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Capital and Labor Irreversibility Measures
Our model results are modulated by fixed costs FiK, which capture the degree of
irreversibility of capital. To empirically measure capital irreversibility, we use an
index of capital redeployability proposed by Kim and Kung (2016). That index
classifies fixed capital liquidity in terms of salability of assets in secondary mar-
kets.21 The premise is that when a firm operates assets that are used across several
industries, there are more potential buyers should the firm decide to revert invest-
ment decisions by selling off its assets. The same is not true for a firm that operates
highly-specialized assets. Higher values of the asset redeployability index are asso-
ciated with a lower degree of capital irreversibility, corresponding to a lower value
of FiK in our model.
Our next task is to find an empirical proxy for the irreversibility of labor, FiL.
We resort to the use of worker unionization as an empirical proxy for frictions in
labor input. We do so as ample research highlights the difficulties faced by firms
with unionized employees in adjusting their workforce in response to changes in
aggregate conditions (see, among others, Bloom (2009)). In using this strategy, we
measure the percentage of total employees who are unionized at the 4-digit SIC
level using data from the BEA. We expect firms with a greater share of unionized
workers to have lower labor flexibility and incur greater costs in adjusting the size
of their workforce.
3.5 Firm-Level Empirical Analysis
This section gauges the impact of the 2016 Brexit vote on US firms. We first describe
the data. Next, we set up our DID test by identifying key event dates and treatment
and control firm groups. Finally, we present results on investment, disinvestment,
employment, R&D, and cash holdings.
21The asset redeployability index is derived from the capital flow table constructed by the Bu-
reau of Economic Analysis (BEA). The BEA breaks down fixed capital expenditures into several
categories of assets for a broad cross-section of industries. Kim and Kung (2016) compute the asset-




We use COMPUSTAT Quarterly to gather basic information on firm investment
and financial data. We consider US companies from the first calendar quarter of
2010 through the fourth quarter of 2016. We drop utility and financial firms, as
well as companies whose market value or book assets are lower than $10 million.
The sample used in our baseline investment tests consists of 41,630 observations
(firm-quarters). For additional analysis on firms’ investment in the US, we obtain
subsidiary-level investment data from the Bureau van Dijk’s Orbis dataset (see
Cravino and Levchenko (2016)). We use Orbis’s company search tool to match
parent firms in our COMPUSTAT sample to ultimate owner firms in Orbis. By
doing so, we obtain separate information on their US- and UK-based subsidiaries.
The Orbis sample we use consists of 6,203 observations (firm-years).
Firm-level data on total employment is available only at lower frequency, taken
from COMPUSTAT’s Annual Fundamentals. We construct a measure of employ-
ment growth based on the change in the number of employees of the firm. Our
employment sample consists of 11,345 observations (firm-years). We rely on the
COMPUSTAT’s Historical Segments dataset for information on the geographical
location of employment. We also utilize data on firms’ job ad postings in the United
States provided by Burning Glass Technologies. These data are compiled from on-
line vacancy postings on about 40,000 websites, representing the near-universe of
online hiring in the US (see Hershbein and Kahn (2018)). We match firms (both par-
ents and their US subsidiaries) in our sample to Burning Glass employers through
exact name matching, fuzzy name matching, and finally, manually. We construct
our measure of firm hiring as the log number of postings. Our firm hiring sample
consists of 27,464 observations (firm-quarters).
We use CRSP stock price data and Bloomberg equity index and currency data
to compute our model-based measure of firm exposure to the UK (see Eq. (3.19)).
We use monthly data from 2010:M1 through 2014:M12 so that exposure to the UK
is measured before any major Brexit-related events. For our text-based measure
of exposure to the UK, we obtain firms’ 2015 10-K filings from the SEC’s EDGAR
platform. Analyst forecast data are obtained from I/B/E/S. Data on bond yields
are from TRACE and SDC, while syndicated loan spreads are drawn from WRDS-
Reuters DealScan. Macroeconomic variables are taken from the Federal Reserve
Bank of St. Louis’ FRED database (supplemental data sources are described below).
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3.5.2 Test Strategy and Empirical Specification
Identification
We use a standard DID approach to assess the impact of the 2016 Brexit vote on
American firms. Following our model framework, in our base analysis, we charac-
terize firms as treated (control) units if they are in the upper (bottom) tercile of the
non-negative range of the βUKi distribution.
22 Under this market-based approach
a total of 449 unique firms are assigned to the treated category (βUKi > 0.68). In
contrast, 360 unique firms are assigned to the control category (βUKi < 0.28).
We also consider an alternative, text-based measure of exposure to Brexit. Under
this approach, a total of 807 firms are assigned to the treated category (2015 10-K
mentions of Brexit terms > 5). A total of 433 firms in the control category have no
mentions of Brexit-related terms in their 10-Ks.
Timeline
Once firms are identified as exposed (treated) and non-exposed (control), we need
to set the time-frame of our DID analysis. We make this determination by mapping
key events of our institutional setting into market-based measures of perceived un-
certainty. In Figure 3.4, we plot three point-in-time snapshots of the term structure
of implied volatility for the FTSE100 Index. The dynamics described in this figure
help us identify dates in which uncertainty surrounding the Brexit Referendum
seems to be incorporated into market expectations.23
22For group contrasting, we do not include firms that benefit from uncertainty in the UK in
the control group (firms with βUKi < 0) as this could lead to overestimation biases attached to
the treatment effects we seek to identify. Nevertheless, in specifications where we use βUKi as a
continuous treatment variable, we relax this restriction and include all values of βUKi . In unreported
tests, we only label those firms with statistically significant positive βUKi estimates as treated firms,
and those with βUKi statistically indistinguishable from zero as controls. We find that our results
hold across a range of sensible treatment assignment thresholds.
23The implied volatility term structure serves as a metric of market uncertainty over time as it
expresses the range of movements in the FTSE100 that investors expect over various horizons (see
Dumas et al. (1998) and Mixon (2007)). The values in Figure 3.4 reflect the market’s expectation of
the volatility of the FTSE100 over different maturities. For example, if annualized implied volatility




































































































Dec 31, 2014 (Benchmark, Pre-Brexit)
Feb 22, 2016 (Day after Brexit vote date announcement)
Jun 24, 2016 (Day after Brexit victory)
Figure 3.4. Term Structure of FTSE100 Implied Volatility. This figure shows the term structure
of the FTSE100 Index at three different moments. The term structure at each of the dates is
constructed from average Black-Scholes implied volatilities derived from quoted prices of
at-the-money options on the FTSE100 Index (Ticker: UKX) on that date. The values plotted reflect
the market’s expectation of the volatility of the FTSE100 index over various maturities considered.
The first (dotted blue) curve represents the term structure as of December 31,
2014, which is the last date of our βUKi estimation period. We use this curve as a
benchmark since expectations at that time were uncontaminated by Brexit. As is
typical for equities during normal economic conditions, the term structure is up-
ward sloping, indicating the market expects greater volatility at longer horizons.
The curve hovers smoothly around the 15–16% range, suggesting that no abrupt
changes are expected by options market participants over a maturity horizon of up
to two years.
The second (continuous red) curve is the term structure as of February 22, 2016,
the first trading day following David Cameron’s announcement of the Brexit vote
date. Upon news that the Referendum would be held on June 23, the term structure
exhibits a U-shape for the window leading up to this newly-revealed date, with a
peak at 5 months. This pattern is notable since the options with 5 months to
maturity would be the very first FTSE100 derivatives to mature after the Brexit
vote.
The third (dashed yellow) curve depicts the term structure as of June 24, 2016,
the first trading day following the “leave” victory. The term structure becomes
downward-sloping, pointing to substantial uncertainty in the immediate aftermath
at each date in the graph is computed from average Black-Scholes implied volatilities derived from



























































Low Beta UK Mean Forecast
High Beta UK Mean Forecast
Figure 3.5. Analysts’ Earnings Per Share Forecasts around Brexit. This figure shows how analyst
Earnings Per Share (EPS) forecasts behaved around Brexit’s key dates. Confidence intervals are
calculated as ±1.5 standard deviations from the mean forecast. Each line represents a group of
firms sorted by exposure to the UK economy as measured by βUKi . The shaded area marks the
beginning of Brexit-related events with the announcement of the date of the UK–EU Referendum
by PM David Cameron (2016:Q1). Both series are normalized to take the value of 0 in 2016:Q1.
of the Brexit vote, relative to longer maturity horizons. This curve also shows that
the volatility implied by option prices converges to a similar level of longer-term
uncertainty (several years out) to that of pre-Brexit levels.
The dynamics of options markets depicted in Figure 3.4 are useful in guiding
our test strategy. Responses to official news about the exact Referendum vote date
suggest that market participants were quick to incorporate uncertainty embedded
by Brexit in their trading activity — before the actual outcome of the vote. In par-
ticular, options trading taking place on February 22, 2016 were priced to reflect a
significant drop in market volatility for the period leading up to the Brexit vote date
(on June 23), only to show a spike in volatility right after the vote. At the time the
vote takes place, market uncertainty seemed unusually high. Resolution about the
vote outcome, nonetheless, seems to quell uncertainty forecasts. In particular, as
of June 24, 2016, the one-year ahead implied volatility is not significantly different
from that registered back in December 2014.
Having examined market uncertainty in the UK based upon implied options
volatility, we set out to verify in our US firm-level data if this period coincided with
increased perceived business uncertainty for High UK-Exposure firms. We do so us-
ing data on analysts’ forecasts from the I/B/E/S database. Beginning in 2015:Q1,
we obtain the 1-year ahead earnings per share (EPS) forecasts for each firm in our
sample and compute the mean and standard deviation of forecasts. We quantify
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earnings forecast uncertainty for firms in the high and low βUKi groups by con-
structing ±1.5 standard-deviation intervals around their group mean forecasts in
Figure 3.5. The figure shows no discernible difference in mean forecasted earnings
between high and low βUKi firms, suggesting analysts did not expect UK-exposed
firms to do any worse, on average, in terms of earnings performance following
the Brexit vote. The fact that mean EPS forecasts stay virtually the same over the
2-year window for both high and low βUKi firms suggests that there is no clear sign
of a “first-moment” (negative) effect of Brexit on US corporate earnings. That same
earnings forecasts evidence points to the Brexit vote having a “second-moment”
effect in terms of increased uncertainty regarding UK-exposed firms’ expectations
in 2016:Q1–Q2. In particular, EPS forecast dispersion of High UK-Exposure firms
increases significantly in early 2016.
In our empirical tests, we compare two quarters before versus two quarters after
the two key Brexit events we have just identified (February 22 and June 23, 2016).
We focus on a relatively short window around the Brexit vote because our model
stresses the relatively short-lived impact of uncertainty on investment (a duration
impact that we show to hold in the data). We limit our analysis to the end of
2016 due to the start of the Trump administration in January 2017 (another relevant
political event). We show in later robustness checks that results also hold for a
narrower window that excludes the election of Trump.
Empirical Model
We compare differences in outcomes of interest between treated (High UK-Exposure)
and control (Low UK-Exposure) firms. Differences over the 2016:Q3–Q4 period are
taken relative to the same two quarters in the previous year, 2015:Q3–Q4.24 This is
equivalent to estimating the following model:
Yi,t = α + δ [Postt × High UK-Exposurei]











The outcomes of interest, Yi,t, are fixed capital investment, employment growth,
R&D expenditures, divestitures, cash holdings, and non-cash working capital.
24Comparing the last two quarters of 2016 with the same quarters in the prior year is meant to
minimize the impact of seasonal effects.
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High UK-Exposurei is a dummy variable that equals 1 if firm i is UK-exposed and
zero otherwise. A firm is considered to be UK-exposed according to two measures:
(1) if it belongs to the top tercile of βUKi (market-based measure); or (2) if it has a
high number of Brexit-related entries in its 2015 10-K form (textual-search-based
measure). Postt equals 1 if the time period is in the 2016:Q3–Q4 window.
Controlsi,t−1 is a vector of macroeconomic- and firm-level control variables. Macro
controls include the lagged US dollar/British pound FX rate, the lagged VIX im-
plied volatility index, the lagged mean GDP growth 1-year-ahead forecast from the
Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia’s Livingstone Survey, the lagged Consumer
Sentiment Index from the University of Michigan, and the lagged Leading Eco-
nomic Indicator from the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia. Firm-level controls
include lagged stock returns, Tobin’s Q, cash flow, logged assets, and sales growth.
As an additional control for first-moment effects of Brexit, we add 1-quarter-ahead
consensus earnings forecasts to our empirical model. Firmi represents firm-fixed
effects, Industryj is a dummy for each industry category j of the Hoberg and
Phillips (2016) classification (FIC 100),25 and Quartert are calendar-quarter dum-
mies. Standard errors are double-clustered by firm and calendar quarters.
3.5.3 Descriptive Statistics
Table 3.1 presents our sample summary statistics. Firm-level accounting variables
are normalized by lagged total assets. We begin with Panel A presenting the
statistics for the universe of COMPUSTAT firms in the pre-Brexit sample period
(2010:Q1–2015:Q4). Using our baseline market-based βUKi criterion, Panel B sum-
marizes the data for treated firms as defined by βUKi ( those in the top tercile of
βUKi ), while Panel C reports statistics for control firms as defined by β
UK
i (bottom
tercile of βUKi ). Panels D and E report summary statistics for treatment and control
firms, respectively, as defined by mentions of Brexit-related words in firms’ 10-K
filings (our text-based approach).
The reported statistics show that our sample firms do not display salient discrep-
ancies relative to the larger universe of COMPUSTAT firms. Comparisons across
25These industries are formed by grouping firms with textually similar product descriptions
in their 10-Ks. Hoberg and Phillips (2016) show that the resulting industry classification is more
granular and captures the locus of product-market competitors of a given firm better than the
standard SIC or NAICS industry schemes.
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subsamples suggest that treated and control firms (as defined by βUKi ) differ across
a few characteristics: firms in the treatment group are smaller as measured by total
assets and invest more than control firms. However, firms in the treated group
as defined by 10-K mentions of Brexit-related words are, if anything, larger than
those in the control group, while their investment appears to be similar. Treatment
and control firms share similarities on a number of dimensions across both assign-
ment schemes we use. They display economically similar R&D expenditures, cash
holdings, Tobin’s Q, and employment growth.
To confirm that differences in firm characteristics do not drive our results, we
redo all of our tests on propensity-score matched samples in which firm-level char-
acteristics are balanced before any estimations are conducted. Table 3 in Appendix
C.3 displays summary statistics of the matched samples. Table 4 in Appendix C.3
reports the results of our main estimations on these matched samples.
3.5.4 The Impact of Brexit on US Firms’ Investment, Labor, R&D,
and Divestitures
Results from our baseline estimations for investment and employment are shown
in Table 3.2. We begin with a firm-fixed effects estimation in which βUKi enters the
specification as a linear continuous-treatment variable in column (1), allowing for
the entire range of βUKi values. The Post× βUKi interaction coefficient is negative
and highly significant, consistent with our model. In short, it points to the inter-
pretation that a higher exposure to UK uncertainty is linked to lower investment
spending following the 2016 Brexit vote. We move to our baseline specification
in column (2), which considers the non-negative range of βUKi partitioned in ter-
ciles. The model includes time-varying industry-fixed effects by way of interacting
Hoberg and Phillips (2016) industries (FIC 100) and calendar-quarter dummy vari-
ables. The Post×High βUKi coefficient is again negative and statistically significant.
Finally, we consider our text-based approach to measure firm-level exposure to the
UK in column (3). The Post× High 10-K Entries DID coefficient is once again neg-
ative. The investment reductions reported in all of these estimations are not only
statistically, but also economically significant. Given that the pre-Brexit (2015) av-
erage investment was 1.1% of firms’ assets, the DID estimate of –0.165 implies a
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drop of up to 15% in investment rates.26 As a first-order approximation, the dol-
lar magnitude of aggregate investment cuts implied by this estimate is around $2
billion.27 In all, estimates under columns (1) through (3) show that following the
Brexit vote victory, UK-exposed American firms significantly cut their investment
vis-à-vis non-UK-exposed counterparts.
The impact of the Brexit vote on corporate employment is also reported in Ta-
ble 3.2. Using the specifications previously adopted, columns from (4) through (6)
display negative and significant DID coefficients for employment growth. The es-
timated coefficients imply a drop of between 2.6 and 4.9 percentage points. Given
that pre-Brexit (2015) sample average employment growth was 3.4%, our results
suggest that the Brexit vote contributed to a measurable slowdown in net job cre-
ation in some segments of the US economy, with the upper bound estimate point-
ing to a reduction in employment for UK-exposed firms. This is a notable finding
given the steady growth in employment observed across the US economy since
2010, particularly during 2016.
Next, we study the effects of the Brexit vote on UK-exposed firms’ innovation
policies. Columns (1) through (3) of Table 3.3 show that, for all specifications of
UK-exposure, there is a positive and highly significant response of R&D spending
to Brexit. This result is consistent with the growth-options channel discussed in our
model. The results for R&D are also economically significant, reaching an increase
of 0.24 percentage points relative to the pre-Brexit average of 3.2% of assets.
Finally, we look into the effects of the Brexit vote on UK-exposed firms’ disin-
vestment (the sales of plant, property and equipment scaled by lagged total assets).
Columns (4) through (6) of Table 3.3 suggest that Brexit led to substantial reduc-
tions in divestitures for UK-exposed firms. The magnitudes here are notable, with a
decline of up to 0.03 percentage points, representing 33% of the average divestiture
rate of the pre-Brexit period. Confirming our model’s predictions, Brexit-induced
uncertainty led to a reduction in both capital investment and disinvestment by af-
fected US firms.
26Under an analogous treatment scheme using the Campbell-Shiller decomposition-adjusted sen-
sitivity, βUKi,CF (in place of β
UK
i ), the DID estimate for investment is –0.330. Results for all outcome
variables under this treatment scheme are shown in Appendix Table C.5.
27The 449 firms in the top tercile of βUKi had average assets of $2.81 billion in 2016:Q2. A decline
in their investment-to-assets ratio of 0.165 percentage points implies a drop in investment of $4.64
million per firm, or $2.08 billion in total.
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Figure 3.6. Corporate Investment Trends around Brexit-related Events. This figure displays
coefficients of investment regressions for the timeline of the main events related to Brexit. The
shaded area marks the beginning of Brexit-related events, with the announcement of the date of
the UK–EU Referendum (2016:Q1).
Effect Duration
We also look at the duration of the 2016 Brexit vote impact. Figure 3.6 extends the
period of our baseline sample from 2015:Q1 through 2017:Q3, one full year after
the Referendum. The figure plots the difference between investment regression co-
efficients (and 95% confidence intervals) from UK-exposed versus non-UK-exposed
firms (refer to the estimation under column (2) of Table 3.2). The significant dif-
ference in investment rates across those two groups of firms taking place in 2016
confirms our previous findings. Consistent with our model, Brexit-induced uncer-
tainty led to a significant, yet temporary, drop in investment for affected US firms
for a period of three quarters, followed by a rebound to near normalcy in the fol-
lowing three quarters. This “drop and rebound” behavior is salient and matches
a pattern of domestic uncertainty shocks discussed in Bloom (2009). Conveniently,
the figure also illustrates the presence of parallel trends in the pre-Brexit invest-
ment of both groups of firms. This is a reassuring finding for our proposed DID
framework. In the Appendix C.3, we provide additional evidence supporting the
parallel trends assumption for all of our outcome variables.
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3.5.5 Result Characterization
The Effect of Input Irreversibility
We turn to the analysis of adjustment costs in modulating the effect of uncertainty
on investment and employment as a way to more finely characterize our results
(cf. Hypotheses 4 and 5 from our model). We begin by looking at fixed capital ad-
justment costs. We do so introducing a firm-level proxy for capital investment re-
versibility; namely, the Kim and Kung (2016) asset redeployability index. Columns
(1) through (3) of Table 3.4 show results on the amplification effect of capital adjust-
ment costs. In column (1), we run the DID estimation that considers firms in the
top tercile of βUKi as the treatment group. In this first run, we restrict the sample to
firms with high irreversibility, as defined by the bottom tercile of the Kim and Kung
index. The DID coefficient is negative and highly significant. The same exercise
is repeated in column (2), but for the subsample of firms in the top tercile of asset
redeployability; that is, firms with plausibly less irreversible investment. The DID
coefficient is insignificant for this group of firms. The estimation under column (3)
uses the entire sample of firms, introducing a dummy variable High Irreversibility
that equals one if the firm is in the high irreversibility group. The coefficient on
this variable can be interpreted as a third difference in a differences-test frame-
work, that is, as a Difference-in-Difference-in-Differences (DIDID) estimate. The
coefficient for the triple interaction in column (3) is negative and highly significant,
implying that cross-group responses are economically and statistically distinct, in
line with the prediction of Hypothesis 4 of our model.
We next turn to the impact of labor adjustment costs, using industry-level union-
ization rates as a proxy for such costs. Columns (4) through (6) of Table 3.4 show
that the response of firms in more unionized industries is significantly different
from that of firms in less unionized industries. This analysis suggests that the
effect of uncertainty on US corporate employment following the 2016 Brexit vote
was modulated by a real-options channel of input irreversibility, such as the one
emphasized by our model’s Hypothesis 5. In all, the results of Table 3.4 confirm
the theoretical prior that capital and labor adjustment costs modulated firms’ re-
sponses to Brexit-induced uncertainty.
112
Mapping Investment and Labor Cuts
Since we are looking at multinational firms, it is important that we identify whether
investment and job reductions occur within US borders or stem from cuts in foreign
operations. In this section, we first investigate whether investment cuts observed
amongst American firms exposed to the UK affected operations that take place in
the United States. We then look at the location of jobs affected by the Brexit vote.
The Location of Investment Cuts
We determine the location of investment cuts using data from Orbis. With these
data, we are able to conduct our baseline analysis on investment looking squarely
at US-based operations of companies domiciled in the United States. The total
number of US-based subsidiaries in our sample is 51,750. For each parent firm,
in each year, we compute their US-based investment by summing fixed capital
spending across their US subsidiaries. We then repeat the analysis of Table 3.2
using US-based investment as the dependent variable. Results in columns (1) and
(2) of Table 3.5 indicate that UK-exposed American firms cut investment in their
US-located subsidiaries in response to the Brexit vote. The magnitudes of the invest-
ment cuts are larger than those reported in Table 3.2 (annualized), implying that
effects on investment measured at the parent firm level are driven in large part by
investment cuts in their US operations.
As a further check, we investigate whether these UK-exposed American firms
cut investment in their UK-based subsidiaries as well. Using Orbis, we identify UK
subsidiaries of our US-domiciled firms. We similarly calculate the total UK-based
investment of each US parent firm by summing spending figures across UK sub-
sidiaries. We then repeat our baseline analysis with this measure of UK investment
as the dependent variable. Results in columns (3) and (4) of Table 3.5 suggest that
UK-exposed American firms cut investment in their UK-based subsidiaries even
more than they do across their US-based subsidiaries. This result is sensible and
consistent with a strong, direct effect of Brexit-induced uncertainty on UK-based
operations.
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The Location of Employment Cuts
We are also able to identify the location of employment cuts made by American
firms. We do this using the COMPUSTAT’s Historical Segments database and
job postings data from Burning Glass Technologies. Burning Glass data contain
firms’ new job postings and are particularly special in allowing us to look into
their marginal hiring decisions in the US; hence, how US-based job creation was
affected by the Brexit vote.
We first repeat the analysis of Table 3.2 using the sample of firms reporting US
segment employment. Results in columns (1) and (2) of Table 3.6 suggest that UK-
exposed American firms reduced their employment in the US following the Brexit
vote. The magnitude of the employment cuts reported in column (1) of Table 3.6 is
substantially larger than that reported in column (5) of Table 3.2, suggesting that ef-
fects on employment measured at the aggregate US-domiciled firm level are likely
to be driven by employment declines in their US-based operations. Notably, given
the incentives of firms to not disclose disaggregated employment information when
cutting domestic employment (see Beatty and Liao (2013)), the results in Table 3.2
may underestimate the true effect of the Brexit vote on US-based employment.
We next examine the effect of the Brexit vote on firms’ hiring decisions. To do
so, we repeat the tests of Table 3.2 using the log number of new job postings by
a firm as our dependent variable. We are also able to observe whether a given
job posting is part time or full time, allowing us to construct hiring measures for
both categories. Results in columns (3) and (4) of Table 3.6 show that UK-exposed
firms cut their new hiring in the US following the 2016 Brexit vote. The reported
DID coefficients suggest that the Brexit vote brought about reductions in American
firms’ new job offers of up to 5.5%. Breaking down new hiring into full-time and
part-time positions, results in columns (5) through (8) point to sharp cuts in full-
time hiring on the order of almost 7%, and an increase in part-time hiring of up
to 4.6% among UK-exposed firms in the two quarters following Brexit. Our results
imply that exposed firms substituted away from presumably costlier, more rigid
full-time hiring towards cheaper, more flexible part-time jobs in response to the
2016 Brexit vote.
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Input versus Output Channels
We next study whether the effect of Brexit-induced uncertainty on US corporate in-
vestment was driven by firms that were importers from the UK or exporters to the
UK. We do this using the index of firms’ offshoring activities developed by Hoberg
and Moon (2017). This index, derived from firms’ 10-K filings, counts mentions of
words related to the purchase of inputs (“Input”) and sale of outputs (“Output”)
from each country a firm does business with within a year. For each sample firm,
we compute the sum of the Input and Output indices associated with the UK over
the 2010–2014 period (similar to our βUKi estimation window). We consider each
of the Input and Output indices separately, as well as combined (Total). We define
as highly UK-offshoring-exposed firms those with a value of greater than five on a
given offshoring index.28 Control firms are those with scores of zero on the same
index.
The first two columns of Table 3.7 report our baseline results on the effects of
the Brexit vote on investment for ease of comparison, while the next three columns
report analogous results for treatment schemes based on offshoring activities to
the UK. The estimate in column (3) indicates that US firms with a high degree of
total offshoring activity with the UK significantly cut their investment relative to
US firms with no UK offshoring. The magnitude of this effect is remarkably similar
to those of our base tests. In columns (4) and (5), we consider Input and Output
indices separately. This more detailed analysis is important in revealing that the
aggregate cut in investment that we identified was driven by firms with high In-
put exposure to the UK. A closer examination of disclosure data reveals that these
firms have more operations in the UK (e.g., manufacturing units), utilizing labor,
capital, and raw material inputs from the UK. The effect on the investment of US
firms with high Output exposure to the UK is zero. These results suggest that
input-based economic links play a crucial role in the cross-country transmission of
uncertainty and its effects on corporate investment and hiring decisions.
28While this threshold is arbitrary and meant to follow our previous approach to textual-search-
based measurement of exposure to the UK, results are robust to alternative choices.
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3.5.6 Other Firm Policies and Outcomes
We also study how the 2016 Brexit vote affected other firms’ policies, especially
their liquidity management. We do so looking at how firms adjusted their cash
holdings and non-cash working capital (NWC). The positive and highly significant
coefficients in columns (1) and (2) in Table 3.8 show that UK-exposed firms in-
creased their cash savings in the face of higher uncertainty induced by the Brexit
vote. Negative and highly significant coefficients in columns (3) and (4) show that
firms concomitantly accumulated less inventory by adjusting their NWC down-
wards. Although not explicitly modeled in our framework, this behavior is consis-
tent with the theoretical underpinnings from the liquidity management literature.
In particular, precautionary behavior will lead firms to change the composition of
assets on their balance sheets, leading to the accumulation of the most liquid assets.
We further use Table 3.8 to report results on profit growth. The estimates in
columns (5) and (6) are not statistically significant, suggesting that the Brexit vote
did not affect the profitability of UK-exposed American firms relative to those of
non-exposed firms. They support the idea that the investment and employment
drops previously reported are arguably due to a “second-moment” shock to income
uncertainty, rather than a negative “first-moment” shock to firms’ cash flows.
3.5.7 Financing Costs
We next investigate whether any of the effects we observe may be attributable to
UK-exposed firms experiencing higher financing costs as a result of heightened un-
certainty induced by the Brexit vote. Prior work has shown that periods of higher
uncertainty are associated with increased credit spreads, which may lead firms to
curtail investment (Gilchrist et al. (2014)). We accommodate for this channel in our
analysis by accounting for several proxies of a firm’s ability to raise financing in
the debt and equity markets following the Brexit vote. In particular, we re-estimate
the analysis of Table 3.2 controlling for yields on existing bonds (obtained from
TRACE), yields on new bond issues (from SDC), mark-ups on new syndicated
loans (from DealScan), and for the discount rate news component of returns (from
the decomposition of returns news into cash flow news and discount rate news
components as in Vuolteenaho (2002)).
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Results in Table 3.9 indicate that our findings continue to obtain when accounting
for possible tightening of firms’ financing costs. Results in columns (1) and (2), for
instance, produce a range of estimated DID coefficients of between –0.07 and –
0.17 which are virtually identical to those in columns (2) and (3) of Table 3.2. Our
evidence suggests that observed investment cuts are driven primarily by the real-
options channel, and are not subsumed by firms’ financing costs.
3.5.8 Robustness
Examining Trumpit
One could be concerned about confounding uncertainty effects associated with the
election of President Donald Trump in the United States. We address this issue in
two different ways. First, we consider an alternative event window that excludes
2016:Q4 from our treatment evaluation period. This narrower time window helps
mitigate concerns that forward-looking behavior of firms regarding Trump’s elec-
tion in the US could influence our results (Trump’s victory was an unlikely event
as of 2016:Q3). Accordingly, we compare the third quarter of 2016 with the same
quarter of 2015. As shown in columns (1) and (2) of Table 3.10, results are sim-
ilar to our baseline estimates in Table 3.2. The patterns we report are consistent
with our model’s prediction of relatively short-lived, “drop and rebound” effects
of uncertainty.
Second, we look at the recent literature on the effect of Trump’s election on US
firms. Wagner et al. (2018) detail a methodology identifying what the authors label
as “winners” and “losers” from that election. We use their method, which is based
on 10-day cumulative CAPM-adjusted abnormal stock returns around the Trump
election date, to check for the presence of either of these sets of firms in our sample.
Our treatment group based on βUKi (10-K mentions) contains 57 (23) “loser” firms.
In columns (3) and (4) of Table 3.10, we replicate our baseline tests on investment
omitting firms labeled as “losers” by Wagner et al. (2018); that is, firms that might
invest less because of Trump’s election. The estimates show that our inferences are
unaffected by these firms.29




We also address concerns that our test design is set up in a way that may generate
results not necessarily tied to the June 2016 Referendum result. In doing so, we re-
estimate our tests considering two “treatment periods” that occurred prior to the
2016 Brexit vote: (1) David Cameron’s election as Prime Minister (2015:Q3); and
(2) the US Debt Ceiling Crisis of 2011 (2011:Q2–2011:Q4). The first falsification test
mitigates concerns that firms already anticipated the process leading to the Brexit
Referendum at the time of Cameron’s election. The second addresses concerns that
our investment results could also be driven by episodes of uncertainty in the US
— and not the UK — that affect global firms in general. As shown in columns (5)
through (8) of Table 3.10, the relevant DID coefficients are statistically insignificant
in all such cases.
Uncertainty in the Global Economy
We conduct a battery of supplementary tests to rule out the possibility that our
results on investment cuts in the US may be driven by coincident, potentially
uncertainty-inducing events that take place in economies other than the UK. To
do so, we construct metrics analogous to our baseline UK-exposure measure, βUKi ,
by re-estimating Eq. (3.19) for developed and emerging markets with relevant
trade ties to the US: EU, China, Mexico, Japan, India, and Brazil. In other words,







i , and β
Brazil
i — according to the sensitivity of their equity re-
turns volatility to the respective region’s main equity index return volatility. In this
estimation, performed over the same pre-Brexit sample period of 2010:M1 through
2014:M12, we control for the FTSE100 volatility, the US dollar/British pound ex-
change rate volatility, and the volatility in the exchange rate of the US dollar and
the currency of each country.
Results are reported in Table 3.11. Column (1) repeats our baseline estimate
from Table 3.2 to ease comparisons. In column (2), we find that American firms
exposed to EU uncertainty also experienced significant declines in investment. The
much smaller βEUi estimate is sensible and consistent with the fact that Brexit-
related events induced political uncertainty in the EU as well as the UK. Results in
columns (3) through (6) show that American firms exposed to uncertainty in sev-
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eral other economies experienced no significant change in their investments in the
quarters following the announcement of the Brexit Referendum. Our main results
are unlikely to be driven by American firms’ exposures to events other than the
2016 Brexit vote in the UK.
3.6 Concluding Remarks
Political uncertainty appears to be a growing phenomenon, seemingly fueled by
populism and a rejection of institutions associated with international finance, mi-
gration, and trade. This dynamic seems to be economically important, yet our
understanding of its consequences is limited. In this paper, we provide firm-level
evidence of transmission of uncertainty generated by the 2016 Brexit Referendum
onto American corporations. Our analysis shows how US firms that were exposed
to the UK economy changed a myriad of business policies — including their invest-
ment, hiring, R&D, and savings — in response to 2016 Brexit vote. As the British
anti-integration Referendum has reportedly inspired similar national-centric move-
ments in other countries, it is important that researchers and policy makers are able
to gauge its larger implications.
Our results show how foreign-born uncertainty is transmitted across borders,
shaping domestic capital formation and labor allocation. Yet, the effects we iden-
tify on UK-exposed firms in the US are likely only a few of the many channels
through which economic uncertainty is transmitted across borders. One must bear
in mind that the 2016 Brexit Referendum set in motion a complex process that is
bound to last for several years and affect many other countries connected through
the global economy. One of the important aspects of our analysis is shedding light
on the fact that politicians and regulators can affect the economy not only through
policies they enact, but also by introducing uncertainty in the process of making
decisions. Such uncertainty has real and financial consequences not only for the
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Additional Results and Details of Chapter 1
Table A.1. Indirect Effects: Suppliers receive a greater number of payments from Treated
Customers
This table reports output from Equation (1.3). The dependent variable is the number of payments
received by a supplier from its customers (instead of its real value). Customer controls include age,
size, and credit rating. As detailed in Figure 1.6, in column (1), we use a time window of 1 year after
versus 1 year before the Lehman bankruptcy. In column (2), we expand the time window to include
2 years before and 2 years after. In column (3), the time window is expanded to 3 years before and
after. Statistical significance levels: *** p-value<0.01, ** p-value<0.05, * p-value<0.10.
Dependent Variable Log(Number of Payments)
Downstream DID: (Inflow to a Supplier from Treated vs. Non-Treated Customers)
(1) (2) (3)
DID Period 2009 vs. 2007 2010:2009 vs. 2007:2006 2011:2009 vs. 2007:2005
(±1 Year) (±2 Years) (±3 Years)
Govc × Postt 0.016*** 0.032** 0.037***
(0.002) (0.016) (0.012)
Customer Controls
Age –0.021* 0.002 –0.005
(0.012) (0.005) (0.007)
Size 0.025*** 0.021*** 0.022***
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Credit Rating 0.001 0.002*** 0.002***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Fixed Effects
Customer Yes Yes Yes
Supplier×Year Yes Yes Yes
Clustered SE Supplier, Year Supplier, Year Supplier, Year
N. Observations 3,754,746 7,889,679 12,430,443
R-Squared 0.487 0.520 0.511
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Table A.2. Indirect Effects: Customers make a greater number of payments to Treated
Suppliers
This table reports output from Equation (1.4), using as dependent variable the number of payments
sent by a customer to its suppliers (instead of its real value). The coefficient of interest is the
Difference-in-Differences (DID) estimator given by the interaction Govs × Postt. Govs is an
indicator variable that equals one if supplier s is government-credit-dependent (i.e., if its share of
credit with government banks is greater than the median), and is zero otherwise. Postt is an
indicator variable with value of one if year t ≥ 2009 and zero if t ≤ 2007. The year of 2008 is not
included in the event study window for being the year of Lehman Brothers’ failure. Supplier
controls include age, size, and credit rating. As detailed in Figure 1.6, in column (1), we use a time
window of 1 year after versus 1 year before the Lehman bankruptcy. In column (2), we expand the
time window to include 2 years before and 2 years after. In column (3), the time window is
expanded to 3 years before and after. Statistical significance levels: *** p-value<0.01, **
p-value<0.05, * p-value<0.10.
Dependent Variable Log(Number of Payments)
Upstream DID: (Outflow from a Customer to Treated vs. Non-Treated Supplier)
(1) (2) (3)
DID Period 2009 vs. 2007 2010:2009 vs. 2007:2006 2011:2009 vs. 2007:2005
(±1 Year) (±2 Years) (±3 Years)
Govs × Postt 0.020*** 0.031*** 0.041***
(0.000) (0.008) (0.010)
Supplier Controls
Age –0.016** –0.020*** –0.017***
(0.008) (0.002) (0.001)
Size 0.030*** 0.027*** 0.027***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Credit Rating 0.003 0.005** 0.004***
(0.003) (0.002) (0.001)
Fixed Effects
Supplier Yes Yes Yes
Customer×Year Yes Yes Yes
Clustered SE Customer, Year Customer, Year Customer, Year
N. Observations 4,183,704 8,779,779 13,858,964
R-Squared 0.451 0.425 0.413
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Table A.3. Indirect Effects: Suppliers do not receive greater average payments from
Treated Customers
This table reports output from Equation (1.4), using as dependent variable the average value of
payments sent by a customer to its suppliers (constructed as the log of real payments/number of
payments). The dependent variable is the log of real payments received by a supplier from its
customers. The coefficient of interest is the Difference-in-Differences estimator given by the
interaction Govc × Postt. Govc is an indicator variable that equals one if customer c is
government-credit-dependent (i.e., if its share of credit with government banks is greater than the
median), and is zero otherwise. Postt is an indicator variable with value of one if year t ≥ 2009
and zero if t ≤ 2007. The year of 2008 is not included in the event study window for being the year
of Lehman Brothers’ failure. Customer controls include age, size, and credit rating. As detailed in
Figure 1.6, in column (1), we use a time window of 1 year after versus 1 year before the Lehman
bankruptcy. In column (2), we expand the time window to include 2 years before and 2 years after.
In column (3), the time window is expanded to 3 years before and after. Statistical significance
levels: *** p-value<0.01, ** p-value<0.05, * p-value<0.10.
Dependent Variable Log(Average Payment)
Downstream DID: (Inflow to a Supplier from Treated vs. Non-Treated Customers)
(1) (2) (3)
DID Period 2009 vs. 2007 2010:2009 vs. 2007:2006 2011:2009 vs. 2007:2005
(±1 Year) (±2 Years) (±3 Years)
Govc × Postt 0.006 0.000 –0.003
(0.004) (0.008) (0.006)
Customer Controls
Age 0.048*** 0.015 0.031**
(0.002) (0.011) (0.012)
Size –0.001 0.002 0.006*
(0.001) (0.002) (0.003)
Credit Rating 0.008*** 0.011*** 0.012***
(0.001) (0.003) (0.003)
Fixed Effects
Customer Yes Yes Yes
Supplier×Year Yes Yes Yes
Clustered SE Supplier, Year Supplier, Year Supplier, Year
N. Observations 3,754,746 7,889,679 12,430,443
R-Squared 0.584 0.572 0.569
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Table A.4. Indirect Effects: Customers increase their average payment to Treated Suppliers
This table reports output from Equation (1.4), using as dependent variable the average value of
payments sent by a customer to its suppliers (constructed as the log of real payments/number of
payments). The coefficient of interest is the Difference-in-Differences (DID) estimator given by the
interaction Govs × Postt. Govs is an indicator variable that equals one if supplier s is
government-credit-dependent (i.e., if its share of credit with government banks is greater than the
median), and is zero otherwise. Postt is an indicator variable with value of one if year t ≥ 2009
and zero if t ≤ 2007. The year of 2008 is not included in the event study window for being the year
of Lehman Brothers’ failure. Supplier controls include age, size, and credit rating. As detailed in
Figure 1.6, in column (1), we use a time window of 1 year after versus 1 year before the Lehman
bankruptcy. In column (2), we expand the time window to include 2 years before and 2 years after.
In column (3), the time window is expanded to 3 years before and after. Statistical significance
levels: *** p-value<0.01, ** p-value<0.05, * p-value<0.10.
Dependent Variable Log(Average Payment)
Upstream DID: (Outflow from a Customer to Treated vs. Non-Treated Suppliers)
(1) (2) (3)
DID Period 2009 vs. 2007 2010:2009 vs. 2007:2006 2011:2009 vs. 2007:2005
(±1 Year) (±2 Years) (±3 Years)
Govs × Postt 0.009*** 0.005* 0.005**
(0.000) (0.003) (0.002)
Supplier Controls
Age 0.010*** –0.001 –0.001
(0.000) (0.002) (0.001)
Size 0.013*** 0.016*** 0.017***
(0.000) (0.003) (0.002)
Credit Rating 0.008*** 0.009*** 0.010***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
Fixed Effects
Supplier Yes Yes Yes
Customer×Year Yes Yes Yes
Clustered SE Customer, Year Customer, Year Customer, Year
N. Observations 4,183,704 8,779,779 13,858,964
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table A.7. Robustness: Market Power of a Customer, Survivor Suppliers Subsample
This table reports output from Equation (1.3), conditioning on the sample of suppliers that survive
the Global Financial Crisis. The dependent variable is the share of payments that a customer has
with respect to its suppliers’ total payments. This share of payments is interpreted as a measure of
the market power of the customer. The coefficient of interest is the Difference-in-Differences
estimator given by the interaction Govc × Postt. Govc is an indicator variable that equals one if
customer c is government-credit-dependent (i.e., if its share of credit with government banks is
greater than the median), and is zero otherwise. Postt is an indicator variable with value of one if
year t ≥ 2009 and zero if t ≤ 2007. The year of 2008 is not included in the event study window for
being the year of Lehman Brothers’ failure. Customer controls include age, size, and credit rating.
As detailed in Figure 1.6, in column (1), we use a time window of 1 year after versus 1 year before
the Lehman bankruptcy. In column (2), we expand the time window to include 2 years before and
2 years after. In column (3), the time window is expanded to 3 years before and after. Statistical
significance levels: *** p-value<0.01, ** p-value<0.05, * p-value<0.10.
Dependent Variable Share of Payments of a Customer with its Survivor Suppliers
(Market Power of Customer)
(1) (2) (3)
DID Period 2009 vs. 2007 2010:2009 vs. 2007:2006 2011:2009 vs. 2007:2005
(±1 Year) (±2 Years) (±3 Years)
Govc × Postt 0.001*** 0.004 0.003
(0.000) (0.003) (0.003)
Customer Controls
Age –0.003*** 0.001 0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Size 0.004*** 0.005*** 0.005***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Credit Rating 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Fixed Effects
Customer Yes Yes Yes
Supplier×Year Yes Yes Yes
Clustered SE Supplier, Year Supplier, Year Supplier, Year
N. Observations 2,470,728 5,264,289 8,406,959
R-Squared 0.832 0.818 0.808
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Table A.8. Robustness: Market Power of a Supplier, Survivor Customers Subsample
This table reports output from Equation (1.4), conditioning on the sample of customers that survive
the Global Financial Crisis. The dependent variable is the share of payments that a supplier has
with respect to its customers’ total payments. This share of payments is interpreted as a measure
of the market power of the supplier. The coefficient of interest is the Difference-in-Differences
(DID) estimator given by the interaction Govs × Postt. Govs is an indicator variable that equals one
if supplier s is government-credit-dependent (i.e., if its share of credit with government banks is
greater than the median), and is zero otherwise. Postt is an indicator variable with value of one if
year t ≥ 2009 and zero if t ≤ 2007. The year of 2008 is not included in the event study window for
being the year of Lehman Brothers’ failure. Supplier controls include age, size, and credit rating. As
detailed in Figure 1.6, in column (1), we use a time window of 1 year after versus 1 year before the
Lehman bankruptcy. In column (2), we expand the time window to include 2 years before and 2
years after. In column (3), the time window is expanded to 3 years before and after. Statistical
significance levels: *** p-value<0.01, ** p-value<0.05, * p-value<0.10.
Dependent Variable Share of Payments of a Supplier with its Survivor Customers
(Market Power of Supplier)
(1) (2) (3)
DID Period 2009 vs. 2007 2010:2009 vs. 2007:2006 2011:2009 vs. 2007:2005
(±1 Year) (±2 Years) (±3 Years)
Govs × Postt 0.002*** 0.004*** 0.006***
(0.000) (0.001) (0.002)
Supplier Controls
Age 0.000 –0.001 –0.001
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Size 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Credit Rating 0.001* 0.001** 0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Fixed Effects
Supplier Yes Yes Yes
Customer×Year Yes Yes Yes
Clustered SE Customer, Year Customer, Year Customer, Year
N. Observations 2,793,409 5,939,501 9,498,460



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table A.10. Robustness: Propensity-Score Matching
This table reports output from estimating our baseline regressions of the indirect effects of credit
shocks with a propensity-score matched sample. Panel A shows the supplier-centered regression
(refer to Table 1.4) and Panel B shows the customer-centered regression (refer to Table 1.5).
Statistical significance levels: *** p-value<0.01, ** p-value<0.05, * p-value<0.10.
Panel A. Supplier-Centered Matched Regressions
Dependent Variable Log(Real Payments)
Downstream DID: (Inflow to a Supplier from Treated vs. Matched Control Customer)
(1) (2) (3)
DID Period 2009 vs. 2007 2010:2009 vs. 2007:2006 2011:2009 vs. 2007:2005
(±1 Year) (±2 Years) (±3 Years)
Govc × Postt 0.089*** 0.162*** 0.215***
(0.006) (0.018) (0.091)
Fixed Effects
Supplier×Year Yes Yes Yes
Clustered SE Supplier, Year Supplier, Year Supplier, Year
N. Observations 700,307 1,349,143 1,900,276
R-Squared 0.396 0.404 0.414
Panel B. Customer-Centered Matched Regressions
Dependent Variable Log(Real Payments)
Upstream DID: (Outflow from a Customer to Treated vs. Matched Control Supplier)
(1) (2) (3)
DID Period 2009 vs. 2007 2010:2009 vs. 2007:2006 2011:2009 vs. 2007:2005
(±1 Year) (±2 Years) (±3 Years)
Govs × Postt 0.038*** 0.032*** 0.039**
(0.004) (0.006) (0.018)
Fixed Effects
Customer×Year Yes Yes Yes
Clustered SE Customer, Year Customer, Year Customer, Year
N. Observations 1,187,721 2,302,609 3,254,469
R-Squared 0.204 0.215 0.225
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Appendix B
Additional Results and Details of Chapter 2
B.1 Data Sources
Political Conflict: Monthly Reconstruction of Banks’ (1976) Dataset We construct
a US-monthly version of the classical Cross-Polity Time-Series annual data set originally col-
lected by Banks (1976) for more than 160 countries. The data set is widely used in political
science, economics, as well as other social sciences. The Cross-Polity Times Series data set is
currently updated every year by Databanks International. The current version of the data is
available for purchase at www.cntsdata.com. We use the original sources adopted by Banks
(1976) to convert his annual database into a monthly measure for the following types of
political events: anti-government demonstrations, assassinations, general strikes, and riots.
Specifically, we primarily relied on the search engine for the New York Times to pinpoint the
monthly date of anti-government demonstrations, assassinations, general strikes, and riots.
Housing Market: City-Level and Aggregate Value of Building Permits Data are
taken from various issues of Dun & Bradstreet’s Review. The aggregated series is the sum of
city-level data. The index is based on a consistent set of 215 cities for period 1928–1938.
Stock Market Return Volatility We follow Schwert (1989) and calculate stock volatility
as the sample standard deviation of the S&P index returns aggregated monthly from daily
data.
Market Value of Corporate Leverage The market value of leverage is taken from the
Moody’s Manuals of Investments (Industrials and Railways). The data were provided by John
Graham and Mark Leary. They calculate the market value of leverage as (Debt/Debt +
Market Equity) for non-financial firms. We convert their data from annual to monthly for
the period 1925:M1–1938:M12 using linear interpolation.
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Corporate Headquarters Corporate headquarters and main office locations for all CRSP
firms were hand-collected from the Moody’s Manuals of Investments. We used all non-
government manuals (i.e., Industrials, Banks and Financials, Public Utilities, and Railways)
to ensure the coverage of all sectors.
Macroeconomic Time Series All aggregate time series in our analysis were obtained
from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis’s FRED or the NBER Macrohistory databases
unless otherwise noted.
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B.2 Building Permits and New York City Skyscrapers
We ran a series of 24-month rolling regressions using only lags of leverage and the volatil-
ity of building permit growth as explanatory variables. Figure B.1 reports the R-squared
for the rolling regressions using the aggregate building permit series and the aggregate
building permit series excluding New York City. The R-squared of the rolling regression
for the aggregate permit series is particularly high during the Great Depression, rising to
more than 90 percent as the moving window begins to include data at the onset of the
Great Depression. The R-squared during the Great Depression is lower if the building per-
mit series for New York City is not included in the empirical analysis. Following the Great
Depression, the statistical fit of the two rolling regressions is less sensitive to the build-
ing series employed for the empirical analysis. The results suggest that the boom in New
York City “skyscraper permits” is important for predicting the onset of the Great Depres-
sion. However, the volatility of building permit growth remains a statistically significant
predictor of stock volatility even if the New York City building permits are not included.
(A) All Cities
(B) All Cities Except NYC
Figure B.1. R-Squared Value of 24-month Rolling Regressions. The figures show the R-squared
values for rolling 24-month window regressions of Stock Volatility on lags of financial leverage
(Lev) and volatility of building permit growth (Permit Vol). The only difference between panels A
and B is that the time series used to calculate Permit Vol in Panel B subtracts New York City
permits from the original 215 aggregate permits series used in Panel A. The two vertical black
lines indicate NBER recession dates of the Great Depression.
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B.3 Time Series Data of Political Conflict
Below we present detailed time series data of political conflict, as reconstructed from the






















Figure B.2. Monthly Frequency of Important Political Events, 1928:M1–1938:M12. The shaded
areas in all panels is the Great Depression as defined by the NBER. Appendix B.1 describes in
detail how each type of event is defined according to the Banks (1976) methodology.
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B.4 Robustness to Influential Observations and Outliers
Our baseline Building Permit Model is estimated using three different methods known to
alleviate the influence of outliers: data winsorization (Column 1), median quantile regres-
sion (Column 2), and Markov-switching dynamic regression (Columns 3a and 3b). Results
are in Table B.1 below.
Table B.1. Robustness: Sensitivity to Influential Observations and Outliers
The table displays the estimates of our baseline model (Building Permit Model) using methods
known for dealing with influential observations or outliers. Column 1 estimates the model with all
variables winsorized at the 1% level. Column 2 uses quantile regression methods to estimate
median quantile coefficients. Columns 3a and 3b show the coefficients of a Markov-switching
dynamic regression for which two states are modeled: high volatility (state 1) and low volatility
(state 2). Columns 1 and 2 use 7 lags of each variable as selected by the AIC, whereas columns 3a
and 3b use one lag of each variable in the switching state-space equation to estimate a
parsimonious regime-switching model and avoid maximum likelihood convergence problems.
Coefficients are the sum of all lags of a variable, and p-values in parentheses refer to
joint-significance F tests. Significance levels: * p <0.10, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01.
Baseline Sample [1] [2] [3a] [3b]
Dep. Variable: Stock Vol 1%–Winsorized Median Quantile Markov-Switching Markov-Switching
Regression Regression Dynamic Regression Dynamic Regression
Building Permit Building Permit Building Permit Building Permit
Model Model Model Model
Lags of Variable: R2 = 0.73 Pseudo R2 = 0.52 State 1: Low Volatility State 2: High Volatility
Stock Vol 0.452*** 0.473*** 0.435*** 0.628***
(Std. Dev. of Stock Ret) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Lev 0.058*** 0.055* 0.032*** 0.000
(Market Leverage) (0.000) (0.075) (0.003) (0.290)
Permit Vol 0.052*** 0.049*** 0.013* 0.075***
(Building Permit Growth Vol) (0.005) (0.000) (0.083) (0.002)
Seasonal Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
N. Observations 132 132 132 132
B.5 NBER-Defined Great Depression Sub-sample
Table B.2 presents our baseline specifications for the Great Depression sub-sample (1929:M8–














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































B.6 Arellano-Bond Estimation of Expanded
Cross-Sections
Below we present the Arellano and Bond (1991) GMM estimation of dynamic panels for
the expanded cross-section of industries (using the Fama–French 17 classification) and for
the expanded cross-section of states (using the top 10 states in number of corporate head-
quarters). Results are shown in Table B.3.
Table B.3. Cross-Sectional Expanded Samples: Arellano-Bond Dynamic GMM Estimation
The table displays the estimates of our baseline model (Building Permit Model) using the Dynamic
Panel GMM method of Arellano and Bond (1991). We limit GMM instruments up to three lags to
avoid the instrument proliferation problem, as discussed by Roodman (2009). Significance levels: *
p <0.10, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01.
Expanded Cross-Sections [1] [2]
Baseline Sample (1928:M1–1938:M12) Sectoral Expansion Geographical Expansion
Dep. Variable: Stock Vol (17 Fama–French (Top 10 States by number of
Industries) Corporate Headquarters)
Building Permit Building Permit
Lags of Variable: Model Model
Stock Vol 0.319*** 0.356***
(Std. Dev. of Stock Returns) (0.000) (0.000)
Lev 0.221*** 0.155***
(Market Leverage) (0.000) (0.000)
Permit Vol 0.072*** 0.026***
(Building Permit Growth Volatility) (0.000) (0.000)
Seasonal Dummies Yes Yes
N. Observations 2,516 1,240
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Appendix C
Additional Results and Details of Chapter 3
C.1 Proofs
C.1.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. Let us define
H(n∗) = vi1 + E [vi2]− (κ + λ)n∗ −E [max (vi2 − (κ + λ)n∗, 0)] .
To guarantee the existence of n∗ as characterized by (3.8), it suffices to show that
H(n∗) = 0 for some n∗ ∈ [0, N]. Since H(·) is a sum of continuous functions, it is
itself continuous. Since vi1 > 0 and vi2 > 0, it follows that:
H(0) = vi1 + E [vi2]−E [max(vi2, 0)] = vi1 > 0.





(vi1 + E [vi2]− (κ + λ)N) + lim
N→∞
(E [max (vi2 − (κ + λ)N, 0)])
= −∞ + 0 = −∞.
Thus, there must exist an N̄ ∈ R such that, for N > N̄, H(N̄) < 0. Putting these
conditions together with the continuity of H(·) over [0, N], the Intermediate Value
Theorem guarantees that there exists an n∗ ∈ [0, N] such that H(n∗) = 0.
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C.1.2 Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. Let us define
H(n∗; r) = vi1 + E [vi2]− (κ + λ)n∗ −E [max (vi2 − (κ + λ)n∗, 0) ; r] = 0







Considering first the derivative of H with respect to n∗, we have:
∂H(n∗; r)
∂n∗
= −(κ + λ)− ∂
∂n∗
E [max (vi2 − (κ + λ)n∗, 0) ; r]




max (vi2 − (κ + λ)n∗, 0) ; r
]
= −(κ + λ)−E [max (vi2 − (κ + λ), 0) ; r]
< 0.





E [max (vi2 − (κ + λ)n∗, 0) ; r] .











= E [J(vi2); r] .
Since max (vi2 − (κ + λ)n∗, 0) is convex in vi2, it follows that:
E
[
max (vi2 − (κ + λ)n∗, 0) ; r′
]











E [max (vi2 − (κ + λ)n∗, 0) ; r]
≤ 0.







C.1.3 Proof of Proposition 4
Proof. Let us define
H(n∗; κ) = vi1 + E [vi2]− (κ + λ)n∗ −E [max (vi2 − (κ + λ)n∗, 0)] = 0.











Next, considering the denominator,
∂H
∂κ
= −n∗ − ∂
∂κ





max (vi2 − (κ + λ)n∗, 0)
]
= −n∗ −E [max (vi2 − n∗, 0)]
< 0.
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C.1.4 Proof of Proposition 5
Proof. Symmetric to the case of capital.
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C.2 VAR Alternative Specifications
(A) BIC-selected lag order (1 lag)
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(B) Giannone et al. (2015)
hyperparameters
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Figure C.1. Robustness Impulse-Response Functions of US GDP. Each figure shows the
impulse of a 3.4-standard deviations shock to UK Economic Policy Uncertainty and its response on
US GDP with 68% confidence intervals.
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C.3 Additional Robustness Tests
Table C.1. Parallel Trends: Market-Based Approach
This table reports the average investment (Panel A), employment growth (Panel B), R&D (Panel C),
and divestitures (Panel D) for firms in the treated and control groups going back different periods
prior to Brexit. The treatment group is composed by the top tercile of βUKi , while the control group
is composed by firms in the bottom tercile of βUKi . The table also reports the differences in means
and the p-value associated with a test statistic for the differences.
Periods prior to Brexit Treated Control Difference p-value
Panel A (Quarterly Frequency): Investment
One 1.165 1.027 0.138 0.156
Two 1.184 0.942 0.242 0.153
Three 1.362 1.135 0.227 0.281
Four 1.100 1.381 –0.281 0.600
Five 1.433 1.115 0.318 0.369
Six 0.996 1.526 –0.530 0.380
Panel B (Annual Frequency): Employment Growth
One 3.794 3.906 –0.112 0.951
Two 9.723 4.812 4.911 0.369
Three 6.434 5.033 1.401 0.374
Four 9.265 5.217 4.048 0.126
Five 10.178 8.083 2.095 0.223
Six 8.113 8.985 –0.872 0.670
Panel C (Quarterly Frequency): R&D
One 4.441 2.641 1.800 0.317
Two 2.568 4.369 –1.801 0.311
Three 2.275 3.760 –1.485 0.434
Four 4.150 2.376 1.774 0.197
Five 4.342 2.399 1.943 0.221
Six 4.287 2.465 1.822 0.229
Panel D (Quarterly Frequency): Divestitures
One 0.076 0.057 0.019 0.234
Two 0.056 0.102 -0.046 0.748
Three 0.071 0.077 -0.006 0.710
Four 0.073 0.054 0.019 0.218
Five 0.071 0.054 0.017 0.289
Six 0.056 0.043 0.013 0.304
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Table C.2. Parallel Trends: Textual-Search-Based Approach
This table reports the average investment (Panel A), employment growth (Panel B), R&D (Panel C),
and divestitures (Panel D) for firms in the treated and control groups going back different periods
prior to Brexit. The treatment indicator is a textual-search-based measure of UK-exposure that
sums up the number of Brexit-related words in firms’ 2015 10-K forms. The treatment group is
made of firms with more than five entries, whereas the control group are firms with zero entries.
The table also reports the differences in means and the p-value associated with a test statistic for
the differences.
Periods prior to Brexit Treated Control Difference p-value
Panel A (Quarterly Frequency): Investment
One 0.958 1.064 –0.106 0.202
Two 0.930 1.047 –0.117 0.186
Three 1.124 1.203 –0.079 0.419
Four 1.174 1.090 0.084 0.348
Five 1.194 1.140 0.054 0.570
Six 1.110 1.122 –0.012 0.897
Panel B (Annual Frequency): Employment Growth
One 9.711 8.881 0.830 0.678
Two 11.400 13.321 –1.921 0.343
Three 7.600 6.290 1.310 0.448
Four 8.972 6.828 2.144 0.258
Five 10.286 10.076 0.210 0.914
Six 9.928 8.619 1.309 0.498
Panel C (Quarterly Frequency): R&D
One 4.972 5.334 –0.362 0.488
Two 4.830 5.054 –0.224 0.653
Three 4.230 4.218 0.012 0.979
Four 4.246 4.423 –0.177 0.683
Five 4.733 4.258 0.475 0.279
Six 4.263 4.419 –0.156 0.729
Panel D (Quarterly Frequency): Divestitures
One 0.051 0.059 -0.008 0.566
Two 0.062 0.058 0.004 0.783
Three 0.062 0.076 –0.014 0.297
Four 0.066 0.054 0.012 0.378
Five 0.055 0.038 0.017 0.165
Six 0.039 0.046 –0.007 0.578
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Table C.3. Summary Statistics: Matched Sample
This table reports mean values for the main variables used in our empirical analyses in the
matched sample. Each treated firm is matched to 3 control firms (with replacement) which are its
nearest neighbors in terms of treatment propensity. The propensity score is a function of lagged
returns, 1-quarter-ahead consensus earnings forecast, Tobin’s Q, cash flow, sales growth, and size.
Panel A shows summary statistics for the sample of treated and matched control firms as defined
by βUKi (top tercile of β
UK
i ). Panel B shows summary statistics for the sample of treated and
matched control firms as defined by mentions of Brexit-related words in their 2015 10-K filings.
The table also reports the differences in means and the p-value associated with a test statistic for
the differences.
Firm-Level Variables Treated Control Difference p-value
Panel A: Market-Based Approach
Investment 0.020 0.012 0.008 0.251
Employment Growth (Annual) 0.083 0.061 0.022 0.424
R&D 0.030 0.016 0.014 0.385
Divestitures (×100) 0.129 0.088 0.041 0.404
Cash Holdings 0.175 0.164 0.011 0.410
Non-Cash Working Capital 0.058 0.086 –0.028 0.272
Tobin’s Q 1.948 1.928 0.020 0.383
Cash Flow 0.016 0.032 –0.016 0.610
Size (Log Assets) 6.677 7.205 –0.528 0.528
Sales Growth 0.195 0.105 0.090 0.203
Consensus Earnings Forecast 0.023 0.025 –0.002 0.594
Stock Returns 0.021 0.038 –0.017 0.618
Panel B: Textual-Search-Based Approach
Investment 0.013 0.014 0.000 0.269
Employment Growth (Annual) 0.084 0.078 0.006 0.429
R&D 0.030 0.022 0.008 0.749
Divestitures (×100) 0.062 0.056 0.006 0.210
Cash Holdings 0.232 0.194 0.038 0.339
Non-Cash Working Capital 0.041 0.057 –0.016 0.522
Tobin’s Q 2.199 2.037 0.162 0.166
Cash Flow 0.018 0.021 –0.003 0.836
Size (Log Assets) 7.059 6.581 0.478 0.293
Sales Growth 0.162 0.167 –0.005 0.605
Consensus Earnings Forecast 0.055 0.023 0.032 0.137
Stock Returns 0.028 0.030 –0.002 0.758
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